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the US Army.
By
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Master of Science in Engineering and Management.
ABSTRACT
Under a charter from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the author participated
in a study of the military's behavioral health system for the purpose of determining
the means and effectiveness of that system for the treatment of PTSD and related
conditions. This work focuses on the architecture and means of control over the
existing arrangement of semi-independent enterprises, organized into functional
work groups that necessarily collaborate to provide a full spectrum of behavioral
health services to service members and their families.
The author suggests a rearrangement of the system architecture to enable integrated
work across organizational boundaries in order to reduce waste generated through
structural inefficiencies. Implementation of network architecture and control relies
heavily on the development of shared strategic objectives that direct network
processes in supporting overall organizational goals. Further, performance
measurement systems and stakeholder behavior change through use of incentives
are used as the drivers of inter-enterprise process development. Finally, a
governance structure, focused on development of integrative processes and
outcomes is established to foster inter-organizational relationships, direct process
improvement, and resolve system conflicts.
Thesis Supervisor: Jayakanth Srinivasan
Title: Research Scientist, Sociotechnical Systems Research Center
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Chapter 1 - Intent
1.1 Introduction and Research Objective
Government organizations' hierarchical structure, specifically that of the
military, is a critical component to its success in the active execution of its primary
mission, to overcome any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the
peace and security of the United States (U.S. House of Representatives, 2011). This
same organizational architecture, however, often inhibits the efficient and effective
execution of operations at home station due to the rigid adherence to functional
silos. This system of organizations generates significant process waste (Nightingale
and Srinivasan, 2010) through overlapping capabilities and duplication of effort.
The phenomenon is well observed in the interaction of the organizations on an
Army installation that provide behavioral health services to soldiers and their
families.
As a result of ten years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need for the
provision of behavioral health treatment is overwhelming. Approximately twenty
percent of the two million soldiers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan over the past
decade suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Dao, 2010), but the
Army's current system for preventing, recognizing, and treating this condition is
highly fragmented and not suited for providing the volume of treatment required by
veterans returning from combat. Each Army installation has an array of
organizations that contribute to the provision of behavioral health care, although
very few of these stakeholders have cooperative relationships or an agreed-upon
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common purpose. Structural inefficiencies (Nightingale and Srinivasan, 2010)
result from these organizations having separate and often incompatible purposes,
incentive systems, and governance structure; and they encounter difficulties in
working together, even in instances in which the stakeholders wish to cooperate.
The Department of Army recognizes that its soldiers are the Army, and not just
in the Army (Department of the Army, 2005), and it has an obligation to take care of
its most precious resource. Because of the great increase in soldiers' demand for
behavioral health services and the potentially catastrophic outcome of not treating
the condition, it is imperative that the Army eliminate waste within the system that
deliver on this need. Although integrating all of the stakeholders in the system's
architecture will not eliminate all waste, it is likely that cultivation of deliberate
value exchange relationships will enable a dramatic increase in the fidelity of
behavioral health services, reduction in process waste, and will enable identification
of other opportunities for waste reduction and increases in effectiveness.
This work has two fundamental objectives. The first is to define the current
state organizational architecture specific to the unit of analysis, an Army
installation. This will require an analysis of all of the stakeholders within the
behavioral health system, their processes, their incentives, and their interaction
with the system's other stakeholders. The second objective is to use the products
from the current state analysis to develop an idealized control architecture for
the system, giving particular attention to the governance structure, artifacts,
and policies required to manage this complex system. By completing these
objectives, the work should answer the question, "What are the critical components
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for generating coordinated, mutually beneficial, and customer-oriented behavior in
a public network?"
1.2 Expected Application of this Research
The immediate goal of this work is to provide a holistic assessment of the
structure of the Army's Behavioral Health System by a proven theoretical
framework as well as an implementable architectural solution that will allow all of
the system's stakeholders to achieve their own goals, but most importantly, to serve
soldiers and their families in a coordinated, efficient, and effective manner. The
military's budget is decreasing; however, the military healthcare budget is
increasing, partially in response to an all-time high demand for Behavioral Health
services (Department of the Army, 2012), and the Department of Defense has stated
that it is imperative that the military uses its resources in a more disciplined fashion
(Department of Defense, 2012). The application of lean enterprise principles to the
system is very likely to precipitate an expansion of capability through the
unification of effort and elimination of systemic waste.
Provision of behavioral health services unites, as this research will show,
stakeholders from all segments of the military, and it is likely that an integration
effort for this purpose will be scalable to other organizations and purposes. As
stated above, government organizations are designed as hierarchies, and
cooperation outside functional workgroups, although often necessary, is difficult
due to reporting structure and often-competing organizational goals. Military
organizations in particular are designed to work independently and to trust that
other organizations will execute their mission as defined by shared headquarters in
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support of one another. While this model is works well in combat operations, it
does not work well at home station where disparate reporting chains do not reach a
point of confluence at an operationally practical level. The outcome is that the
installation's organizations work alongside each other but are only informally
unified in purpose and effort. The military enterprise can greatly benefit from
adopting modern business enterprise techniques, and if it can apply lean enterprise
principles at the installation level, gaps and overlaps may be reduced, eliminating
structural inefficiencies and process wastes in its systems.
In addition to direct application, this work attempts to build on/continue the
work of the scholars who study organizational and system architecture, the
integration of stakeholders into an effective enterprise, and the governance of
enterprises and networks. Additionally, this thesis will serve to continue research
into organizations as systems, transformation of enterprises, systems thinking, and
holistic enterprise architecting.
1.3 Research Framework and Data Collection
This work utilizes, as its means of organization analysis, the Enterprise
Strategic Analysis for Transformation (Nightingale, Stanke, and Bryan, 2008). Using
this framework, the thesis examines the enterprise objectives, the stakeholders, and
processes, and performance metrics of the Army's Behavioral Health system.
Additionally, the thesis employs System Architecture (Crowley, 2011) tools to
examine the needs and goals of the stakeholders, as well as Enterprise Architecting
(Nightingale and Rhodes, 2011) concepts to holistically evaluate the functionality of
the enterprise and to determine the dominant drivers of the system's performance.
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The second half of the work, the development of an idealized future state,
will likewise use Enterprise Architecting tools, but will also incorporate a review of
literature regarding network governance to determine additional means that may
be required for the oversight and control of a multi-enterprise network.
The information that this thesis examines for defining the stakeholders,
processes, the enterprise(s), resources, and laws/policies is derived from two
primary sources. First, the examination of Army Regulations, Field Manuals, laws,
and public policy informed the work of the responsibilities and relationships of the
stakeholder organizations, as well as the hierarchical relationships, confluences of
the hierarchies, and mandated value exchanges. Second, the author conducted over
300 hours of interviews with stakeholders at five military installations as well as a
series of meetings with the Army and Military Health System's senior leaders. The
author structured the interviews so that each respondent, regardless of
organizational affiliation, answered the same basic questions; although interviews
were tailored to accommodate differences in organizational ecosystems and
purposes. These semi-formal interviews and meetings yielded a practical
understanding of the implementation of the systems described in Regulations,
policies, and laws as well as the important emergent finding that each installation's
Behavioral Health system is unique, and that the proper unit of analysis is, in fact,
the installation.
1.4 Boundaries
An important aspect of an engineering systems approach to problem solving
is a definition of the system boundary, and this thesis must adhere to that principle,
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as the military's health system extends well beyond the individual installation and
an examination thereof is well outside the scope of this work. As stated above, the
unit of analysis for this thesis is the military installation, which is a city unto itself.
Any analysis of organizations outside the military installation or its surrounding
community is only undertaken to understand applicable influences on the
interactions inside the boundaries of the system.
This work does not intend to examine or influence the actions of medical
professionals in the execution of their clinical duties. The author and his
organization have no level of expertise in psychiatry or any related field, and no
inferences should be made regarding the analysis or conclusions that would
presume such training. This is a system/organizational engineering study, and
work related to the medical field is limited strictly to the systems and organizations
in which medical professionals work.
This thesis is not a quantitative analysis of process flows or monetary
exchanges. Since each installation is unique and dynamic, and the Army population
is in a nearly constant state of flux, it is impractical to conduct high precision value
stream mapping or like activity to identify trends and outliers for a work that
intends to examine organizations and their relationships at the macro level.
Detailed, quantitative, analysis and process mapping with "the Army" as the unit of
analysis is being undertaken as a part of the larger research effort at MIT, and may
be cited in this thesis for use as examples or evidence for specific points, but
quantitative measurement is not the primary focus of this work.
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Chapter 2 - Defining the Enterprises
In order to understand the installation's behavioral health system, we must first
understand the stakeholders in the system, their purposes, the behaviors upon which
they are evaluated, and the incentives that the stakeholders are offered for delivering on
their value proposition. Next, we must understand the behaviors, needs, and interactions
of the organizations and their respective stakeholders. At the conclusion of the analysis,
we will see that the behavioral health system is not one, but three distinct enterprises
that interact in formal and informal exchanges for the purpose of providing mental health
care to soldiers. These three enterprises are Forces Command, Medical Command, and
Installation Command.
What is an Enterprise?
An enterprise is a complex entity with a specific purpose, which is to fulfill its
value proposition - that is, its reason for being. An enterprise has distributed leadership
and diverse stakeholders who share some interests in common.
- Deborah J. Nightingale and Jayakanth Srinivasan. Beyond the Lean Revolution.
2.1 US Army Forces Command
2.1.1 Objectives: The mission of the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is to train,
mobilize, deploy, sustain, transform and reconstitute conventional forces in order to
provide a sustained flow of relevant and ready land power to combatant commanders
worldwide in defense of the nation.i
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In plain terms, this organization's value proposition is to prepare combat units for
deployment to execute combat operations. Preparing for war and fighting a war are two
distinctly different endeavors, and FORSCOM headquarters is not a warfighting
organization. Instead it is a force projection organization that prepares its subordinates
for transfer to headquarters that are charged with actively executing operations. For
example, FORSCOM units are assigned to the US Army Central Command (CENTCOM) for
execution of combat operations in the Middle East, to US Army Africa Command for
operations in Africa, etc. When
transferred back to FORSCOM.
2.1.2 Structure: FORSCOM's
subordinates are organized into a
hierarchy that include five Army
Corps, each with approximately
50,000 soldiers, and is commanded
by a Lieutenant General. Each
Corps is composed of two to five
Divisions, which consist of
approximately 18,000 soldiers.
The Army currently has ten Active
Duty divisions. The Division
Commander is a Major General,
who also serves as the Senior
these units return to their home station they are
a
Leader ApproximatePopulation (per)
General (010) 265,000
Corps Lieutenant 5,0CorpsGeneral (09) 50,000
(-5 Divisions)G n rl( 9
Major
Division General (08) 18,000
3 Brigades~
Brigade Colonel (06) 5,000
3 or more Battalions)
Bion LieutenantBtainColonel (05) 600
3 - 5 Companies
Captain (03) 150
Platoon 2nd Lieutenant (01) 40
3 - 4 Squads
Squad Staff Sergeant (E6) 10
Figure 2.1 Organizational Structure of FORSCOM's
Number in
the Active
Duty Army
Mission Commander on his installation. This means that he is in charge of his Division,
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4
10
45
Operating Forces
but also has ultimate oversight of the installation's programs, services, and physical
property that makes up the actual installation.ii
Each Division is composed of three Brigades, or Brigade Combat Teams (BCT),
each of which are commanded by a Colonel and have approximately 5,000 soldiers. The
BCT is the smallest independently deployable unit. The structure of these units is shown
in Figure 2.1ii.
2.1.3 Performance Measures: The fundamental metric that drives leader actions for
operating forces on the installation is readiness, which is registered with the Department
of the Army (DA) Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for planning and
reporting to the US Government through the use of the Commander's Unit Status Report.
iv This report is given monthly, and requires the commander to give information on the
following readiness areas:
1. Personnel Readiness (P-Level): The P-level describes the number of soldiers in a
unit that are assigned, physically present or can be present within 72 hours, and meet
medical readiness criteria. The medical criterion is the deployable/non-deployable
determination of physicians that care for the unit's soldiers. For current operations
these physicians use the Central Command's Individual Protection and Individual-Unit
Deployment Policy (Mod 11) in addition to traditionally used standards to determine
medical readiness.v For a unit to be considered deployable, it must have an aggregate
90% or greater P-Level.
2. Training Readiness (T-Level): The T-Level is the commander's assessment of
the ability of his/her unit's capability to execute the tasks associated with the core
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functions expected of the organization. For a unit to be considered "trained" it must
be able to collectively execute its essential tasks with a minimum of 85% proficiency.
3. Equipment on Hand (S-Level): The S-Level is an assessment of the mission
essential equipment available to the organization. For a unit be deployable by the S-
Level, it must have over 90% of its authorized mission essential equipment.
4. Equipment Readiness/Serviceability Level (C-Level): The C-Level is an
indicator of how well the unit is maintaining its mission essential equipment on hand.
The threshold for deployability by the C-Level is 90%, meaning that based on the
authorized quantity of mission items, 90% must be in a serviceable state of repair.
2.1.4 Incentives: Army leaders in FORSCOM units are incentivized to achieve the specified
readiness goals through career advancement and opportunities for positions of increased
responsibility. Each year Army leaders formally assess the performance of subordinates
in their assigned roles. Each officer's role is clearly defined at the beginning of the rating
period through a specified set of responsibilities and annual performance objectives. For
commanders in operational units, the duty will always charge him or her with the welfare
and readiness of the unit.vi With regard to the P-Level and the T-Level, this means that
the commander is directly responsible for making sure that the soldiers in the unit are
ready and trained to execute their mission essential tasks in accordance with his or her
parent unit's deployment timing. Although Army regulations specifically states that the
Commander's Unit Status Report shall not be used as an evaluation tool, Army leaders are
assessed on their ability to generate mission ready units. Leaders who are not able to
adequately prepare their units and achieve a P-Level of 1 are typically replaced and
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rarely have the opportunity to advance in their careers to positions of increased
responsibility.
2.1.5 FORSCOM on the Installation: At the typical installation, which is our unit of
analysis, FORSCOM's senior representative is a Division Commander, who is the top of the
chain of command for the installation. The exceptions to this rule are installations where
a Corps or higher headquarters is collocated with the division.' The Division Commander
and his staff generally support three brigades, each of which has a staff that mirrors its
division counterpart in terms of their primary duties. The staff members who affect
soldiers' mental health care are:
1. Division Surgeon. The Division Surgeon is the lead primary care provider for the
Division. He or she advises the commander on the medical readiness of the division,
and oversees and coordinates the Brigade Surgeons. The Brigade Surgeons, in turn,
advise the Brigade Commanders and oversee the Battalion Primary Care Providers.
The battalion is the lowest echelon with an organic medical asset. The Battalion
Primary Care Provider, a Physician's Assistant, directs the unit medics.
2. Division Pychiatrist. The Division Psychiatrist advises the Division Commander
on the Behavioral Health needs and disposition of the unit, provides specialty care to
the soldiers in the Division, and oversees the Brigade Psychiatric Officers, who are
Licensed Clinical Social Workers or Clinical Psychologists. The Brigade is the Army's
lowest echelon with organic behavioral health support.
1 The highest headquarters located at most Army installations is the Division, however,
some installations are home to Corps and Division Headquarters. At these locations the
Corps Commander serves as the Senior Mission Commander.
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3. Division Chaplain. The Division Chaplain advises the commander on the spiritual
wellbeing of the unit and provides pastoral support to the division's soldiers.
Additionally, the Chaplain oversees, coordinates, and mentors the Brigade Chaplains
and Chaplain Assistants. The Brigade Chaplains in turn, oversee, mentor, and
coordinate their respective Battalion Chaplains and their assistants. The Battalion is
the lowest echelon with organic chaplain support.
4. Family Readiness Support Assistants (FRSA) and
Family Readiness Groups (FRG). The fourth group shown
in Figure 2.2 is the FRSA and FRG. Assigned at the Brigade
and Battalion Levels, FRSAs are government employees who
assist the unit Commander in disseminating information to
family members, aggregating information on the unit's
families, advising family members on needed programs and
services on the installation, and coordinating the Family
Readiness Groups to provide any necessary direct support
to families of unit personnel. The Family Readiness Groups
directly support and inform family members on behalf of
the commander. The FRG leaders are not
spouses of the commanders or other senior
Group is a mandated Commander's program.
Chain of
Command
Pnimary
Care
Chaplain
Corps
DIV/BCT
Psych
FRGs
FORSCOM
Figure 2.2. FORSCOM
Stakeholders on the Installation
paid employees, and are typically the
unit personnel. The Family Readiness
2.1.6 Needs of the Stakeholders
- Chain of Command: The chain of command is the agent in the system responsible for
execution of the Army's warfighting mission, and adherence to unit deployability and
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readiness standards. Unit commanders' main needs from the behavioral health system
are timely courses of treatment that return soldiers to a deployable condition and usable
information regarding the disposition/fitness for duty of the soldiers who remain within
care. Implicit in this second need is effective information exchange with both primary
and specialty care providers regarding the soldiers for which they are responsible and in
trust to execute difficult and dangerous training and combat missions.
- Primary Care Providers: The fundamental need of primary care physicians, outside
the needs associated with the provision of clinical care, is centered on effective
information exchange with other stakeholders within the system. Primary Care
Providers generally form relationships easily with the chain of command, the chaplain
corps, the unit psychiatric provider, and the family readiness support assistant due to
close proximity and shared strategic objectives. Relationships with institutional medical
providers outside FORSCOM are more difficult since they are separated in mission and
space. Automated means of information distribution allow the distribution of electronic
medical records among all and post providers; however, limitations in the military's
information systems reduce the fidelity of information transfer.
* Chaplain Corps: Chaplains serve as a first line of defense for behavioral health, due to
constant proximity to soldiers, and their implicit confidentiality that guarantees their
accessibility for soldiers who need nonclinical counseling. When soldier issues exceed
those treatable within the chaplains' set of competencies, the chaplain may refer soldiers,
with their permission, to primary care providers or directly to behavioral health specialty
care through self-referral. Regarding the chaplaincy needs, chaplains require time with
the soldier and the trust of the chain of command and unit medical providers to serve as
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the first line of behavioral health defense. Again physical proximity and shared strategic
objectives make the chaplain and effective part of the unit-based coordinated care team.
* Unit Psychiatric Provider: The unit based psychiatric care provider is assigned at the
BCT level and is the first specialty care provider for behavioral health available to
soldiers within FORSCOM units. Because these providers are assigned one per brigade
(4000 soldiers), their primary need is time to provide care and access to patient
populations. BCT providers remarked that the bulk of their time is occupied by staff
functions and travel to and from unit areas.
* Soldiers: Soldiers are not listed as a stakeholder in the behavioral health system,
because they are viewed as the customer of the services provided by that system.
Soldiers, for the purpose of this work, are assigned to FORSCOM, and their job is to train
for and execute mission essential tasks.
Soldiers who have behavioral health needs require first support from their chain
of command for referral into the system. Stakeholders acknowledged that stigma
associated with behavioral health challenges frustrates soldiers in regard to freely
seeking care. Many respondents have stated that soldiers who genuinely need behavioral
healthcare are often hesitant to seek the services because they believe their peers and
their leaders will consider them weak. Army leaders who understand that behavioral
health challenges are real and potentially debilitating will encourage their soldiers to find
providers who can help them get back to 100%, so that they are individually ready for
deployment, thus increasing the unit's deployment capability.
Next, soldiers require behavioral health care that is both accessible and responsive
to their needs. Care providers who are centrally located but are prohibitively far away
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from patient populations make care delivery difficult in terms of accessibility. Likewise,
providers who have schedules that are completely full are unable to provide treatment
and the frequency required to make the desired progress in overcoming behavioral
health-related illness. Soldiers and providers alike have noted that the overwhelming
numbers of patients seeking behavioral healthcare have caused providers to be
inaccessible for this reason.
Finally, soldiers need behavioral health options that will allow them to return to
duty in a fully mission capable condition. This implies the need for treatment that is both
effective and timely since the military has time-based criteria for determining whether a
soldier is getting better, defined as deployable, and if these criteria are not met, then the
soldier is processed for elimination from the service.
2.2 US Army Medical Command
2.2.1 Objectives: The stated mission of the US Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) is to
execute a coordinated, synchronized, and integrated comprehensive Soldier Medical
Readiness Campaign Plan to support Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) in each of its
phases to increase the medical readiness of the Army. MEDCOM seeks to meet this
objective through five distinct strategic objectives:
1. Optimize medical readiness systems through early and effective identification of
Medically Not Ready (MNR) soldiers.
2. Enhance soldier care in order to increase medical readiness by implementing
Medical Management Programs for MNR soldiers.
23
3. Improve health and fitness, and reduce injury rates through integrated health
promotion and injury prevention, and human performance optimization
programs.
4. "The fourth Line of Effort is Effectiveness of the Soldier Medical Readiness
Campaign with an objective of ensuring strategic effectiveness."
5. Effectively communicate the Soldier Medical Readiness Campaign Plan to all
stakeholders. vii
2.2.2 Structure: The US Army Medical
Number in
Command is lead by the Army Surgeon Leader the Active
Duty Army
General, who is dual-hatted as the MEDCOM Lieutenant 1
General (09)
MEDCOM Commander. This officer is
located in Washington DC, and leads Commana GenMr O0)
five Regional Medical Commands. The
Military Treatment Colonel (06) 38
Regional Medical Commands serve the Facility
regions shown in Figure 2.4, below. At
LieutenantClinic/ Patient Centered Colonel (05) or
the installation level, MEDCOM's Medical Home Civilian Equivalent
senior representative is the Military Figure 2.3. Organizational Structure of MEDCOM's Generating
Units.
Treatment Facility (MTF) Commander,
an Army Colonel, who is a medical doctor. This officer has oversight over all MEDCOM
activities on the installation, and he or she reports to the Regional Medical Command
Commander. The MFT Commander is responsible for each MEDCOM clinic on the
installation, which are respectively lead by a Lieutenant Colonel or Department of the
Army (DA) Civilian. MEDCOM units are not deployable, although military providers
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within MEDCOM may be tasked individually to support fixed medical facilities or
operational units belonging to Combatant Commanders.
Figure 2.4. US Army Medical Regions (source: http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/hc/mtfs.html)
2.2.3 Performance Measures: The primary metric for evaluation of MEDCOM activities at
the installation level is production of Relative Value Units (RVU).viii RVU generation is a
measure of provider productivity, earned through patient encounters. This metric is used
nationally to gauge the resources applied to a medical task, and it has a significant impact
on resource acquisition in the medical community.ix It is a non-monetary measurement
unit, and it is scaled to match the level of expertise of the medical provider and the
intensity of the procedure being performed.x
The measurement of RVU generation allows for fair compensation proportional to
resources applied to a medical task, but it also serves as an indicator for the number of
providers needed on an installation. Essentially, if RVU production is higher than
expected, then the installation can justify a request for additional providers or staff. If
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RVU generation is less than that expected, then resources can be reallocated to a location
of higher need. For example, the assessed need for Psychiatric Nurse Practitioners is a
function of the RVUs generated by Psychiatrists on an installation. MEDCOM expects a
Psychiatrist, Psychologists, and Social Workers to generate a requisite number of RVUs
daily in the conduct of clinical care. Support staff in a medical facility also generate RVUs,
although at a lower rate than the providers listed above. For example, an enlisted Psych
Tech earns 0.82 RVUs for tasks associated with his or her primary duties; administrative
support personnel ear 0.5 RVUs per task.xi
The second metric that affects MEDCOM action at the installation level is Access to
Care. The MTF is evaluated on its ability to provide appointments for acute care patients
within 24 hours of initial triage. For behavioral health, acute patients are those who are
suicidal, homicidal, or psychotic. Specialty care appointments for non-acute patients
must be made within 28 calendar days of triage, and since Behavioral Health is specialty
care, a provider must see a soldier within a month. If MEDCOM cannot achieve this
timing, then providers off the installation, in the TRICARE insurance network must see
the patients within the requisite time.
Next, MEDCOM is evaluated on patient satisfaction; however, for the following
types of patient encounters, patient satisfaction is not measuredxii:
- Psychiatry
- Psychology
- Mental Health
- Social Work
- Substance Abuse
- Community Health
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2.2.4 Incentives: As with the officers in FORSCOM, MEDCOM's officers are incentivized to
execute on the measured behaviors by career advancement both in terms of promotions
and positions of increased responsibility. Civilian providers are incentivized to generate
RVUs, so that their job continues to exist. Unlike their
T riage and
military counterparts, civilian providers can receive pay Assessment
Clinics
increases for excellent job performance, but they can be Outpatient
11BH Clinics
promoted to positions of increased responsibility the same as
military officers. Outpatient
Care
2.2.5 MEDCOM on the Installation: Regarding behavioral [nient
1BH Wardhealth, MEDCOM operates the activities shown in Figure 2.5
Warrior
that provide Behavioral Health care to soldiers and family Transition
Battalion
members. MEDCOM
Triage and Assessment Clinics. The Triage and Figure 2.5. MEDCoM's
Behavioral Health
Assessment Clinic is the stakeholder in the Army's behavioral Stakeholders on the
Installation.
health system that serves as a formal point of entry into
MEDCOM's care delivery architecture. The clinic makes the determination whether a
patient is suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, or routine, and schedules follow on care in
accordance with access to care standards. In some locations, the Triage and Assessment
Clinic has the capability to prescribe medications for the mitigation of symptoms
associated with mental health diagnoses for patients who are routine and need to wait 28
days to see an outpatient provider. For patients who are not routine, the clinic makes an
immediate referral to the Inpatient Behavioral Health Ward.
- Outpatient Clinics. Clinics that provide outpatient behavioral health care serve two
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purposes within the system. The first of these is to provide therapy for soldiers who are
identified as routine. The clinic's cadre of providers sees non-acute patients within 28
days of their initial triage to pursue a course of treatment according to each patient's
needs. After the initial visit, these clinics schedule patients according to a six-week
template of patients, which typically means that a soldier can see his or her therapist
once every month and a half.
The second purpose of the outpatient care clinics is to conduct triage on all
patients of who arrive for care. Because of the protracted timeframe between visits, the
condition of previously non-acute soldiers may have changed between visits. This
constant triage serves as a safeguard for patients and for those with whom they come in
contact.
Outpatient clinics require a cadre of providers appropriate for the patient load for
which they must provide care. When providers are insufficient to meet the demands of
the patient population, patients must be referred to the TRICARE network, which may
provide behavioral health services in civilian clinics, but at a greater monetary cost to the
MEDCOM.
- MTF Inpatient Behavioral Health Ward. The primary purpose of the inpatient ward
is to provide an intensive combination of psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy, med
management and supervision to those patients identified as homicidal, suicidal, or
psychotic by the triage function of the system. As with the outpatient care clinics the
inpatient ward executes a volume of care provision commensurate with the number of
providers available in the facility. Likewise, in instances when the demand for inpatient
care exceeds the supply (a function of providers and operating beds) urgent need
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patients are referred to the TRICARE network for inpatient care.
e Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP). The IOP is for soldiers who are diagnosed with
moderate to severe PTSD. For the period of enrollment, the patient's place of duty is the
treatment facility in which they are treated in a variety of treatment modalities for the
entire workday. The program treats soldiers in groups, so that in addition to individual
therapies, group therapies may also be leveraged and a support network is pre-
established for graduates. The downside to the cohort model is low throughput, but
positive results, which are the focus of the program, rather than throughput, demonstrate
that the treatment regimen is effective. Of the programs observed, over 50% of the
soldiers admitted into the program are returned to duty successfully, which is
remarkable.
The administrators of the programs cite the program's ability to take the time to
focus on treatment with measurable patient outcomes is the reason for the program's
success. Leaders of the program have concerns for the soldiers who return to
inhospitable units that are focused on the patient's absence rather than his or her success
in getting the help that he/she needed. Returning to a toxic environment, according to
leaders, can easily reverse the progress made in the program.
o Warrior Transition Unit (WTU). The Warrior Transition Unit site a serves as an
intensive case management activity for soldiers assigned. In the case that soldiers require
intense treatment, cannot perform their primary duties for a period of time greater than
six months, and is approved for admittance by the leadership of the WTU, the hospital
commander, and the installation's senior mission commander, a soldier may be
transferred from his combat unit to the Warrior Transition Unit. The entire cadre at the
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WTU is trained for handling medical information for the soldiers in their charge. The unit
has a staff of nurse case managers that work closely with the unit's chain of command to
ensure coordination of care for the soldiers assigned. This unit is committed to returning
soldiers to duty or processing them for elimination from the service within one year of
assignment to the organization. For soldiers who exceed the one-year mark, the warrior
transition unit leader must account for them by name to the senior mission commander
monthly with a plan of action.
2.2.6 Needs of the Stakeholders:
- Triage, Outpatient, and Inpatient Care Clinics: The primary needs of all of these
clinics can be broken down into two categories.
First, each activity requires the appropriate resources, both in terms of quality and
quantity, to execute its function commensurate with the demand of the patient
population, so that it may deliver care in accordance with MEDCOM's performance
measurement criteria. For example, the Inpatient Ward requires both clinical and non-
clinical staff, operating beds, and hospital support such as pharmacy and logistics
functions. If the ward does not have the capacity to meet the demand, it must rely on
civilian providers in the TRICARE network to cover the shortfall in care provision, again
at significantly increased cost to MEDCOM. In the case of the IOP, the program needs staff
and facilities to accommodate the demand for its services. In each of these programs
observed, the wait time for enrollment exceeded three months.
The second need of these activities is information. Information flows both in and
out of these clinics is critical to the system's overall success. The military uses the Armed
Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA) to record and transmit for
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the sharing of provider notes among medical professionals and encounter coding (for
RVU accounting). The clinics also require conduits to 1) transmit information to the
operational units that need fit for duty or limited duty recommendations for the soldiers
that execute the units' mission essential tasks, and 2) collect information from the units
on patient backgrounds and histories, since the providers are not organic to or physically
near the units. Finally, the clinics require conduits to civilian providers who provide
behavioral health care to military patients for the transmission of diagnoses, provider
notes, and prescription information.
0 Warrior Transition Unit: The needs of this unit stem from the short timeframe for
which they expect to have soldiers assigned. The unit needs the cooperation of medical
providers to allow WTU patients to bypass long queues for medical services. Additionally
this unit requires enhanced facilities for housing soldiers who live on the installation, and
a large staff capable of maintaining contact with soldiers who do not live on the
installation.
2.3 US Army Installation Command
2.3.1 Objectives: The US Army Installation Command (IMCOM) provides facilities,
support, and services necessary for the readiness of the soldiers and the family members
of the soldiers assigned to the units on the installation. Additionally, IMCOM is
responsible for providing the physical infrastructure for the support of mission
requirements; this includes training areas, buildings, roads, and utilities. The published
mission statement of IMCOM is "is to provide Soldiers, Civilians and their Families with a
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quality of life commensurate with the quality of their service." xiii The IMCOM Commander
proposes six distinct focus areas to address this mission and objectives.
1. Soldier, Family, and Civilian Readiness. In this focus area, IMCOM has
committed to creating and maintaining the infrastructure and services that are
needed to support mission readiness in accordance with the dynamic requirements
of the Army Force Generation process. An important component of supporting
organizations with dynamic needs is the careful integration of services, which
IMCOM proposes to execute through its Community Health Promotion Council
(CHPC). Finally, IMCOM leverages Family Support Groups (FRG) and FORSCOM
Rear Detachments to maintain links with the families who remain at home station
when FORSCOM units deploy.
2. Soldier, Family, and Civilian Well Being. The stated objective of this focus area is
to "ensure Soldiers, Families, and Civilian employees are being cared for, and
[IMCOM's] programs and services enhance community life, foster readiness,
promote mental and physical fitness, and deliver a quality working and living
environment." The primary agent of this area is Army Community Services (ACS),
which coordinates soldier and family support services, emergency financial
support, the Military Family Life Counselor (MFLC) program.
3. Leader and Workforce Development. This IMCOM focus area is centered on
organizational and individual self-improvement, so that its employees may
continuously improve capabilities and process for serving the needs of soldiers and
their families.
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4. Installation Readiness. Here, IMCOM focuses on stewardship of resources and
facilities that it utilizes for soldier and unit training as well as family programs.
This is a focus area because of the requirement to provide dynamic support to the
ever-evolving missions of the FORSCOM units assigned to the installation.
5. Safety. IMCOM focuses on safety in its activities in order to preserve the readiness
of the soldiers that it supports as well as the mission readiness of its own soldiers
and civilians.
6. Energy and Water Efficiency and Security. Finally, as the enterprise responsible
for the installation's physical infrastructure and utilities, IMCOM is focused on
being responsible stewards of the resources that it uses to support readiness.
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2.3.2 Structure: The US Army Installation Command is lead by a Lieutenant General,
a three-star general, who commands five regions; two in the United States, One each in
Europe, Korea, and the Pacific region.xiv Members of the Government's Senior Executive
Service (SES), commonly described as the Army's "civilian generals", direct IMCOM
Regions, illustrated in Figure 2.6.
Installations In green are managed by IMCOM headquarters.
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Figure 2.6 IMCOM Regions. (source: http://www.imcom.army.mil/hq/about/regions/)
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IMCOM's senior representative at the " Number in
Leader the Active
I Duty Armyinstallation level is the Garrison
IMCoM LieutenantGeneral (09)1
Commander, an Army Colonel, who is
charged with providing support to the IMCOM Regional Senior Executive
Director Service 5
Member (SES)
Senior Mission Commander as described
in the IMCOM Objectives. Finally, CM Colonel (06) 86*
IMCOM's programs and services on the
Program / Service Department of the
Director Army Civilian
installation are each lead by a Department .....
of the Army Civilian. These leaders report Figure 2.7. IMCOM Structure. *IMCOM Operates 86 Posts,
Camps, and Stations, however, only 10 installations
directly to the Garrison Commander, who behave as described in this document. The remaining
installations are small and/or do not have a warfighting
reports to both the IMCOM Regional 
mission.
Director and the Senior Mission Commander.xv This hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 2.7.
2.3.3 Performance Measures
At the installation level, IMCOM has 61 metrics associated with their six focus
areas described above. With regard to the execution of Behavioral Health and associated
services, the following six performance measures assess IMCOM's behaviors that support
soldier and family Behavioral Health needs.
1. Risk Reduction program "shot group" rating. The Installation Risk Reduction
plan measures fourteen risk behaviors. Reduction of the proliferation of these
behaviors is indicative of a successful program. See Appendix A for a description of
this program.
2. Garrisons with an established Community Health Promotion Council (CHPC).
Success in this area is the presence of a CHPC that delivers the value required in the
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Army's Health Promotion Regulation. In short, the CHPC is required to execute the
installation's Suicide Prevention, Risk Reduction, and Community Health
Programs.xvi
3. Garrisons with ARFORGEN support requirements providing a standardized
ARFORGEN support plan. This metric assesses IMCOM's dynamic support to the
specific needs of FORSCOM units both in terms of mission support and the pre- and
post-deployment needs of soldiers and their families.
4. Soldiers completing Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) requirements. This
performance measure assesses FORSCOM unit commanders' satisfaction with the
SRP's support to their deployment and redeployment medical, behavioral, and
administrative needs.
5. Army Community Service (ACS) Accreditation. This metric measures the
quality of ACS performance through comparing the number of ACS organizations
that are accredited to the total number of organizations that are providing ACS
services.
6. Military Family Life Consultant (MFLC) Effectiveness. This performance
measure assesses the percentage of garrisons with MFLCs that are meeting the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) minimum for contacts per day.
2.3.4 Incentives
Military leaders, just like their peers in FORSCOM and MEDCOM are incentivized
to execute through promotions, leadership opportunities, and career advancement.
Officers and NCOs assigned to IMCOM units are evaluated on their ability to increase
performance in their organizations in regard to the behaviors that IMCOM and the Senior
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Mission Commander measures. Civilians in the system are likewise measured on their
ability to deliver on IMCOM's measured behaviors. Department of the Army (DA)
Civilians can choose to advance or to remain in positions in which they may build
expertise over a career. DA Civilians, although they may choose not advance in pay grade,
may be incentivized through cash rewards for performance and/or increases in pay
based on time in their grade.
2.3.5 IMCOM on the Installation
* Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP): The Army
Substance Abuse program serves to strengthen the fighting
force and enhance readiness through drug and alcohol
education and prevention programs, and installation-level risk
reduction. ASAP also provides substance abuse counseling and
treatment, and it has the capability to execute psychoanalysis
for triage and, at a limited scope, psychotherapy, generally
offered by an organic psychiatrist. Finally, ASAP serves as an
aggregator of the manifestations of risk behavior in conjunction
with the installation's risk reduction program.
- Army Family Advocacy Program (AFAP): "The Family
Figure 2.8 IMCOM's
Behavioral Health
Stakeholders on the
Installation
Advocacy Program provides information designed to support strong, self-reliant families
and enhance coping skills. The program educates families about child and spouse abuse,
as well as abuse prevention, education, intervention and treatment. Other programs
include new parent support, victim advocate, sexual assault prevention and response and
parenting classes."vi
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. Military Family Life Counselors (MFLC): The MFLC serves as an independent
Licensed Clinical Social Worker assigned to a BCT and provides "as needed" clinical
counseling to soldiers and family members. Since the MFLC is accountable to the
installation through Army Community Services, there is no requirement for informing
command or medical providers of the details of their services. Soldiers enjoy this
program because of the confidentiality and the location of the MFLC to their work areas.
e Community Health Promotion Council: The Community Health Promotion Council
serves as an informal integrator of stakeholders and services on the installation.
Interviews with CHPC directors show that that success in this endeavor is a function of
deliberate cultivation of personal relationships with leaders in each stakeholder
organization since, "attendance is mandated, but participation is not." The council is
responsible for coordination of suicide prevention, community health, and risk reduction,
and does so through the formation of working groups to address targeted areas of
concern, defined in the council's quarterly meetings. Concerned stakeholders from
across organizations (FORSCOM/MEDCOM/IMCOM) work together toward cooperatively
developed programs developed to solve issues at the installation level. Finally, the CHPC
is the integrator of risk data that is aggregated by ASAP and the DES for evaluating the
installation's risk reduction program.
e Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) station: The SRP station executes medical and
administrative processing for soldiers deploying to or from combat operations. The "one
stop shop" is designed to provide an easy place for soldiers and their commanders to
correct deficiencies in deployment readiness or to identify medical or administrative
issues generated during deployment. This stakeholder fits in to the Behavioral Health
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enterprise through evaluating the results of the PDHA and FORSCOM Risk Assessment
Tool, and then linking high and medium-risk soldiers with a counselor as soon as they get
off the [redeployment] plane. In addition to actively linking high-risk soldiers with
counselors, the SRP Station screens every soldier in order to determine Behavioral Health
needs not identified by standard instruments.
e Directorate of Emergency Services (DES): The Directorate of Emergency Services is
responsible for the installation's Military Police, Fire Department, and EMS. The DES fits
into the Behavioral Health enterprise as the second aggregator of risk data associated
with the installation's risk data. In effect, any risk data collected by the Military Police is
transmitted to the CHPC through the DES. CHPC directors report that this information
must be manually extracted from the police blotter, the daily report of all serious
incidents in which the MPs were involved.
2.3.6 Needs of the Stakeholders
e Army Substance Abuse Program. ASAP requires access to the soldier and the
cooperation of the chain of command for supervision of outpatient-based treatment
programs. From medical providers, ASAP requires credentialing of its providers and
facility, since one of its activities is medical treatment. Additionally, ASAP requires the
support of MEDCOM for the treatment of comorbid patients who have Behavioral Health
and Substance Abuse illnesses. Finally, ASAP requires information sharing with all other
stakeholders for the collection of installation risk-behavior statistics, as they are one of
two aggregators of data required by the FORSCOM Installation Risk Reduction Program.
e Army Family Advocacy Program. AFAP requires cooperation of and information
from the Directorate of Emergency Services for notification of serious events, the Chain of
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Command for information on soldier history as it relates to family matters and time for
soldiers to attend training. Likewise, the program requires continuous access to the
soldiers who are required to complete mandated training or counseling. This means that
commands must remain engaged with AFAP, recognizing the value added by the
organization's expertise instead of attempting to deal with issues from a position of less
expertise in the field.
e Community Health Promotion Council. The fundamental need of the CHPC is
active participation from the council members as well as cooperation among the
stakeholders. The council is bound by a Letter of Agreement (LOA), but not by policy or
law. The most successful CHPC directors observed continuously build and maintain
strong personal relationships with the members of the council. Since only attendance is
mandated, buy in from the leadership of each involved organization is vital to the success
of the program.
e Military Family Life Counselors. Due to the MFLC's reporting chain and
confidentiality, they only have one real need - access to the soldiers. MFLCs at all sites
report that initial cooperation of the Chain of Command is difficult, but as commanders
recognize the value added, access increases proportionally.
e Soldier Readiness Processing Station. The station, although owned and managed by
IMCOM, depends on MEDCOM and FORSCOM for qualified providers who may execute
the screenings. Likewise, the site depends on the Chain of Command and Primary Care
providers to transmit the data collected through the PDHA and FORSCOM Risk
Assessment Tool to home station prior to redeployment, so that the SRP site can analyze
the data before the soldiers arrive.
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2.4 Chapter Summary
Although the clinical elements of the Army's behavioral health system are isolated
to MEDCOM, and ASAP, each of the three enterprises contribute necessary value for the
generation of a complete system of Behavioral Health care. Stakeholders in this
collection of enterprises must work cooperatively in order to adequately coordinate a full
spectrum of programs and services. The enterprises measure performance that is aligned
to their own strategic objectives, however, as we will see in the next chapter, fulfillment
of individual enterprise strategic objectives does not always functionally align with the
shared goal of readiness, which is underpinned by the mental health of soldiers.
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Chapter 3 - Execution
With an understanding that the Army's Behavioral Health system is a
cooperative effort of three enterprises, it is appropriate to examine the behaviors of
the enterprises as they relate to the provision of Behavioral Health services to
service members. First we will examine the effect of performance measurement on
the behavior of each enterprise in terms of its inner workings and inter-enterprise
behavior. Next, we will discuss communication and cooperation between the
enterprises in an effort to understand how the stakeholders work together. Finally,
we will focus on the role of incentives in generating behaviors that contribute to the
overall goal of improving the behavioral health status of soldiers and their families.
While the analysis of the interaction of the systems is not exhaustive, it is intended
to illustrate the most salient issues that the network must overcome.
3.1 Performance Measurement Driving Behavior - Each enterprise uses
performance measurement techniques to gauge value delivery for its own set of
strategic objectives. These metrics drive the behaviors of the stakeholders within
each, as the system of incentives for the stakeholders reward execution and
improvement of measured behaviors. Although performance measurement within
the enterprises is aligned to objectives of the primary organizations, it often
produces effects that do not benefit, or are blatantly counterproductive, to the
interests of the others enterprises.
3.1.1 FORSCOM. With its mission to prepare units for deployment and its
requirement to maintain readiness levels, leaders of FORSCOM units at the
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installation level are measured on their abilities to achieve readiness levels
commensurate with their position in Army's Force Generation Cycle (See Appendix
B - Summary of the Army Force Generation Cycle). In terms of mission readiness,
this is an appropriate metric, as it links directly to FORSCOM's strategic objectives.
In terms of the Behavioral Health of the soldiers in the units, however, performance
measurement is driving counterproductive behaviors.
In units that are approaching their deployment dates, an excess of Medically
Non Ready (MNR) soldiers may cause an unacceptable reduction of the P level
below 90%. Since the P-Level encapsulates both the number of soldiers assigned to
the units, relative to the number authorized (strength), as well as the medical
readiness of the soldiers assigned, it is not enough for commanders to transfer MNR
soldiers to another unit. Instead, commanders are forced to transfer MNR soldiers
to another unit whose position in the deployment cycle permits a lower P-Level, and
from that unit pull a medically ready soldier. In effect FORSCOM units cannibalize
medically ready soldiers from units on disparate deployment cycles in order to
satisfy the expectations of their own performance metrics. It is important to note
that the units that are not next in the deployment queue are most often
reconstituting after a deployment of their own, in accordance with the ARFORGEN
cycle. Swapping soldiers allows the deploying unit to meet the required readiness
levels for both strength and readiness.
While this behavior has the positive effect of meeting combat readiness
requirements, it also has two likely outcomes that are negative. First, mission ready
soldiers who are picked from "off-cycle" units will continue to deploy at a higher
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than expected frequency, resulting in greater than expected exposure to both
physical and mental combat stresses. The soldiers in the reconstituting units are in
a programmed period of rest and personal reconstitution in preparation for
deployment in the parent unit's timeline.i This increase in deployment tempo
proportionally increases the likelihood that the medically ready soldier will become
MNR.
Second, if commanders of FORSCOM units induce reduced medical readiness
rates through selective controlled substitution of soldiers, then FORSCOM should
expect longer term Army-wide reduction in medical readiness. This exact
phenomenon was observed at Site C, where commanders report an entire BCT that
is below its expected medical readiness due to this practice.
Although this behavior is counterproductive to the long-term health of the
force, we cannot blame the commanders of FORSCOM units for this activity. The
Army's mission is to overcome any nations responsible for aggressive acts that
imperil the peace and security of the United Statesii, and FORSCOM's part in this
mission is to produce mission ready units to execute combat operations; it has
developed metrics over decades that appropriately measure its ability to execute
this mission. Commanders are incentivized for this behavior, as described in
Chapter 2, so their best way to ensure their own career progression while at home
station is to generate units that meet the prescribed readiness rates, both in terms
of training and personnel. We see here that performance measurement is driving
behavior, but the prescribed behavior generates unintended consequences that are
counterproductive in the long term.
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This counterproductive behavior is detrimental not only to FORSCOM and its
soldiers. This behavior likewise increases the MEDCOM workload by inducing a
higher than expected rate of Behavioral Health problems. IMCOM is likewise
affected because as deployment frequency increases for selected soldiers, utilization
rates to IMCOM programs and services will likely increase proportionally.
3.1.2 MEDCOM. The US Army Medical Command's reliance on the Relative Value
Unit (RVU) for fair compensation and personnel requirement forecasting provides a
second example of performance measurement driving behavior and unintended
second order effects across the Army's behavioral health system. The requirement
to maximize RVU generation without an outcomes metricii incentivizes MEDCOM to
focus on throughput of patients rather than to take time to focus on improving the
behavioral health of the system's customers.
As with FORSCOM's readiness metric, MEDCOM's RVU is completely
appropriate for that enterprise, if that enterprise's behavior had no impact on the
others. The business operations side of the Military Treatment Facility uses this
metric to ensure that the proper number of providers is present, and that those
providers are productive enough to ensure a constant stream of revenue for the
clinics. Since MEDCOM does not measure patient satisfaction for Behavioral Health
activities, and there are no patient outcome measures in place, the RVU is the only
performance measurement tool at the installation. Organizations will always
"execute and improve upon what is measured,"iv and the effect is that medical
providers are only incentivized to, in the words of one head of Behavioral Health,
"move meat through the system.""
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MEDCOM's exclusive use of this performance metric is counterproductive to
its stated mission, to "...increase the medical readiness of the Army."vi In interviews
with XX installation level medical providers, not a single respondent reported that
any entity is measuring medical outcomes. This confirms that the primary focus of
the clinical portion of the Army's behavioral health system is focused on revenue
generation, instead of improving the health and readiness of patients. It should be
noted though, that this is not just an Army problem; the National Institute of
Medicine has identified that this same phenomenon occurs nationwide, and further
recognizes that this shortcoming in the medical system must be corrected.vi
Once again, we observe a system with performance measurement driving
counterproductive behavior and employees who are only incentivized to execute
this behavior. In an interview with a MEDCOM psychiatrist, the respondent was
asked what would happen if providers slowed down and focused on patient
outcomes. The doctor replied that if [he] does not produce enough RVUs monthly,
the MTF's Business Operations division "hammers the clinic chief."viii Since there is
only one element of performance with which clinical providers can quantifiably
stand out from their peers, then this is where they must excel if they wish to
advance in their careers. We cannot assess blame to any provider or leader in this
system for promoting this behavior, but instead we must attribute the system of
performance measurement that drives it.
In visits to five Army installations, we universally observe clinical providers
and chiefs who are exasperated by the system in which they must work. The level of
demand for Behavioral Health services creates a capacity deficit, evidenced by six-
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week wait times for appointments at every site. Across all the sites, clinical
respondents have noted that they see patients before duty hours, during lunch
hours, and choose to do documentation at home or after duty hours in order to
provide as much service to soldiers as is needed. One clinical provider stated that
he and his peers are providing excellent medical service "despite the system."ix This
level of dedication is commendable, and speaks to the desire of clinicians to do the
very best that they can; however, MEDCOM should expect that provider burnout will
eventually degrade the quality of care delivered. Clinical providers at all sites state
the same.
This suggestion of quality degradation returns us to an important aspect of
performance measurement. Since there is no measurement of patient satisfaction
for Behavioral Health services, nor is there a metric for outcomes, then it is not
possible to gauge system improvement in terms of value delivery to the customer.
MEDCOM's performance measurement system for Behavioral Health perpetuates
continued reduction in quality of care in exchange for increased quantity of care. In
a visit to a non-Army installation, the MTF Commander stated, in response to a
question about the effect of increased RVU generation requirements on provider job
satisfaction, "No one has quit on me yet, so it must not be that bad."x Although this
attitude represents an extreme case it speaks to an acceptance, or worse an
embrace, of the system deficiencies caused by performance measurement.
In addition to the negative effects of improper performance measurement on
the internal behavior of the MEDCOM system, this system affects FORSCOM as well.
Soldiers who are identified as a potential threat to themselves, others, or the unit
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mission are made, appropriately, NMR by the clinical portion of the Behavioral
Health system. Since that system does not incentivize improvement of its patients'
health status, then the NMR soldier is added to the six-week queue for continued
treatment at that interval. FORSCOM units, in turn, have their P-Level reduced by
the MNR soldier, and there is a reduction in the unit's net T-Level due to the absence
from training of that soldier as well as those required to provide supervision for the
NMR soldier. The reduction in readiness and requirement for constant supervision
of the NMR soldier generally precipitates a less-friendly environment for the soldier
who needs Behavioral Health care, and adds to the stigma associated with
Behavioral Health.
3.1.3 IMCOM. The Installation Command's performance measurement system, as
described in Chapter 2, has two foci. The first set of metrics centers on the existence
of a few specified programs and compliance to minimum standards for their
operations, and the second set creates linkages to the needs of IMCOM's customers.
This second focus and the outcomes associated with the programs measured by the
respective metrics provide the first instance in which one enterprise serves another
in both word and deed.
Two of the six metrics that IMCOM uses to assess the performance of its
organizations, as related to the Behavioral Health system, are rated simply on the
existence of a program, but not on the quality of the services delivered by those
programs. These performance measurements: 1) garrisons with an established
CHPH, and ACS Accreditation, only measure the presence of the programs. This
means that the onus for creating the presumably desired functionality in the
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operation of these programs falls exclusively on the directors and installation-level
leaders. We observed this phenomenon in the varied quality these programs at the
four sites that we visited, and can be illustrated in comparing two Community
Health Promotion Councils. The CHPC at Site A was an active and dynamic program
that engaged stakeholders from all enterprises to build a highly functional coalition
with specific goals for reducing risk, preventing suicides, and enhancing community
health. The director of the Site A program relied heavily on building functional
personal relationships with the leadership of each of the Council's organizations.
FORSCOM and MEDCOM leaders at the Site were very pleased, and referred to the
CHPC director by name as someone who was doing excellent work with regard to
the installation's Behavioral Health system.
Conversely, at Site C the CHPC director stated explicitly that he had "no idea
what the CHPC was supposed to do."xi To be fair, this director had only been in the
job for six months, and had developed a long-term vision for what he wanted his
program to be; but the program had generated no actions or outcomes at the time of
the interview. The program at Site C, despite its lack of functionality, met all of the
standards set forth in the Army's Community Health regulation that covered the
existence of CHPC, and was could thus be measured as a success by IMCOM's
metrics.
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The point to be taken from these two examples is that simply measuring the
existence of a program or service does nothing to guarantee their actual
performance. Improperly devised performance measurements, although well
intentioned, may result in lost opportunities and resources applied to non-
functional activities.
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Figure 3.1 Installation Risk Reduction Shot Group
While two of the six IMCOM metrics are not tied to actual performance, the
remaining four measure program value delivery through quantifiable success
measures. A good example is the Installation Risk Reduction "Shot Group" Rating.
This metric helps to assess the success of IMCOM programs in reducing
manifestations of the risk behaviors shown in Figure 3.1. As manifestations
decrease, the indicators move closer to the middle of the bull's-eye, tightening the
"shot group." IMCOM controls programs that are aimed at reducing the frequency of
all of the fifteen risk behaviors. This technique measures the effectiveness of
IMCOM's programs, which in turn pays a direct benefit to FORSCOM by increasing
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readiness of its soldiers, and to MEDCOM by proportionally reducing the demand for
medical services through reduction of injury outcomes associated with the
behaviors.
We see in this section that metrics that measure behaviors that are beneficial
to enterprise may generate unintended and counterproductive consequences for
other actors in the system. Although these performance measures often generate
action that directly benefits the primary enterprise, we occasionally observe a
misalignment of outcome with intent as we see with MEDCOM. Finally, in
FORSCOM we observed behavior, driven by metrics, which yielded a short-term
solution, but transformed into a potential long-term problem.
3.2 Information and Knowledge Management: The next area of focus in the
Army's behavioral health system is the role of communication within and between
the enterprises. We will see that the three enterprises have internally focused
systems that demonstrate little consideration of the impacts of their practices on the
other stakeholders in the behavioral health system. The only exceptions that we
will observe are those information flows that are specifically needed to satisfy
performance measurement criteria or those mandated by policy.
3.2.1. FORSCOM: Commanders in FORSCOM units frequently receive new soldiers of
all ranks into their organizations, as military personnel change units about once
every three years. This presents a leadership challenge for the unit leadership, as
there is no pre-planned transmission of information regarding the soldiers who
move to a new unit. This issue relates to Behavioral Health in two ways. First, the
Army Human Resources Command's policy xii regarding post-deployment
52
Hstabilization (rest) periods disintegrates chains of command and teams who have a
baseline for "normal" for each other well before the expected period for the
manifestation of abnormal behaviors associated with Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) and Acute Stress Disorder (ASD). Without a knowledge capture
mechanism for this type of data and a deliberate transmission of the data to the new
unit, the inherent understanding of typical behavior for an individual is lost when
his or her peers and leaders change, due either to soldier or leader movement. If
soldier actions deviate, then the new leadership has no benchmark for how far the
soldier's behavior has shifted.
Second is the need for effective integration of knowledge capture in the
deployed environment. Both commanders and Behavioral Health providers have
stated a need for documentation of traumatic incidents during deployments that
could serve as a trigger for PTSD or for mTBI/TBI. There is information that is
currently captured in the CENTCOM Combined Information Data Network Exchange
(CIDNE) tool, which could potentially be leveraged, but is currently not exploited by
FORSCOM leaders or MEDCOM providers. Although some units have undertaken
efforts to record such incidents, this is not an Army-wide practice. The effect of a
missing knowledge management mechanism is twofold. First, leaders have no
traceability to link abnormal behaviors to potential root causes in those soldiers
who do not self-identify for Behavioral Health needs. Second, providers cannot
identify soldiers who self identify for combat-related Behavioral Health issues with
no associated root cause.
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The effect of inadequate knowledge management and information systems is
twofold. First, leaders in FORSCOM units are unable to adequately understand the
current condition of their soldiers' mental state, relative to a historical baseline.
Second, FORSCOM units are unable to provide an accurate medical history to clinical
providers in MEDCOM and IMCOM. This effect creates an effective state of isolation
from, but dependence on, the other enterprises for treating the behavioral health
needs of FORSCOM's soldiers.
3.2.2. MEDCOM: As with FORSCOM, the US Army Medical Command has internal
information systems problems, and a significant challenge in the execution of
knowledge sharing that it must overcome to effectively support the Behavioral
Health services demand of its customer, FORSCOM units. MEDCOM utilizes
disconnected, unreliable information systems that inhibit top performance from the
enterprise and frustrate medical providers. Likewise, there is a widespread
rejection of knowledge sharing with FORSCOM due to concerns over the impact of
releasing protected information on professional licenses. Combined, these two
factors result in an enterprise that has ownership of extremely important behavioral
health information, but is either unable or unwilling to share it with other
enterprises who desperately need it.
MEDCOM uses the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology
Application (AHLTA), a portion of the military's electronic medical records system,
to document and transmit medical clinical information between clinical providers
and their staffs who require access. The underlying system, the Composite Health
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Care System (CHCS), was created to combine all medical data collection and
scheduling into a single system.
Providers at every site have stated that AHLTA is the single biggest
frustration in their day-to-day operations due to its unfriendly interface,
unreliability, and limitations on data entry capabilities. A clinical behavioral health
provider at one site stated that "in a twenty minute patient encounter, I spend ten
minutes just trying to get the computer to work,"xiii when commenting on the
difficult AHLTA interface. Another, when asked about AHLTA's reliability, noted
that, "every day there is cursing up and down this [clinic] hallway because of AHLTA
crashes."xiv Finally, regarding the ability of AHLTA's data entry limitations, the size
of a standard Behavioral Health clinical input form (OQ45) exceeds the system's
upload limit, frustrating a patient's continuity of care as he or she moves from
provider to provider. The inconveniences of the information system primarily affect
medical providers, but the outcome of the combined issues affects the entire system,
as a difficult and unreliable information system yields diminished information
fidelity for all those who rely on AHLTA. Both MEDCOM providers and FORSCOM
commanders use this information; the former as a repository for the accumulated
medical knowledge, and the latter, to inform mission readiness and administrative
decisions on each soldier.
Commanders in FORSCOM must rely on the opinions and decisions of
MEDCOM's Behavioral Health to inform their readiness and administrative
decisions. The standard means of communication between clinicians and
commanders is the Department of the Army Form 3349 (Appendix C), a two-page
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form that allows the clinician to describe the physical limitations imposed by a
soldier's medical condition. Providers and Commanders at each site report that the
form is inadequate for reporting behavioral health states and associated limitations.
The result is the necessity for in-person or telephonic communication between the
two parties.
It is in this communication that we observe the knowledge sharing policy that
inhibits the much needed flow of information between the enterprises. In thirteen
interview sessions with 110 total respondents from the Chain of Command, at three
FORSCOM installationsx", there was a uniform response that personal information
protection under the Health Insurance Privacy and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was
held up as an impediment to successful information exchange with Behavioral
Health providers. Conversely, over 75% of the 33 clinical providers interviewed
stated that they cannot or would not share protected information with commanders
due to concerns over patient privacy and fear of losing their medical license due to a
HIPAA violation. This is troubling for two reasons: first, commanders are
responsible for the health and welfare of their soldiers as well as mission readiness.
If a provider has information that the commander needs in order to execute on
these responsibilities, particularly if the soldier is a danger to himself or others, then
that information must be shared. Second, DoD regulations and MEDCOM guidance
require that this information must be shared.
DoD Instruction 6490.08 (August 17, 2011) requires that Behavioral Health
providers notify commanders of soldier behavioral health conditions that could
precipitate harm to self, to others, to the mission, or in circumstances "in which
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proper execution of the military mission" would require notification. The
notification to commanders must include the diagnosis, treatment plan, the impact
on duty or mission, the prognosis, duty limitations, and any implications on the
safety of the soldier or others. Further, ALARACT 160/2010 - VCSA Sends on
Protected Health Information (PHI) makes clear that health care providers and
commanders must have a dialogue beyond the DD 3349 form described above.
Finally, DoD Instruction 6025.18-R, paragraphs C1.2.5 and C7.11, state that
commanders have the right to their soldiers' medical and behavioral health records
for the purpose of determining fitness for duty, and OTSG/MEDCOM Policy Memo
10-042 details the procedure for commanders and unit medical personnel to obtain
the information.
Taken together, these documents assert that if a provider recognizes a
condition that will cause a soldier to be unable or even less able, to perform his
mission essential tasks, then the provider must clearly articulate that to the
command. The failure to follow means one of two things: either MTF Commanders
are not enforcing the Department of Defense and MEDCOM guidance, or these
instructions have not been published to the clinicians who serve FORSCOM and its
soldiers.
3.2.3 IMCOM: In an organization whose performance metrics generate some
programs that are proactively customer serving and some programs that are
inwardly focused, we should expect varied effectiveness in knowledge management
and communication. This is precisely what was observed. In this section we will
discuss instances of IMCOM programs, Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) and the
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Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). These programs each have regular
interaction with both FORSCOM and MEDCOM, but only SRP has performance
metrics that directly support cooperation.
The Soldier Readiness Processing station is an IMCOM activity that is staffed
with MEDCOM clinical providers, and serves FORSCOM. For the purposes of
Behavioral Health, SRP receives FORSCOM-generated soldier risk assessments while
soldiers are still deployed in order to provide targeted Behavioral Health services to
those pre-identified as high and medium risk. This is an example of knowledge
management and communication between the enterprises that is appropriate and
successful. IMCOM coordinates resources from one enterprise into a directed
response to the needs identified from knowledge transmitted from the third.
Upon arrival at home station, every soldier participates in a short behavioral
health consultation with a MEDCOM-provided clinician in order to provide a second
layer of detection for those who may not have been identified by the "downrange"
assessment tools. Here we see a structural inefficiency in the system caused by
improper information flows and inter-enterprise coordination. Clinical providers
working at the SRP stations do not generate clinical referrals to MEDCOM's
Behavioral Health clinics. Instead, the SRP providers refer those identified as high
or medium risk back to the FORSCOM Primary Care providers, so that the Primary
Care provider may make the referral to MEDCOM. The rationale behind this has
been explained in different ways at different sites. Some sites report that if SRP
generates a referral, then the feedback structure flows back, inappropriately, to SRP
rather than to the soldier's Primary Care clinician. Others report that the reason for
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the procedure is keep Primary Care and the unit in the information loop. Regardless
of the rationale, this creates duplication of effort, and it begs the question why
FORSCOM's organic clinicians do not supervise and participate in their own SRP
process.
Despite the inefficiencies, we observe in IMCOM's SRP the first glimpses of
deliberate inter-enterprise cooperation with consistent patterns of information
flows and knowledge management procedures. In the Army Substance Abuse
Program (ASAP), however, we observe knowledge management procedures that do
not assist the other enterprises with work that must be done cooperatively in order
to fully serve the soldier's behavioral health needs.
Patients enter ASAP through soldier self-referral, command referral, or
clinical referral from Behavioral Health. Whatever the means of entry into the
program, ASAP begins treatment of patients with an extensive clinical intake,
executed by a counselor using the ASAP Clinical Assessment Form (ACAF) (see
Appendix D). This intake requires two hours, and afterward the counselor must
enter this same information into a series of paper form, (Appendix D) , which
requires approximately one hour. Finally, to finish the intake the counselor enters a
very short note into AHLTA to inform other clinical providers that the soldier "saw
an ASAP counselor on a specific date for substance abuse treatment for a specified
period of time."xvi The patient's first encounter with ASAP, in total, consists of two
hours of filling out a form with a counselor and no real treatment. Further,
counselors with over fifteen years of experience, report that they spend over three
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hours filling out redundant forms when a one-hour evaluation and one-page
narrative in an AHLTA note would suffice.
MEDCOM and FORSCOM are impacted by these procedures each in their own
way. First, MEDCOM is unable to see, through AHLTA, any actionable information
regarding the patient's substance abuse/dependence or the course of treatment.
MEDCOM clinicians stated that, "I don't think [ASAP is] doing any documentation at
all, and we don't get anything useful from the two-sentence AHLTA note that [ASAP]
generates. "xvii The result is that a comorbid patient that enters Behavioral Health or
a Medical Evaluation board must undergo a MEDCOM-specific clinical intake or
unnecessary back-and-forth clinical referrals for drug dependence, duplicating
effort and further overwhelming clinical resources.
This has a second order effect on FORSCOM. When an NMR soldier in a
FORSCOM unit is being processed for discharge from the Army, the period of
reduced unit readiness is extended due to the need for redundant clinical
procedures for substance abuse evaluation. Finally, FORSCOM is affected by ASAP's
knowledge management procedures due to the diminished ASAP capacity caused by
the unnecessarily heavy administrative load per patient.
3.3 Incentives:
3.3.1 Stakeholders: Actors in the system are incentivized to deliver on the measured
behavior, but little else with regard to the other enterprises. We see the impacts in
the knowledge sharing and communication between the enterprises. With few
exceptions, the incentivized behavior does not involve working with agencies
outside of, or often within, a stakeholder's own enterprise.
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In nearly every interview at every site, the stakeholders understood that they
could be doing more to coordinate the care for soldiers. Further, many stakeholders
understand the overall goals of the others, and they articulate the desire to work
closer with the rest of the behavioral health system. Unfortunately, the system is
overwhelmed with patients, and stakeholders are far too busy to stop and take time
to do anything other than what is being measured. To slow down will cause a
reduction in performance, and incentives will proportionally decrease. "People can
know what is the right thing want to do it deep down in their hearts, but at the end
of the day they will do what they get paid to do."xviii
3.3.2 Customers: A group that has not been discussed here, but has a significant
impact on the Army's behavioral health system, is the patients. Commanders and
clinicians universally report that the overwhelming majority of patients who use
behavioral health resources are the junior soldiers in the 18-24 year old
demographic. These soldiers are those who generate the greatest demand on the
system for a couple reasons. First, this is the Army's largest demographic, and
second, it is the 18 to 24 year old junior enlisted soldier who occupies the front lines
in combat operations.
These soldiers generally enter the Army straight out of high school. The
Army is their first real job, and for many it is their only opportunity to get a job with
any upward mobility.1 The military presents a unique "opportunity" for those who
choose to leverage the disability and benefits system for their own gain. The
1 This is the experience of the author, and is representative of most of the young
people that enlist in the Army.
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disjointed and overwhelmed behavioral health system is extremely vulnerable to
those seeking secondary gain for falsely obtaining a PTSD diagnosis. Soldiers who
receive this diagnosis can get a guaranteed 50% disability that generates lifetime
monetary payments as well as preferential treatment for employment and
government programs. Additionally, soldiers who leverage the system can remove
themselves from the deployment cycle and can use duty-limiting diagnoses to avoid
any undesirable conditions. This situation is further enabled by a system that "is
never going to tell anyone no if they say they have PTSD,"xix "...because no one wants
to be the [clinician] who gets their name on CNN as the doctor who signed off as
someone [who committed a crime or committed suicide] as ok."xx
The patients of the system understand the vulnerabilities, and we cannot
attribute complete blame to the soldiers who take advantage, as they are passively
incentivized to do it. A lifetime benefits versus fighting for a job in an uncertain
economy; safe, limited duty in the United States versus deployment to combat in
Afghanistan - these are the choices that the system affords 18 to 24 year olds. The
owners of the system should not be surprised when soldiers use weaknesses for
their own gain.
The outcome of this unintended system of incentives falls on first on
FORSCOM units, as every soldier who falsely seeks Behavioral Health care and
receives a duty limiting diagnosis reduces the unit's P-Level and in turn their T-
Level as described above. Commanders who see these soldiers every day, on and off
duty express that they are very frustrated by this behavior, but "are powerless to
stop it, as they cannot tell a soldier that he or she cannot go to the doctor."xxi This
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frustration extends to the whole unit's attitude toward Behavioral Health, as it is
perceived as a "safe place where soldiers can go to avoid anything they don't want to
do."xxii
More importantly, soldiers leveraging this system vulnerability affect the
soldiers who truly need Behavioral Health services, but do not want to be perceived
as working the system. One commander reported that, "it's heartbreaking to see a
guy who you really know needs help, but just refuses to go because he doesn't want
to be thought of as a malingerer."xxiii
MEDCOM and IMCOM providers are affected by this behavior because
soldiers who unnecessarily seek Behavioral Health care overwhelm clinical capacity.
Providers and commanders report that the percentage of soldiers seeking
behavioral health care that are seeking secondary gain is alarmingly high. Clinicians
"have to see everyone who comes in the door though, because [they] can't turn away
someone who may have a real need."xxiv
3.4 Chapter Summary:
The Army's behavioral health system is rife with well-intentioned
performance measurement, underpinned by rigid incentive systems that generate
unintended consequences in the form of dysfunctional inter-enterprise behavior.
Both the clinical and non-clinical portions of the system are overwhelmed with
demand - some true and some artificial, that precludes individual stakeholders from
maintaining working relationships, aside from those specifically measured or
mandated by policy, across functional silos. It seems that the solution to these
system challenges could be to align the strategic objectives of the three enterprises
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for the purposes of improving the multi-enterprise behavioral health network, and
to impose a governance structure that transcends the three hierarchies. This
structure must measure performance across the three enterprises and incentivize
cooperative behaviors in order to force mutually beneficial behavior from all
stakeholders in the interest of soldier health and system effectiveness and
efficiency.
In the following three chapters, we will explore potential solutions that
address these challenges.
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Chapter 4 - Unity of Effort
One of the limitations of the hierarchical configuration of the current Behavioral
Health network is that each enterprise is incentivized to act independently, with little
regard to the others. As we have observed in the previous chapter, each enterprise pursues
its own strategic objectives which, when examined at face value, are aligned to enable
mission readiness. Closer examination yielded a view of three enterprises as being
unlinked and myopically intent on achieving their own goals.
Allee (2000) defines value as currency in a network as transactions of goods,
services, and revenue; knowledge; and intangible benefits.i Recurring value exchanges
between the enterprises in the Behavioral Health network are not well coordinated and
system performance suffers as a consequence. When the needs of the system's ultimate
customer, the soldier, exceeds the capabilities of one enterprise the handoff to the next
agency is clumsy and unstandardized. In plain terms, when a soldier's needs cannot be met
by one organization on the installation he/she is "passed over the wall" to the next with
almost no coordination of care.
A first step toward integrating the three enterprises for the purpose of delivering
Behavioral Health care is to develop a common focus for all stakeholders involved in the
coordinated provision of these services. A clearly defined and communicated set of
objectives that are aimed at an overarching system goal will act as a catalyst for the
integration of Behavioral Health processes.
There is a broad range of literature describing research and theory regarding
unification of complex systems of organizations. A common theme in academic and
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practitioner writing is the need for cooperative action toward a shared end state. A review
of some of these writings will inform a thoughtful establishment of network wide strategic
goals.
4.1 Literature Review
Cebul, Rebitzer, Taylor, and Votruba (2008) assert that efficiency and effectiveness
of a health care network is directly linked to the degree of coordination in that network
over a period of time. Health care system underperformance results from system
stakeholders intent on seeking their own goals and objectives ahead of cooperation with
other stakeholders. Fragmentation of a system further yields competition that reduces
coordination as well as quality of care, and it increases resource utilization. Cooperation in
a health care system that considers the specialized capabilities of the different
organizations, enhancement of information flows, and deliberate integration of the
stakeholders results, over time, in marked improvement of system performance.ii
Koza and Lewin (1998) support this view in that strategic alliances with an
exploitation strategy, that is the goal of leveraging stakeholder strengths toward a common
goal, have a greater probability for success due to cooperative goal seeking.iii This
assertion that firms benefit from participation in network relationships is likewise held up
by Holm, Eriksson, and Johanson (1999), who state that firms are able to generate greater
value in cooperative partnerships than the members of the network could produce
independently.iv
Nightingale and Srinivasan (2011) describe strategic objectives as the enterprise's
goals which, when achieved will enhance the enterprise's ability to deliver on its value
proposition, or reason for being. These objectives should reflect the needs of the overall
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enterprise, but should also address the needs of the stakeholders and their value
propositions. Finally, processes that the enterprise executes to create collective value
should link to enterprise objectives and each should be gauged by appropriate metrics.
The authors stress the need for a holistic approach to enterprise transformation with an
emphasis on effectiveness before efficiency.v This emphasis on value production for both
the stakeholders and the overall enterprise is echoed by Murman et al. (2002) who explain
that participation in a multi-organization enterprise must produce a benefit to justify the
effort expended toward cooperative goals.vi
Campbell and Alexander (1997) state the need for firms to clearly distinguish their
purpose for existence and to understand insights for value creation. It is from those
insights that strategy must be developed.vii Professor Richard Rumelt (2011) presents
three elements that he considers crucial for the establishment of an effective strategic plan
for organizations. He asserts that these three elements transcend specific industries, and
he provides anecdotes drawn from his vast consulting experience as well as history as
evidence for his points.
Rumelt's second tenent in his framework for strategy development is the necessity
for a guiding principal that will drive actions for moving the company from where it is to
where it wants to be. In plain terms, the company must have a meaningful strategic
objective that serves as the anchor for its long term plans. This is where companies use an
understanding of their competitors and environment, so they can array their own
capabilities and strengths to provide an advantage.viii
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Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations (2011) provides the
overarching doctrinal guidance for Army operations. Most importantly to this work, it
details the top-level concept of the Army's Operations Structure. Here the publication gives
the framework for prioritizing effort among subordinate organizations one the basis of the
criticality to mission success. The organization that is most important for achieving
success is designated as the operation's main effort. Other organizations in Army
operations are designated as supporting efforts, which serve to support the success of the
main effort.ix
In the classical text on military strategy, On War, Carl von Clausewitz (1873)
describes unity of effort as synchronization of many organizations, under a common
command, toward a common objective in order to achieve the maximum possible effect.
Unity of command and effort result in coordinated action that may achieve far more than
the unsynchronized individual efforts of units deployed individually.x
The literature on informs our thinking of the importance of several aspects
regarding strategy development for the Behavioral Health network. First is the potential
for emergent network outcomes that are possible through coordinating and leveraging the
unique capabilities of the stakeholders. Second, strategic objectives should be considered
as a set of guiding principles to which plans are anchored, instead of considering the
objectives plans unto themselves. Finally, network strategy should be devised to deliver on
the overall value proposition, but should advancement toward the objectives should yield
benefits to all of the stakeholders.
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4.2 The Need for Shared Objectives.
The first step toward improving the performance of the behavioral health system is
to unify the focus of the enterprises. FORSCOM, MEDCOM, and IMCOM and their
representatives on the installation, shown in Figure 4.1 must cooperate on specific
activities that contribute to the behavioral health system, but are chiefly concerned with
execution of their own goals per their incentive structure. Since each enterprise is focused
on its own strategic objectives, then there is little cause for cooperative endeavors, which is
concurrent with the findings of Cebul et al (2008). With a unified purpose, achieved
through the development of shared strategic objectives, the network may begin to realize
integrated behaviors that eliminate duplications of effort as well as information gaps,
improving overall network performance.
Figure 4.1 Installation Behavioral Health Network Leadership
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The outcome of a unification of purpose in the system will be the designation of one
enterprise as the value-delivery agent, and the others as supporting activities that directly
enable that lead agent to execute the goals of the top-level organization. Nightingale and
Srinivasan (2011) assert the need for identification of an enterprise value proposition as
the reason for being, development of strategic objectives that support that proposition, and
alignment of integrated enterprise processes to fulfill those objectives. Execution of this
assertion aligns the purposes of the stakeholder organizations toward a common goal, and
integration of the stakeholders requires the establishment of standardized and effective
value exchanges in support of effective and efficient delivery on the system's overall
objective.
Army doctrine (APD 3-0) mandates, in combat operations, the appointment of a
main effort and supporting efforts. The main effort is the "designated subordinate unit
whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success.
Supporting efforts are designated subordinate units with missions that support the success
of the main effort." xi In practical terms, the main effort is the primary agent in the top-level
organization's delivery on its value proposition. Supporting efforts are stakeholders that
deliver value that directly enables the primary agent to deliver on the value proposition on
behalf of the enterprise.
Unification of the Army's behavioral health system must begin with an analysis of
the system's overall value proposition and continue with the development of common
strategic objectives as a basis for defining integrated processes that minimize waste in
stakeholder value exchanges. Identification of the system's value proposition will define
which enterprise is the main effort, and which are the supporting efforts, enabling positive
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synergistic behavior, vice the disjointed and inwardly focused activities we observe in the
current state.
Unlike informally aligned business The mission of Forces
networks, a common headquarters oversees Command is to train,
mobilize, deploy, sustain,
the Army's operationally independent transform and reconstitute
conventional forces in order
enterprises, and this headquarters, the to provide a sustained flow
Department of the Army has a congressionally of relevant and ready land
power to combatant
mandated value proposition; "The mission of commanders worldwide indefener fothewnation
the Army is to overcome any nations defense of the nation.
responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the FORSCOM Campaign Plan, 2012-2015
peace and security of the United States."xii When we compare this mission, or value
proposition, of the top-level organization against the objectives of its subordinates, then it
is obvious that FORSCOM is the Army's main effort. Strategic objectives for the Behavioral
Health system must reflect this and directly support the main effort's mission, effectively
designating MEDCOM and IMCOM as supporting efforts.
Creation of the Behavioral Health system's objectives must be developed by the top-
level organization for multiple reasons. First, definition of strategic objectives must come
from this first echelon above the others; else the leaders of the individual enterprises will
likely continue pursuit of their own objectives without regard to the other enterprises in
accordance with their individual incentive systems. Second, top-level guidance for the
system protects systemic evolution from New Leadership Failure (Nightingale and
Srinivasan, 2011), in which new enterprise leaders take the organization in a new direction
with no regard to previous goals and progress. If the system's goals are established and
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codified by the top-level organization, then new leaders for the subordinate enterprises
will be unable to halt or reverse the integration process. Finally, policy created at the top
level may be implemented as a standard across all installations, reducing variation in the
system and uncertainty over the priority of local versus Army policies.
The first operational confluence of all A A A
Vice Chief of
Staff of the
three enterprises in the Behavioral Health Army
system is the office of the Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army (VCSA), who acts as a Chief Operating MEDCOM IMCOM
(ArmySG) Commander Commander)
Officer for the Department of the Army,
Figure 4.2. Operational Confluence of the Behavioral
managing policy and resources for the whole Health Network.
Army. Leaders of the three enterprises report directly to the VCSA, as shown in Figure 4.2.
This is important because the reporting relationships between the enterprises'
representatives at the installation level (ref: Figure 4.1) are not as rigid as those at the top
level. If common strategic objectives are developed at the top level, cooperatively with the
leaders of the three enterprises, then the network may proceed with a unity of effortxiii and
the development of processes that support the effective and efficient value exchanges
among the stakeholders.
We observe the alternative unified effort in the current state. Chapter two of this
document details what appears to be dovetailing organizational goals for the three
enterprises, but we observe and describe in Chapter Three the effects that flow down from
unsynchronized efforts. Disjointed, and inwardly focused efforts result in a behavioral
health system that underperforms in supporting the top-level organization's value
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proposition. This underperformance can be directly traced to uncoordinated actions that
attempt to provide behavioral health services to a common customer, the soldier.
4.3 Proposed Strategic Objectives
If we consider FORSCOM as the Army's primary agent, or main effort, in delivering
on its value proposition, then the Behavioral Health network's strategic objectives should
reflect that, and the capabilities of the supporting efforts should be considered and
incorporated into the shared system goals. A final examination of the FORSCOM mission,
above, through the lens of the elements that providing behavioral health services, yields
three key words. The first of these, ready, describes the overall goal of the Behavioral
Health network, as this is the overall goal of the main effort as evidenced not only by the
mission statement, but also the enterprise's performance measurement system. If the
Army's main effort's goal is to be ready to conduct combat operations, then the Army's
Behavioral Health network must focus primarily on medical readiness in support of that
goal.
Objective 1: Maximize individual medical readiness. The first strategic objective of the
Army's behavioral health network should focus on the main effort's value proposition,
which is likewise nested in the parent organization's value proposition. Providing relevant
and ready forces to combatant commanders requires all home station activity to center on
ensuring that people, units, and equipment are ready to perform combat operations. Since
the three enterprises participating in the behavioral health network have a stake in
increasing the readiness level of soldiers, as defined by Army-wide standardsxiv, and
74
succeed in this endeavor through cooperative efforts, the first strategic objective must
reflect this need for cooperative engagement.1
It is important to make the distinction between individual and unit medical
readiness, as IMCOM and MEDCOM cannot directly affect the readiness levels of units.
Additionally as we have observed, commanders of combat units currently affect unit
readiness through substitution of medically ready and non-ready soldiers to affect unit
readiness commensurate with the requirements of the Army Force Generation cycle. By
focusing on individual readiness the system is forced to focus on medical outcomes for
those with positive prognoses and expeditious discharges for those soldiers who are not
expected to make a recovery that would allow the soldier to return to duty.
A behavioral health network strategy, cooperatively executed by the stakeholders
(Fuchs et al., 2000)w, will enhance the Army's ability to deliver on its value proposition
through an increase in the collective P-Level of warfighting units. Again we assume that
FORSCOM is the Army's main effort, and that MEDCOM and IMCOM are supporting efforts.
A strategic objective that links the three enterprises for collaborative efforts, aimed at a
goal that each can affect, will encourage the development of integrated processes.
Integration of the network processes should yield a reduction in structural inefficiencies,
reducing costs for each, and an increase in soldier-centric care planning.
Objective 2. Build resilient soldiers through proactive education and skills development to
mitigate self-imposed stresses. The second proposed objective for the behavioral health
1 There is important work to be accomplished in standardizing "readiness" across
Behavioral Health providers. The authors found, during data collection, that there is
widespread disagreement and/or lack of knowledge regarding what constitutes a status of
"medically ready." Establishment of such a standard is outside the scope of this work, but
must be addressed if standardization of network outcomes is a long term goal.
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system is tied to training and sustaining of the Army's forces. Respondents at each site at
which data was collected state that soldiers in the 18 to 24 year old demographic
demonstrate a reduced capability to effectively deal with finances, relationships, sleep
hygiene, use of alcohol, and the stress that mismanagement of each brings. These same
sources report that combat-related stresses are fifth (or lower) on the list of those who
cause soldiers to become NMR for Behavioral Healthxvi. Commanders, Primary Care
Physicians, and Behavioral Health providers alike state that the combination of combat
stresses with the self-imposed stresses that results in duty-limiting conditions.
When we consider that that the Army's largest demographic is the 18 to 24 year old
age group, then it follows that the behavioral health network must work together to teach
this group to effectively deal with self-imposed stressors and stress. Development of an
integrated, comprehensive system for training soldiers requires utilization and
coordination of capabilities that are distributed across the network. Each enterprise has
unique capabilities for building resilience, and by allowing each to concentrate on its
organic competencies, mission overlap may be reduced and synchronization of training
programs can yield positive synergistic behaviors that accomplish a greater end with an
overall reduction in resource requirements.
As an example, IMCOM's Army Community Services employs financial counselors
who are uniquely suited to proactively educate soldiers about financial management, the
Family Life Chaplains in FORSCOM's Chaplain Corps are able to push relationship
education, and MEDCOM's Department of Behavioral Health has organic social workers
who can teach stress reduction techniques to soldiers before problems arise. Respondents
at all sites report, and are frustrated by the fact, that all of these services are strictly
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reactive, and by the time a soldier comes into contact with a professional he or she is
already in crisis.
By coordinating and integrating resilience training to prevent crises the network
enhances soldiers' abilities to reduce self-imposed stressors that reduce the collective
capability to deliver on the organization's value proposition. Again, this must be
approached as a collective and coordinated effort in order to preclude gaps and overlaps.
The Army has implemented an effort to holistically address soldier wellbeing
through its Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program (reference: Appendix E). The
program addresses five areas that, together, generate fitness. These factors, Physical,
Emotional, Spiritual, Social, and Family, are used as the framework in which resilience or
strength should be improved. This program, since it is already in place, could be leveraged
as a basis for stress reduction and mitigation efforts.
The Army has already started fielding a Master Resiliency Trainer (MRT) program
that equips selected unit personnel to train basic stress reduction skills at the unit level,
but those who have received the training report that their MRT duties are second in
priority to their combat mission, and that they are unable to be everywhere, all the time.
The MRT program is a step forward, but is no substitute for proactive professionally
executed resiliency education. Again, to provide a comprehensive program, then the entire
behavioral health network, to include clinical and non-clinical stakeholders, should
embrace stress reduction and mitigation as one of its objectives.
Objective 3. Facilitate successful and expeditious transition to civilian life for soldiers who
cannot meet medical readiness standards. Although some soldiers can be treated for
Behavioral Health conditions and return to duty, not every soldier has a positive prognosis.
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In order to meet the mission of reconstituting combat forces, it becomes necessary to
discharge permanently NMR soldiers from the service. The separations process involves
all three enterprises, and to be executed expeditiously will require integrated, standardized
processes that reach across the three. This objective must be pursued in terms of efficiency
and quality, as it is essential to deliver all appropriate services to separating soldiers with
the intent of preparing them as well as possible for success outside the military.
The reason that this objective is important, in terms of delivery on the Army's value
proposition is that separation of NMR solders makes room for replacements in FORSCOM
units and reduces the demand for services from IMCOM and MEDCOM. By Army policy a
FORSCOM unit may not request a replacement for an MNR soldier until that soldier is
separated from the service, and respondents at all sites report that the current separation
process for Behavioral Health reasons requires, on average, one year. For the year that the
soldier is in the process the unit has reduced readiness and must expend human resources
to ensure that the soldier's medical and administrative needs are met. Likewise for that
year, IMCOM and MEDCOM must commit resources to both care delivery and the
separation process. If the timeframe for separations is reduced all three organizations
benefit. The separating soldier also benefits from the potential gains presented by a more
efficient and effective separations effort. He or she is able to leave the military and enter a
new career more quickly instead of waiting for the system while they are unable to
contribute to the unit mission.
Streamlining the separations process requires contributions from all three
enterprises, and if network processes are developed to improve efficiency and
effectiveness, all stakeholders will benefit. Additionally, improvement on this objective, as
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with the others, will enhance the parent organization's ability to deliver on its value
proposition.
4.4 Chapter Summary
The Army's Behavioral Health network must develop shared strategic objectives for
the three contributing enterprises. These objectives will serve as an overarching set of
goals that drive integrated behavior toward a unified purpose. The network should
identify its collective value proposition as well as the stakeholder, or in this case the
enterprise, that is the primary value delivery agent or in the Army's terms, the main effort.
Network strategic objectives should focus on the value delivery agent's value proposition in
order to enhance the delivery of the network's mission, but improvement of network
processes linked to those objectives should likewise benefit all stakeholders.
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Chapter 5 - Performance Measurement
and Incentives
A unified set of network objectives is a first step toward integration of the
three enterprises that contribute to Behavioral Health care provision. It is unlikely,
however, that stakeholders will change their behavior and establish effective
cooperative processes based solely on a call to unification through a set of altruistic
goals. Without a persistent mechanism for affecting system behaviors, the
thoughtfully established network objectives will likely turn out as the latest
buzzwords that adorn PowerPoint briefings but generate no action beyond the
status quo.
"Behavior that is measured is executed and improved upon"i is noted by
many as common wisdom in commercial industries as well as in the military. The
Army executes quarterly briefings in which subordinate leaders stand and
individually account for their organizations' performance to their superiors.
Underperforming organizations are "assisted" by their superiors in order to bring
organizational functionality up to standard. Extra assistance from higher
headquarters brings with it extra scrutiny, so junior leaders strive to meet and
exceed the standards in reportable behaviors, often at the expense of other
activities.
In order to induce behavioral change in the network, leadership must install
a system of measurement and accountability for desired cooperative behaviors. The
measured behaviors should be representative of the desired network outcomes.
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Otherwise, performance measurement will generate unproductive or disruptive
activity when stakeholders apply resources to those behaviors that are measured
but not related to Behavioral Health network functionality.
5.1 Literature Review
Merrick, Garnick, Horgan, and Hodgkin (2002) analyze the use of quality
management activities in behavioral health organizations. The authors proposed
that in Managed Care Organizations cost savings had overtaken quality of care as a
primary focus. The research found that patient satisfaction surveys and adherence
to practice guidelines were the most common benchmarks for quality assurance
used in three quarters of organizations surveyed. Conversely, use of clinical
outcomes as quality measurement criteria were only used by half of those clinics
surveyed. The authors propose that patient satisfaction and utilization of standard
processes were reported out to organizations responsible for the clinics, while
clinical outcomes were reported out, infrequently, to those purchasing clinical
services.ii
Bititci, Carrie, and MdDevitt (1997) describe performance measurement as a
critical driver of management and pursuit of strategic goals, and they cite integrity
and deployment as the keys to success in measurement system development. iii
Friedman, Kokia, and Shemer (2003) confirm these findings in their description of
the Israeli HMO model that seeks to maximize the quality of clinical care within the
constraints imposed by resources and government policies. This system links
clinical processes to performance measurement criteria, which are specifically
developed to improve upon strategic goals. The authors found that quality of health
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care increases and costs are regulated when system goals, metrics, and processes
are developed in concert. Additionally, information flow and cooperation in the
network improved when performance measurement was used as an integration
catalyst.iv Chennell et al. (2000) likewise address the potential for achieving success
through alignment of measurement systems with strategic goals and tactical level
processes.v
Neely, Gregory, and Platts (2005) describe performance measurement as the
quantification of action, and by measuring action performance is enhanced. The
authors go on to differentiate between effective and efficient action and assert that
effective performance measurement systems may improve each.vi
Sydow and Windeler (2003) examine the applicability of Structuration theory to
evaluation of networks of organizations. Using this theory the authors examine the
evolutionary development of interfirm networks in as a social system whose
behavior depends on its structure. Network effectiveness likely depends on a
combination of "trust, fairness reciprocity, mutual commitment" and the collective
will of the stakeholders to succeed. The writers conclude that due to dynamic
complexity, performance of interfirm networks is very difficult to assess at high
levels of granularity; however, specific network outcomes may be gauged and
evaluate over time.vii
Neely (1999) discusses the need for improvement of performance
measurement in many organizations, first because of a lack of integration with
business processes and second because of poor, or no, linkages to company strategy.
Conversely, the author cites a 1996 study that found companies who are high
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performers consistently have financial and non-financial performance metrics that
are understood by managers. These metrics are tied to strategic goals and are
regularly updated as the company and its goals change. The author states in this
work that re-engineering of processes necessitates a change to performance
measurement systems to reflect the desired outcomes of the new processes.
Unfortunately there is no universal, definitive set of criteria that, when improved
upon, can assure success, further necessitating regular attention to its measurement
systems.viii
Kaplan and Norton (2001) expand on Kaplan and Norton's (1992) Balanced
Scorecardix work to describe how measurement of leading indicators can allow
proactive organizational leadership. This stands in contrast to their original work in
which they used financial indicators as performance indicators, as financial criteria
lag performance and induce reactive management.x Bourne et al. (2000) also stress
the importance of performance measurement in achieving strategic success.
Additionally, they emphasize the need for vigilance in continuous alignment of
measurement systems with strategy, noting that the findings of effective
measurement can greatly affect strategic system management.xi
Neely et al. (1994) acknowledge early in their work that performance
measurement drives behavior in organizations and thus the execution of strategic
plans. Further, the writers hypothesize that leaders will place greater emphasis on
performance metrics that most closely align with their company's primary tasks. In
their research they found that the hypothesis was true for companies whose
competed on product quality, but was false for companies that achieved competitive
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advantage with price. Further, companies who compete on price were found to use
on-time delivery of the product as their primary performance measure. The
conclusion of the work was that strategic goals for a firm are achieved through
consistent decision-making and execution. Utilization of appropriate metrics in
gauging performance is a tool that leaders may use to induce the desired behavior in
their organizations.xii
The pervasive themes in the performance measurement literature inform us
that alignment of strategic goals to measurement systems is an enabler for long-
term success. Long-term success, however, is contingent on maintaining a
continuous alignment of the two. Finally, measurement of activity drives behavior
and improvement. Measurement systems, if implemented properly can be a
powerful tool for strategic level management and decision making.
5.2 Metrics Development. In Chapter 3 we saw the effect of performance
measurement on the network, producing inwardly focused and often
counterproductive behavior. Neely, et al acknowledge, and evidence in this case
confirms, that performance measurement drives organizational behavior an in turn
the execution of strategy. If the Behavioral Health network is unified in effort under
thoughtfully developed strategic objectives, then network performance must be
evaluated under performance measurement criteria commensurate with those
objectives.
The top-level goals of the network focus on integrated, full-spectrum
behavioral health care delivery to the soldier, but current performance
measurement criteria encourage behavior that does not consider other network
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stakeholders. For this reason the Behavioral Health network must develop metrics
that adequately measure the desired cooperative behaviors. If network-specific
metrics are not developed, then we should not expect change in behavior. MIT
Professor Jonathan Byrnes stated this idea succinctly: "People can know what the
right thing is, and they can want to do it deep down in their heart. At the end of the
day though, they're going to do what you pay them to do."xiii
An Army General Officer echoed this idea when he said that we must be
extremely careful in metrics development because organizations will do "whatever
they have to do to turn their indicators green on their PowerPoint slides."xiv By this
he meant that if a leader is required to explain his organization's status to an agency
to which he reports, then all of his resources will go into meeting the standards as
measured by superiors.
Measurement of cooperative behaviors is imperative for affecting this type of
behavior, but the network leaders must limit measurement to high-level activities.
Sydow and Windeler's (2003) work informs us that due to dynamic complexity of
interfirm behaviors, the level of granularity for these metrics must be maintained at
level that promotes the desired results, and not the specifics. If performance
measurement is kept at a sufficiently broad level, then the stakeholders in the
network are able to innovate at the tactical level over time and refine integrative
value exchanges that account for local constraints. This is consistent with the Lean
Enterprise principle "People, not just processes, effectuate lean value."xv
In order to gauge the functionality of the network in improving collaborative
behaviors, we must quantifiably measure those behaviors. Objective and
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comparable measurement of network performance allows leader attention and
influence to underperforming areas and transfer of demonstrated best practices to
other installations. This is a further call for the development of well-thought-out
metrics in order to avoid the management misstep of wanting what is measured
rather than measuring what is wanted.xvi Thoughtful high level metrics that
quantifiably and objectively measure desired outcomes will allow leaders to
evaluate performance over time and apply resources or policy changes as needed to
promote desired behaviors that are not being adequately met. If we accept that
stakeholders will apply their resources toward evaluated behaviors, then leaders
must ensure that network metrics are directly representative of the outcomes of the
desired behaviors.
Since three enterprises contribute to the desired network outcomes, metrics
developers should consider
that most interactions
exclude one enterprise. The
Mission
non-participating enterprise Commander
should not be held Behavioral
Health
Network
accountable for exchanges in
Commane o omnmander
which they do not participate.
Figure 5.1 shows the broad-
themed activities shared by
the network, and it is at this Figure 5.1. Cooperative Behaviors and Measurement Points for
Network Metrics.
level that metrics should be
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established. This creates a system of measurement in which enterprise leaders at
the installation levels are evaluated on their work with each of the other enterprise
leaders and enable a holistic approach to network behavior modification to align
with network strategy. This holistic approach in consistent with the Neely's finding
for the effect of performance measurement on companies who focus on quality
rather than financial rewards.
Finally, metrics developers should gauge activities that involve all three
enterprises and use those for an overall network health indicator. Although most
value exchanges involve two enterprises, there are some activities that require input
from all three, and these should be used as the installation's highest-level metrics
for evaluating progress over time. Since activities that require all three enterprises
will likewise require a more complex, or at least more numerous, set of inter-
enterprise value exchanges, it follows that progress in those criteria will be
indicative of the maturity of the network integration.
5.3 Metrics Developers.
Freidman, Kokia, and Shemer (20030 stated that quality of care and cost
savings are best achieved when metrics are developed concurrently and as a
complement to strategic goals. Since senior leaders develop the strategic objectives
for the network it follows that these same leaders should develop the performance
metrics by which installations Behavioral Health network will be measured. Metrics
should be cooperatively developed by the top-level leaders of the Army with the
leaders of the three applicable enterprises, shown in Figure 5.2 to ensure adequate
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accounting of shared activities and to show leader buy-in to the change to the status
quo in accordance with Enterprise Transformation Principles.xvi
Development of these performance measures by the top-level leaders serves
two additional purposes. First, as Neely (1999) points out, it is important to
continuously re-evaluate measurement systems, and since the standardized metrics
will span many installations, it is necessary for revisions to the measurement
system to be executed at such a level that can standardize the full organization.
Second, top-level leaders are the overseers of the network at every installation. If
objective, quantifiable comparison of installations and subordinate leader
performance is a desired attribute of the measurement system, then standardization
of the system, driven from the top down, is critical to success.
5.4 Incentive Systems
As discussed in Chapter 2, the incentive systems for military and Department of the
Army Civilians is static, and cannot be changed without a change in law. Because of
this we must consider modification to the incentives themselves as a constraint to
transformation of the network. Military and civilian annual performance
evaluations, however, may be changed simply through a change to Army Regulation,
and Army Senior Leadership is empowered to make this sort of change. Incentives
for network leaders and stakeholders at all levels should be aligned to Behavioral
Health network metrics. With a standardized, objective measurement system in
place that gauges the effectiveness of these leaders in generating desired behaviors
there is an opportunity for the Army to demonstrate emphasis on improving its
Behavioral Health System. Alignment of installation-level leader evaluations, and
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thus incentives, to Behavioral Health network will demonstrate leadership emphasis
and further force behavioral change.
5.5 Proposed Initial Metrics.
The first set of metrics to consider are those that measure processes that
involve only two enterprises. In the interest of leader evaluations, this allows each
to be measured in terms of two organizational relationships, which may reveal
particularly successful or unsuccessful leaders. Proper use of this technique will
prevent one officer from being rated on the merits of another. Proposed Initial
Metrics are summarized in Table 5.1 (below).
5.5.1 FORSCOM and MEDCOM. The shared processes for these two enterprises
will focus on the administration of Primary Care and Specialty Care. Each enterprise
has a stake in the success of the other for this purpose.
Metric 1.1: Duty hours lost due to time spent in Behavioral Health Care (Unit-
Based and Outpatient Specialty Care). By measuring soldier duty hours lost due
to time in care, with the goal of minimization, we can evaluate the effectiveness of
several processes. The first is the shared process of personnel accountability. When
soldiers leave their unit area to go to medical care, the unit's readiness decreases,
both in terms of personnel and training. Commanders at all sites report that when
soldiers go to Behavioral Health care they are gone for, generally, half a duty day.
Clinical providers concurrently report that they have very short waiting times in
their facilities, and that times for patient encounters are strictly observed. By
measuring lost hours, FORSCOM units are compelled to get soldiers to care
expeditiously and MEDCOM providers are required to streamline clinical processes
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that allow soldiers to minimize time spent waiting for care, so that soldiers can get
back to their unit areas.
More importantly, this metric encourages FORSCOM Primary Care Providers
and MEDCOM Clinical Providers to seek positive medical outcomes in a timely
fashion. If a soldier is in treatment for a protracted period of time, then it is likely
that he or she requires a greater number of appointments that would remove him or
her from the unit area.
Metric 1.2 Soldier-days lost due to duty limiting behavioral health profiles. If
leaders measure the time that soldiers spend on duty limiting profiles that
effectively remove them from the unit's readiness numbers, and attempt to
minimize this number, performance measurement may affect the two behaviors.
First, clinicians will be more likely to write profiles that enable soldiers to continue
to perform within the limits of their condition, rather than prohibiting such an array
of activities that keeps the soldier from performing any mission tasks. Second,
minimization of this metric will likely cause FORSCOM units to engage the
Behavioral Health system so that unit Primary Care Physicians may oversee a
treatment plan that facilitates quicker recovery.
5.5.2. FORSCOM and IMCOM. These two enterprises work together to execute risk
reduction, suicide prevention, and substance abuse treatment. Network metrics for
this relationship will focus on the risk behavior reduction and on successful
completion of the ASAP Program.
Metric 2.1 Soldier days lost due to preventable incidents related to
manifestations of identified risk behaviors. IMCOM's Community Health
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Promotion Council, Directorate of Emergency Services, and ASAP each work to
provide prevention programs and education for risk behaviors (reference Figure
3.1) and to track manifestations of these behaviors for trend tracking. FORSCOM
units execute a robust safety program that includes risk behavior reduction,
corresponding to IMCOM's Installation Risk Reduction Program. If minimization of
this metric is pursued cooperatively then installation leaders should expect to see
progressively improved integration of these programs and a resultant reduction in
risk behavior manifestations.
Metric 2.2 Percentage of soldiers successfully completing the ASAP program
and returning to duty. The goal of maximizing this metric should prompt action
from both enterprises, as the program requires participation from both. First,
FORSCOM leaders will likely further engage ASAP for the purpose of developing and
executing a tailored recovery program. Additionally, units will be more likely to
ensure that soldiers attend all appointments with ASAP Counselors. ASAP
personnel will be compelled to track soldiers closely through effective integration
exchanges with FORSCOM units. This will likely result in continued enrollment in
the program during disruptive periods such as soldier transitions to a new unit, a
new installation, or deployment.
5.5.3 IMCOM and MEDCOM. These two organizations work together for several
purposes, but the one most closely related to the Army's Behavioral Health network
is the Warrior Transition Unit. MEDCOM provides medical support through
intensive case management as well as priority for appointments to soldiers in these
units. IMCOM extends special institutional services such as family programs and
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education to WTU soldiers. These two enterprises already work closely in the WTU
processes, and addition of network metrics will encourage improvement in them.
Metric 3.1 Percentage of WTU soldiers returning to military duty. For those
soldiers with a positive prognosis but an extended period of convalescence,
MEDCOM and IMCOM can execute integrated processes to return soldiers to combat
units as quickly as possible. MEDCOM already gives enhanced access to WTU
soldiers, enabling them to get all of the clinical treatment that they need to improve
their medical conditions. Respondents at all sites indicated that family programs for
soldiers in the WTU are particularly important, as Behavioral Health related
conditions add exceptional stress to family members. As discussed in Chapter Four,
relationship stress is a significant challenge for young soldiers, so integration of
family services with clinical Behavioral Health services will likely improve outcomes
and timelines for WTU soldiers.
Metric 3.2 Average time for WTU program completion for soldiers leaving the
military, with TBD quality measures fulfilled. WTU Commanders have reported
frustration with the time required to complete their program for those soldiers who
are transitioning out of the military. The WTU Commander at Site A listed
administrative processing requirements as his number one issue. These processes
are executed by MEDCOM and IMCOM, as soldiers in the WTU are no longer part of
FORSCOM units. By streamlining their administrative processes to meet the goal of
minimizing completion time these two enterprises would open capacity and relieve
resource requirements associated with the WTU.
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These same WTU Commanders state that their soldiers are likewise
frustrated with the time to complete the program. The soldiers' goal is to complete
the program as quickly as possible, so that they may begin a career in a civilian
profession. The military owes certain benefits and opportunities to these soldiers,
so expeditious transition to civilian life should not out prioritize quality of treatment
and quality assurance in WTU processes. For that reason, quality metrics must be
strictly observed in these processes.
5.5.4 Full Network. As mentioned above, certain processes require the full
Behavioral Health network for execution, and these should be gauged not only to
improve performance, but also as an indication of the overall integration of the
network. These Behavioral Health processes are both related to separation
processes.
Metric 4.1 Average time required for Medical Evaluation Board
(MEB)/Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) process completion
with TBD quality measures fulfilled. With the exception of the WTU, soldiers who
are processing out of the military under MEB/IDES require input from all three
enterprises. MEDCOM must execute clinical evaluations and treatment for the
duration of the separation process. Additionally, MEDCOM must make a
recommendation for disability ratings for separating soldiers. As with WTU
separations, IMCOM must provide family and education services during separation,
as well as ASAP in applicable cases. FORSCOM must maintain accountability,
Primary Care, Commander Evaluations, Administrative, and legal support to
separating soldiers. The typical time for a medical separation across the sites is one
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year. Through careful integration of processes for the goal of minimizing the time
requirement for the separation process, again without sacrificing quality, the entire
system and the separating soldier will benefit.
Metric 4.2 Average time required for Chapter separations. As with Medical
Separations, Behavioral Health-related administrative discharges require inputs
from all three enterprises. For the purposes of performance measurement, the
processes are very similar, and minimization of the time requirement will yield
benefits for all stakeholders.
Table 5.1 Proposed Initial Behavioral Health Network Performance Measures
Number Metric Name Enterprises Who Induced Behavior Outcomes
Measures
1.1 Duty hours lost due
to time spent in
Outpatient
Behavioral Health
Care.
1.2 Soldier days lost due
to duty limiting
Behavioral Health
profiles
2.1 Soldier days lost due
to preventable
incidents related to
manifestations of
identified risk
behaviors
2.2 Percentage of
Soldiers completing
the ASAP program
and returning to duty
FORSCOM FORSCOM 1. Expeditious movement to
MEDCOM Battalions and from appointments.
2. Improved clinical support
processes
FORSCOM MEDCOM
MEDCOM Behavioral
Health
Providers
1. Generation of standardized
and effective Behavioral Health
profiles.
2. Improved communication
between commanders and
providers
3. Unit action for facilitation of
Behavioral Health treatment
FORSCOM FORSCOM lIntegration of FORSCOM
IMCOM Battalions commanders safety program
with IMCOM's installation safety
program.
2.Proactive, coordinated safety
education.
FORSCOM IMCOM -
IMCOM ASAP
1.FORSCOM leaders increase
participation in recovery plans.
2.ASAP Counselors actively
engage unit leaders to maintain
accountability and cooperative
action.
1.improved accountability.
2.lncreased availability for training.
3.Resource conservation for
service providers
1. FORSCOM P-Level increases
2. MEDCOM capacity saturation is
reduced by returning NMR soldiers
to duty.
3. Shared situational awareness
between command teams and
providers.
Coordinated action results in fewer
risky activities:
1.IMCOM's "shot group" rating
improves.
2.FORSCOM P-Levels improve
3.MEDCOM resources are
preserved with respect to clinical
treatment of risk manifestation
outcomes.
1.IMCOM's ASAP success rating
increases.
2.ASAP completion rate
approaches 100%.
3.FORSCOM retains trained
soldiers.
4.1MCOM/FORSCOM realizes
improvement in risk behavior
manifestations.
5.MEDCOM benefits from reduced
incidents of substance dependence
comorbidity.
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Table 5.1 Proposed Initial Behavioral Health Network Performance Measures (continued)
Number Metric Name Enterprises Who Induced Behavior Outcomes
Measures
3.1 Percentage of WTU
soldiers returning to
duty
3.2 Average time for
WTU program
completion for
soldiers leaving the
military, with TBD
quality measures
fulfilled.
4.1 Average time
required for
Behavioral Health
MED Board
Separations
4.2 Average time
required for
Behavioral Health
Chapter Separations
IMCOM MEDCOM - 1.WTU intensifies focus on
MEDCOM WTU positive medical outcomes.
2.IMCOM focuses support
services on returning soldiers to
duty vs. transition to civilian life.
IMCOM MEDCOM - 1.Administrative processes
MEDCOM WTU synchronized with medical
processes.
2.Case management focuses on
active coordination of inter- and
intra-enterprise processes.
3.IMCOM transition services
aggressively provides proactive
career training
FORSCOM FORSCOM LIntegrated value exchange
IMCOM Division processes are defined,
MEDCOM Staff standardized, and improved.
2.Coordination between
enterprises yields consistent,
quality assured outputs for
separations.
FORSCOM
IMCOM
MEDCOM
FORSCOM
Division
Staff
1.Integrated value exchange
processes are defined,
standardized, and improved.
2.Coordination between
enterprises yields consistent,
quality assured outputs for
separations.
1.MEDCOM reduces the volume of
medical separations, saving
resources allocated to those
processes.
2.IMCOM career transition services
are relieved, and resources may be
reallocated to other purposes.
1.MEDCOM resources realize long-
term relief by expeditiously
transitioning chronic care patients
to civilian providers.
2.IMCOM refines career transition
services for increasingly efficient
operation.
3.FORSCOM benefits from
additional WTU capacity.
1.MEDCOM resources realize long-
term relief by expeditiously
transitioning chronic care patients
to civilian providers.
2.IMCOM refines career transition
services for increasingly efficient
operation.
3.FORSCOM benefits from
increased P-Levels resulting from
separation of NMR soldiers.
1.MEDCOM resources realize long-
term relief by expeditiously
transitioning chronic care patients
to civilian providers.
2.IMCOM refines career transition
services for increasingly efficient
operation.
3.FORSCOM benefits from
increased P-Levels resulting from
separation of NMR soldiers.
5.6 Chapter Summary
Performance measurement drives behavior in organizations. When organizational
goals are aligned with metrics, they have a higher probability of progress toward
those goals. Conversely, when metrics do not support desired behavior, and then
stakeholders will apply resources to counterproductive actions and are likely to
cause dysfunction. Networks with many stakeholders should have metrics at a
sufficient level of granularity that measure high-level desired outcomes. This
facilitates innovation by stakeholders to overcome dynamic complexity and local
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constraints. The thoughtful development of objective performance measurement
criteria that measure integrated behavior in a network can enable cooperative
behavior as well as a standardized system of evaluation for leaders.
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Chapter 6 - Network Governance
A critical component to an organizational network is a governance structure
to direct the actions of the stakeholders in order to maintain unity of effort toward
meeting strategic objectives. A network body should not only oversee and direct
the actions of the member organizations but also measure network performance
over time with the intent of using network resources to assist stakeholders in
improving value exchanges that lag in performance.
Installation of a behavioral health network governance body for the Army
would ideally leverage existing reporting relationships, but currently faces
significant challenges in spanning organizational boundaries. Although policy and
regulation changes may be necessary to establish governance for the network, a
review of the academic literature may provide insight into the specific leadership
structure and capabilities that the Army should consider prior to establishing a
controlling body for the multi-enterprise network.
6.1 Literature Review
Provan and Kenis (2008) studied the effects of governance structure on the
effectiveness of a network. They state coordination of many organizations into a
cooperative network allows for an increased ability to solve complex problems
through leveraging of stakeholder competencies for a broad spectrum and holistic
approach to the provision of services. For a network with a shared goal it is
necessary to install some sort of governing body to direct action, resolve conflict,
and properly allocate resources. The three proposed possibilities for governance
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structure are Participant Governance, Lead Organization Governance, and Network
Administrative Organization. In the first, each organization in the network
collaborates with the others to make decisions in a governing council. In Lead
Organization Governance, a single stakeholder is charged with coordinating all
network activities and decisions for the whole. Finally, a Network Administrative
Organization (NAO) could be established as an outside entity that serves as the
leader and overseer of network activities. The authors found that in large, complex
networks that the NAO was the most likely to be effective, although each of the
forms is viable.
Lowndes and Skelcher (2002) emphasize the importance of effective network
governance on developing networks for fostering collaborative behavior in
instances where stakeholders have no experience working across organizational
boundaries.ii Complementing this work, Winkler (2006) addresses the role of
network leadership in resolving conflicts among stakeholders in goal-driven
networks.iii
Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2011) provide a definition for governance in
their work that applies well to the concepts presented in this work. By their
definition, governance is the "processes and structures of public policy decision
making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries
of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic
spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be
accomplished." The work goes on to build a framework for collaborative
governance of networks that would enable emergent behavior by through
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transparency and accountability to other organizations, overcoming bureaucratic
hegemonies that stifle progress. Most important in this work is the description of
network behavioral drivers, which include consequential incentives,
interdependence, and leadership. The network leader helps to obtain resources
beyond those available to individual stakeholders, so that new integrative solutions
may be implemented without severely impacting individual stakeholder
performance in areas outside the network purview. The authors acknowledge that
network leadership is very difficult, as each stakeholder will have responsibilities
and reporting requirements outside the network.iv
Park (1996) addresses the criticality of network control and the risks and costs
of working with other organizations. The author proposes that network governance
by an external body is preferable to cooperative control due to the likelihood of
stakeholder or lead agency bias toward resource allocation or decisions that favor a
specific agency and its reporting/incentive structure. Park states that the
establishment of third party control over a set of organizations is difficult to impose
upon stakeholders unless that outside agency is mandated by law or, in the case of a
hierarchical organization, by a higher headquarters." Calton and Lad (1995) stress
the importance of trust relationships between stakeholders as a factor in network
control, and emphasize the responsibility of leaders to facilitate trust building
among network participants.vi
Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997) propose that for a governance form to do
well, it must directly address the uncertainties in the network that emerge from
complex value exchanges among stakeholders. Network leadership must be capable
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of adapting and preserving value transactions among the stakeholders, given that
each of the organizations in the network act autonomously and processes will
evolve over time.vii Claro, Halelaar, and Omta (2003) confirm the role of network
leaders in promoting the maturation of relationships of network agencies over
timeviii Larson (1992) further asserts the certainty of network evolution over time,
and implies that trust and social relations provide limited safeguards to sudden,
disruptive changes to network architecture.ix
Provan and Milward (1997) analyze four mental health networks to determine
factors that contribute to network effectiveness. Among these factors are the
maturity of network integration and the modes of network control. The authors
state that the critical issue for senior leaders and network planners are the
outcomes of the network as a whole, and not the effectiveness of an individual
stakeholder. Through integration of services the network may provide a spectrum
of coordinated care, holistically addressing the specific needs of a patient through
collaboration among experts. Finally, the authors proposed that direct, centralized
external control would maximize network effectiveness.x Sauvee (2002) asserts
that effectiveness of the network as well as efficiency in resource utilization is the
crucial components to network success, and the responsibility for each lies on
leadership.xi
Throughout the literature on network governance we see the theme of
leadership involvement stakeholder relationship building, which is sensible because
the development of formal processes between independent organizations will
certainly generate turbulence between the stakeholders due to the disruption of
102
existing informal processes. Second, we observe several alternatives to the
organizational architecture of governance agent itself. Each alternative appears
viable and warrants a consideration of the opportunities and challenges of each
alternative. Third, we observe the opportunity for a governance node to leverage
the unique capabilities of each stakeholder in the establishment of recurring
network processes, so generate an appropriate and comprehensive spectrum of
services for each patient entering the system in order to maximize patient and
network outcomes.
6.2 Considerations for the Establishment of a Governance Body
Each enterprise and, with few exceptions, the stakeholders involved have
interests that lie outside the scope of the Behavioral Health network. Army leaders
should expect up front resistance to the imposition of additional requirements and
oversight. Likewise, as Sydow and Windelerxii point out, cooperative arrangements
require time to yield strong results, as maturation of the integration of multiple
stakeholders is not a fast process. In a results-driven organization such as the Army
the enterprises will likely continue to resist new organizational arrangements
throughout the maturation process. For all of these reasons, Army Senior Leaders
should observe Park's assertion that enduring policy from a headquarters above the
three enterprises should be used to impose a network governance structure.
A governing body for the network must have the authority to reach across
and affect necessary change in each of the three enterprises. Emerson et al.
emphasize the point that stakeholders must continue to execute the requirements of
their parent organizations and formal reporting change. The governing body must
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be sensitive to the fact that nearly all stakeholders have primary objectives that fall
outside the scope of Behavioral Health network processes. At the same time, the
governing body should complement installation level enterprise leaders' efforts to
improve functionality across organizational boundaries.
Finally, the network control body should work closely with installation level
enterprise leaders when proposing changes to stakeholders' internal processes. As
Provan and Milward suggest, the network governance body must concern itself
primarily with the overall execution of network goals and cooperative outcomes.
Optimization of individual stakeholders by the network governance body is
disruptive for two reasons. First, if a specific component of a system is completely
optimized, then the overall system cannot be fully optimized.xiii Second, affecting
the internal processes of a network stakeholder will cause unintended
consequences for that stakeholder's performance within its parent enterprise.
6.3 Governance Architectures
Provan and Kenis suggest three alternatives for the architecture of a network
governing body. Each of these are viable for the Army's Behavioral Health network
and provides unique capabilities and limitations.
6.3.1 Participant Governance. Administration of the Behavioral Health network
by its participants would allow direct participation by the commanders and/or
representatives of each of the three enterprises on the installation. This sort of
arrangement is already in place at each Army installation in the Community Health
Promotion Council, and the CHPC could be used as a starting point for a participant
governance model.
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This architecture is desirable because it allows active participation by each
enterprise toward solving local challenges giving real consideration to the
limitations of each participant and the costs that alteration of value exchanges and
stakeholder processes. Jones et al. state that network leaders must understand the
changes in stakeholders over time and how those changes will affect their
transactions with other network members. It is likely that individual enterprise
leaders will best understand their subordinate organizations and will be able to
predict disruptions to network activity.
The downside of this model is the inherent tendency of an organization's
leader to seek solutions to problems that are most advantageous to his or her own
enterprise. Emerson et al. acknowledge this network leadership difficulty in their
work when they state that this type of architecture results in network leaders
reporting to two bosses. Since each leader's reporting chain moves away from the
installation as shown in Figure 6.1 (next page), it is likely that some institutional
bias will affect network decision making.
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Figure 6.1. Network Leader Reporting Chains
6.3.2 Lead Organization Governance. Network governance by a lead organization
would allow for consolidation of decision making authority and would remain most
true to Clausewitz's, and the Army's, principle of Unity of Command.xiv The Senior
Mission Commander would cause FORSCOM to be the lead organization on each
installation because of the Army's rank structure. Each of the other enterprise
leaders already maintains a reporting relationship with the Senior Mission
Commander (SMC), so this arrangement is established.
The upside to this method of governance is that the SMC is ultimately
responsible for all activities on the installation already. The addition of Behavioral
Health network governance to the SMC will not disrupt the pre-established
hierarchy.
This lack of disruption to the hierarchy, while a positive in terms of
maintaining established command relationships, is a negative in terms of not
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changing the status quo. There is likelihood with this architecture that network
governance would yield no benefit to the functionality of the network. In addition to
this danger, Park directly addresses the weaknesses of the lead organization
governance model, specifically in the potential for lead agency bias and allocation of
network resources toward lead agency efforts. Finally, since the SMC is responsible
for all activity on the installation, this additional responsibility will most likely be
delegated to subordinates, which will include the IMCOM and the MTF Commander.1
The final downside to lead agency governance is that the Senior Mission
Commander leads a deployable headquarters and is subject to yearlong absences
from the installation. This situation, although not impossible to manage, would
serve to disrupt network leadership on the installation and to possibly cause
distraction for the SMC during combat deployments.
6.3.3 Network Administrative Organization (NAO). Governance by an NAO
would require the installation of a new organization outside the
FORSCOM/MEDCOM/IMCOM hierarchies to direct network activities and control
Behavioral Health network-specific resources. As suggested by Park, a
headquarters above the three enterprises on the installation would establish this
type of architecture. This form of network governance would be the most resource
1 The author worked for 18 months in the office of the Senior Mission Commander
of an Army installation. Although the SMC is responsible for all activity on the
installation, the Commander is too busy to not delegate authority for nearly every
activity. The rule is that the Commander must understand where he or she is most
needed and to position him/herself at that spot. The most important place changes
from hour to hour, so it is imperative that the commander delegates authority to
subordinates to act on his behalf when he/she must be located elsewhere.
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intensive of the three up front, since it requires new personnel, buildings, and
equipment.
The NAO would facilitate unbiased network decision making, resource
allocation, conflict resolution, and performance measurement for the three
enterprises. Since the mandate for such an organization would originate from a
headquarters above the installation's three enterprises, presumably the Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army, it could likewise serve as a standardization node for Behavioral
Health networks across the Army. Finally, since the NAO is detached from the other
organizations on the installation, it could devote all of its resources to the
improvement of the network effectiveness.
The challenges to the NAO governance structure also lie in its detachment
from the other enterprises. Since this organization is an "outsider" it is less likely to
be attuned to dynamic behaviors and structures of the stakeholders than the
enterprise leaders would be. Also, this body would be less sensitive to stakeholder
requirements that fall outside the Behavioral Health network processes. The leader
and staff of the NAO would have to work very closely with the installation's
enterprise leaders to remain well informed and integrated into the network that it
oversees.
6.4 Recommendation for Governance Structure
Because of the need for Army-wide standardization and organizational learning,
a Network Administrative Organization, chartered by the VCSA, is most likely to
succeed in governing a Army installation's Behavioral Health network. Provan and
Kenis, Park, and Provan and Milward all favor the NAO for large, complex networks
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for a number of reasons. Although this governance architecture requires resources
up front, its advantages present a great opportunity for long-term effectiveness.
The NAO's exclusive mission of developing the Behavioral Health network
would allow it to focus on developing inter-enterprise value exchanges in a way that
the other forms of governance could not. Likewise, the NAO could use objective
performance measurement data to inform enterprise leaders and stakeholders of
areas that need immediate improvement, and it could concurrently work to develop
solutions that benefit the stakeholders, their parent enterprises, and the Behavioral
Health network. Finally, since the NAO reports directly to the Office of the VCSA, it
can serve as a network knowledge capture mechanism to record effective practices
and share them among the Behavioral Health NAOs across the Army.
6.4 Chapter Summary
The final component to coordinating an Army Behavioral Health network is
Network Governance. A governing body must be capable of affecting behavior in all
of the network's stakeholders in order to unify effort toward the accomplishment of
the network strategic goals. Although there are several viable architectures for
network control the academic literature as well as practical considerations favor the
establishment of an external governance agency to execute decision making,
performance measurement, resource allocation, and conflict resolution at the
installation level; and knowledge management at the Army level.
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Chapter 7 - Lessons Learned
7.1 Conclusions
Behavioral Health provision is different than any other activity that the Army
executes at home station, because it requires action that crosses enterprise
boundaries and chains of command. None of the organizations involved is able to
independently generate the desired value, and disjointed or piecemeal attempts to
improve behaviors have proven to produce substandard system performance.
Stakeholders in all three enterprises must understand that for the purposes
of Behavioral Health, they are truly interdependent. The need for full-spectrum,
coordinated care requires expertise beyond what may be found in any single
organization in the system. This work does not call for the addition or subtraction
of services or programs, as the Army already has a broad range of capabilities on
each installation. Rather, this work asserts the need for integration of clinical and
non-clinical; command-driven, and installation-based programs and services to
yield an emergent cooperative care system that is both effective and efficient.
To achieve this end, the enterprises must have common strategic goals that
allow them to work together in a united effort. These strategic objectives should be
specific in regard to the capabilities of the network, and linked to the objective of the
larger organization. In this case, the network's objectives center on the cooperative
and coordinated provision of Behavioral Health services to soldiers, but the
objectives directly support the mission of readiness.
111
In the current state we observed that on paper the three enterprises each list
readiness or support to readiness as a strategic goal, but in execution there is little
evidence of cross-organization integration indicative of a system with a shared
purpose. Stated bluntly, FORSCOM units are frequently guilty of suppressing
demand for Behavioral Health services either for the purposes of maintaining P-
Levels or by attempting to provide services that are better provided by legitimate
clinical experts. MEDCOM behaves more like a system of civilian community
hospitals that provides support to individuals who happen to be part of warfighting
units, rather than the larger Army mission. IMCOM likewise tends to focus inwardly
on making services available as a safety net due to their system of performance
measurement, but executes few proactive programs that prevent Behavioral Health
emergencies. Establishment of a common objectives could serve as a catalyst for
generation of integrated behaviors with a proactive focus on an "ounce of
prevention" rather than a reactive system that applies a "pound of cure" in an
uncoordinated fashion.
In Chapters Two and Four we discussed the reasons for behaviors that defy
or support cooperative action. We should not attribute blame for inwardly focused
behaviors to the system stakeholders, as each focuses on measured and incentivized
behaviors. Most interviewees stated frustration due to thier inability to do what
was needed, in terms of working together with other organizations, due to a need to
focus on the actions that they had to do because of existing measurement systems.
In order to bring about a change in stakeholder action, the network leaders must
install a measurement and accountability system that links expected behaviors to
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desired network outcomes. If leaders desire a certain action, then that action should
be measured and stakeholders should report their own performance to network
leaders. Otherwise, leaders should expect no change.
Finally, the installation of a network governance node is necessary to
coordinate integrated action across organizational boundaries. Retaining the
traditional hierarchical control fits well into the Army mold but, as discussed in
Chapter Six, is subject to many limitations and constraints. Although lead agency or
stakeholder driven governance are viable alternatives, the literature and practical
considerations favor the implementation of an independent governing body
chartered by, and acting on the authority of, the Army's senior leadership. Authority
in this governing body must be limited to activities that contribute to desired
network outcomes, and must come with a mandate for coordination with
installation level leaders, so not to disrupt execution of the enterprises' primary
value propositions.
The establishment of a Behavioral Health network should not be expected to
be an easy endeavor, nor should anyone involved expect quick results. A change in
architecture or processes, particularly of the magnitude described in this work, will
always result in an initial period of underperformancei, but should be expected to
generate significant improvement in Behavioral Health provision over time. The
principles that underpin this workii have been proven to generate successful
outcomes in the transformation of disjointed systems of organizations, but the
timeframe for appreciable maturation is typically expected to be around five yearsii.
As stated previously, the Army is a results-driven system, and due to quick leader
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turnover it is organizationally impatient. Network leaders should expect a
resistance to implementation but should likewise expect, if they are patient,
organizational change that exceeds previous outcomes and makes a greater
contribution to the Army mission.
7.2 Areas for Further Research
One of the issues that was discovered in the process of data collection is the
impact of physical architecture on network performance. Location of Behavioral
Health services affects both care delivery and information flows among the
stakeholders. The Army has likewise recognized this phenomenon, and has
introduced the Embedded Behavioral Health architecture, which will place
MEDCOM-owned clinical providers within the Brigade Combat Team footprint.
Units outfitted with this architecture report both quantitative and qualitative
improvements in performance over the centralized specialty care architectures that
most installations use. Further study into this area could inform network leaders on
the effects of physical proximity on network integration and performance.
A second area for further study is the relationship between comprehensive
patient knowledge management and network performance. Respondents at each of
the sites where data was collected reported discontinuities in knowledge
management systems, which resulted in an impediment to coordinated care among
stakeholders. As an example, MEDCOM maintains an electronic medical record on
each patient that is protected by policy from non-clinical providers, and by practice
from commanders, who may benefit from the information contained within.
Likewise, FORSCOM units maintain local records of periodic performance
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evaluations, which could be, but are not, used to inform clinical providers of patient
background for both clinical treatment and for the separations process. Further
research into the integration of knowledge management systems and network
performance could inform network leaders of a possible multiplier to network
performance.
Finally, further research should be conducted on the development of
performance metrics that are used to assess network performance. Specific
consideration should be given to the appropriate level of granularity of these
metrics, and the effect of network metrics on existing stakeholder processes. This
type of work could be used to specify the required fidelity for performance
measurement in the Behavioral Health network and the potential for excessively
rigid measurement systems that could stifle innovation at the individual stakeholder
level.
7.3 Hurdles
To call the proposition of breaking down organizational boundaries in Army
organizations radical is a tremendous understatement. The Army has operated as a
hierarchy with semi-independent functional workgroups for its entire 237 years.
Military history texts attribute decentralized leadership and independence in
fighting units as a key to the American Army's tradition of success in battles. Every
soldier knows what it means when another tells him or her to "stay out of my lane,"
which is to say that someone or some other organization is encroaching his or her
assigned area of responsibility. Leaders should expect organizations to balk at the
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perception of working for another organization when that organization should be
able to work on its own.
The adoption of a new organizational architecture would present a major
shift in culture and would require non-trivial changes to Army policies. Likewise,
operational level leaders will likely resist the addition of a measurement system that
holds them accountable for cooperative relationships as they have historically been
evaluated exclusively on individual performance. These leaders will likely be
uncomfortable with career risk associated with evaluations that depend partially on
another member's abilities and performance.
The final, and tallest, hurdle is the difference in MEDCOM and FORSCOM
organizational cultures and the inherent clashes in value propositions. In the
current state, and I say this from first hand experience, FORSCOM commanders are
loathe to allow a medical doctor to affect the operation of a combat unit. Likewise,
Army doctors generally resent the idea that a non-medical officer could affect
clinical processes. I have been on the receiving end of this resentment several times
during data collection for this study. A former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army best
represents this idea in the recounting of an encounter with an MTF Commander,
four ranks lower than the VCSA, who informed the VCSA that he [the doctor] would
not follow the guidance given by the VCSA, because the VCSA was not a doctor and
could not tell him [the doctor] how to run his clinic.
In simple terms most FORSCOM Commanders and MEDCOM clinicians have a
dysfunctional, adversarial relationship. A Division Command Sergeant Major at one
of the data collection sites remarked, correctly I believe, that the reason for this
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dysfunction are that neither understands the mission of the other, and the near total
lack of communication between the enterprises.
Combined, these reasons demand the need for buy-in and oversight by the
Army's senior leadership during implementation. The leaders of the three
enterprises must drive this change effort under the mandate of the VCSA's office.
Without top-level emphasis and control, reinforced with enduring policy change,
any of these three challenges could present a disruptive force that could derail
execution.
7.4 Insights
Throughout the course of this work I have discovered a great deal about an
organization that I previously thought that I knew a lot about. The biggest single
lesson learned from this effort is the value in understanding why people and
organizations act like they do. Collection of raw data through activities such as
value stream mapping and stakeholder surveys are effective for determination of
the who, what, how, and when of a problem. At a micro level these four pieces of
data may perfectly inform process improvement efforts that yield effective and
sustainable solutions that affect stakeholder value exchanges.
In eighteen years of military service and six years of civilian education in
engineering and management I've learned that the people in the system and the
decisions that they make lie both at the root and the solution of every system
problem. Despite the military's world-class technology, behind all the moving
pieces in complex organizations, every business is a people business. Only through
communicating with people can you find out the why of a problem. This means
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getting out of the office and working quite a lot of people with a system as complex
as the Army, because everyone has a story, and only through hearing many of the
stories may you begin to triangulate the truth.
Dr. Srinivasan and I have spent over 250 hours interviewing over 500
representatives of the stakeholders at five installations, and in every visit we've
found something new. We have sat through many interviews that, after the
respondent had left the room, prompted comments like, "this is exactly the same
story we heard at the last site. I think we've got this stakeholder figured out." In
some cases, it's the fourth or fifth iteration of interviews with, as an example, ASAP
Counselors, yields the ah-ha moment that opens the door to the why of the problem
gold mine.
All of this is to say that I've gained an appreciation for what it takes to
determine causes and solutions to real-world problems, and that is an open-minded
approach to fact gathering. I've learned to enjoy discovering something that
surprises me, even when that something nullifies my preliminary conclusions and
initial solutions to problems that I've solidified in my mind. I know now that I need
to always strive to learn something more and to be pleased when I get to introduce
solution 2.0.
i Forrester, Jay W. Industrial Dynamics. System Dynamics. Cambridge, MA.: MIT
Press, 1961. Print.
ii Nightingale, Deborah J., and Jayakanth Srinivasan. Beyond the Lean Revolution. 1st
ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 2010. Print.
iii Nightingale, Deborah J., Alexis Stanke, and F. Terry Bryan. Enterprise Strategic
Analysis and Transformation. 2.0 ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2008. Print.
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Appendix A - Installation Risk
Reduction Briefing
Source: Army Substance Abuse Program. "Web Based Risk Reduction." Ft. Benning,
GA. 2011. <http://www.benning.army.mil/garrison/dhr/ASAP/content/PDF/
RISK%20brief/o20-%20mock.pdf>
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Risk Factor Trends - Graphs
Risk Factor Trends - Data
Shot Groups
Installation Roll Ups
DCG Roll Ups
Brigade Roll Ups
ARG Roll Ups
Battalion Reports...
ACSAP Utility Reports...
Ranking of Units based on a selected Year, Quarter and Data Collection Group.
Presentation of Risk Factors for a selected Year, Quarter and Data Collection Group.
Presentation of Risk Factors for a selected Year, Quarter and Aggregate Reporting Group.
Regression line graphs are rendered based on every Risk Factor for a selected Installation, DCG or Unit. Additionally,
the Army's trend line is shown on each graph for comparison.
Historical incident rates for a selected Installation, DCG or Unit are rendered along with the associated Army rate.
Customized graphical report based on a selected Target and Grouping entity as well as a selected Year and Quarter.
Factor incident rates for the target entity are compared to those of the grouping entity and are rendered as bullet holes
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Breakdown of Incidents and Rates for a desired Data Collection Group for a selected Reporting Period.
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Risk Factor Trends Graph
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Risk Factor Trend Data
Fort Swampy I Army Through March 2009
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Displays rates per thousands for each
risk factor over a three year period,
showing every quarterly rate.
This report' s comparison level will default to
the RRP Army (shown in black) but, an upper
level comparison may be chosen. (i.e.
Installation, MACOM, Region)
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000: 2 00 120 1.0 2 im. 135 153 1.0 220 1 1.11000I MW 0.10 0.1 0.74 044 010 01 10 00 7 21 0,20 020 0,2 001
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RISK FACTOR SHOT GROUP REPORT
Assigned Strength: 4198
O xxxxxx
Vs.
M zzzzzzzzzz
View Brigade Summary Report
DESIGNATION
DANGER ZONE
CAUTION ZONE
RRP ARMY RATE
SAFETYZONE
BULLSEYE
"Drug Offenses
Alcohol Offenses
RATE**
Greater than 2X Arny Rate
Greater than Army Rate but
less than 2X Army Rate
US Army RRP Rate
Lessthan Army rate
No Incidents in Reporting Period
"Bullet Holes" are displayed only for risk factors for which data was reported.
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Postwe UAO~ 
Deaths
si iv UAs \
Frinacial Problems \'g
Child Abuse --
- Suicide Gestures & Attempti
Crimes against Property "
Crimes against Persons
Traffic Violations/
COLOR BAND
Oct-Dec, 2008
iD eaths
/- STDs
Spouse Abuse -
--AWOLs
The Shot Group is a custom graphical report which
ACSAP developed to quickly display possible high-
risk areas within a selected group.
Each slice of the report displays one risk factor. The
bullet hole displays the selected entity's rate per
thousand soldiers as compared to the RRP Army rate
per thousand soldiers . The RRP Army rate is
displayed as the white section in the chart. Upper level
comparison levels are also available in this report.
The color break down is as follows:
0
DESIGNATION
DANGER ZONE
CAUTION ZONE
RRP ARMY RATE
SAFETY ZONE
BULLSEYE
RATE"R
Greater than 2X Army Rate
Greater than Army Rate but
less than 2X Army Rate
US Army RRP Rate
Less than Army rate
No Incidents in Reporting Period
0
RISK FACTOR SHOT GROUP REPORT
0 xxxxxx
Vs
Assigned Strength 4198 View Bnoade Summeef ete
cOLORBAND DESIGNATION
DANER ZONE
cAUTIONZONE
||RRP ARMY RATE
SAFETYZONE
BULLSEYE
Greater than 2X Army Rat
US Army RRP Rate
L.. the Army at.
No I.cid.,s in Reporting Period
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Oct-Dec. 20B
COLOR BAND
Positi" UAS /Dealln
FrAncW Problem Accidents
Chid Abuse _,STDs
Spcs Abuse - M Sukide Gestizes, Aftermstl
M
Cnines against Prlerty, M '-AWOL.
M
Crainet, againtt Pemm Drug Offerisres
TtafficVdabons Alc" Ollenses
-BNtoW. Are displayeonly for 6* ats .. r~e.hie data..es.,4.tad
A
The Summary reports show the data that is used to
generate a Shot Group Report.
The report displays strength of the group, each risk
factor, number of incidents and rate per thousand
soldiers per factor. Again, this report has the upper
level comparison feature available. If the report was
generated from a Shot Group then the comparison
level will be passed and displayed.
If the incidents and rate per thousand are displayed in
red this means the selected group and/or comparison
level was greater that twice the RRP Army rate.
BRIGADE: WXXXXX Page 1
ZZZZZZZZZz Oct-Dec, 2008
BIGADE: WXXXXX zzzz
asgned Stngth: 4.198 195142
A. HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR RATES
.IUGADE: WXXXXX up my
TOW. MACON RAP ARMY
Aob..1 R.. Act"d Rate Rate
I DojjI 0 0.00 41 021 0.1e
2- A009 0 000 - 02
3,9.IR 44 10 4138 7.01 427
4.Suicideosime5&AttemPts 4 0.95 138 0.71 1. 7
0O AW0IJ 00 10 44 704 3061 3.02
8 DmON*000 a 1,43 220 1 17 138
7 A19o0 Offt 12 2.08 900 507 3,34
Traffoiia018b 77 19.34 4100 21.40 13.02
9Ch. .A3.5
9
Petto W1 11548 1270 9.01 4.38
10. Crims anst Prooped 30 7.15 443 2.27 177
S-vm.430- 12 2.80 329 1009 1.19
1200Child00 1 024 197 1 02 0,77
13. Fimanl Ptoblems 237 5049 7404 3794 20.33
B. URINALYSIS TESTING
TOW. MACON RAP ARMYACtood Rau. AatuW Rat. PRt
14.U A0moIa Sipped 2139 00029 120713 019080 092.31
1 . 41 -77 17- 902 724
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL ACTION RATES
TOW. MACON RAP ARMY
Act"o Rt. Ao.WI Rot. Rot.
1. WAmin.oL 77 005 0.08
'7 EmNoi4to 2 0.02 0385
18 ate Ef4.iminabo0 1220 7008 8.70
19 cotmMatial 197 1.20 0.93
20.DiscloAaons 254 1000 1051
No data avilable
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INSTALLATION: Fort Swampy Page: 1
MACOM: ZZZZZZZZZZ
Oct-Dec, 2008
Installation: Fort Swampy zzzzzzzzzz
Assigned Strength: 38.446 194.813
A. HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR RATES
Installation: Fort Swampy zz ZZZZZzz
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rats Actual Rate Rate
Factor Incidents f(r le) Incidents foer 101 for 1091
1. Death 9 0.23 41 0.21 0.18
2. Acciden 0 0.00 37 0.19 0.21
3. jTs 313 8.14 1387 7.02 4.27
4. Suicide Gestures & Attempts 24 0.02 138 0.71 1.17
5. AWOs 207 5.38 704 3.81 3.62
6. Drua Off 22 0.57 229 1.18 1.35
7. Alcohol Offs 105 2.73 990 5.08 3.34
8. TrafficVolatio 269 7.00 4184 21.48 13.03
9. Crimes aainst Persons 170 4.42 1269 6.51 4.38
10. crimsaaaintPoete 91 2.37 443 2.27 1.77
11. Spouse Abuse 68 1.77 327 1.08 1.19
12. Chid Abuse 16 0.42 194 1.00 0.77
13. Financial Problem 2942 76.52 7401 37.99 20.32
B. URINALYSIS TESTING
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rate Rate
Factor Incidents (Der 1001 Incidents (Dar 1001 Dw 16001
14. UA Samples 18996 404.11 120753 510.84 583.33
15. Positive UAs 35 9.23 1760 0.03 7.24
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL ACTION RATES
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rate Rate
Factor Incidents (oer 19991 Incidents (per lose1 towr 1is
16. Wamina Lettes 77 0.05 0.08
17. Eviction Notc 2 0.02 0.05
18. Chapter Eliminations 1228 7.99 8.75
19. Courts Martial 197 1.28 0.93
20. Disciplinary Action 2563 16.68 16.51
No data available
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N
DCG: Page: 1
MACOM: ZZZZZZZZZZ
Oct-Dec, 2008
DCG: zzZzzzzzZZ
Assigned Strength: 16A48 194.813
A. HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR RATES
DCG: ZZZZZZZZZ
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rate Rate
Factor Incidents f 1 Incident fr 10001 (oer 10901
1. Death 4 0.24 41 0.21 0.18
2. Accident 0 0.00 37 0.19 0.21
3. STps 169 10.27 1367 7.02 4.27
4. Suicide Gestures&Attempt 13 0.79 138 0.71 1.17
6. AWOLs 191 11.61 704 3.81 3.82
9. Drua Offenses 20 1.22 229 1.18 1.35
7. Alcohol Offenses 69 4.19 990 5.08 3.34
8. Traffic Violations 247 15.01 4184 21.48 13.03
9. Crimes against Persons 152 9.24 1289 8.51 4.38
10. Crimes anainst Property 81 4.92 443 2.27 177
11. Spouse Abuse 40 2 A3 327 1.98 1.19
12. Child Abuse 4 0.24 194 1.00 0.77
13. Financial Problems 1290 78,38 7401 37.99 20.32
B. URINALYSIS TESTING
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rate Rate
Factor Incidents (or lse) Incidents foe 10001 fro 10001
14. UA Sampies Shipped 12479 768.05 120753 619.84 583.33
15. Poste U 251 15.25 1790 9.03 7.24
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL ACTION RATES
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rate Rate
Factor Incidents r1 Incident for 100 1 (fer 100 1
18. Wamina Letts 77 0.5 0.98
17. Evicion Notices 2 0.02 0.05
18. Chapter Eliminaibons 1228 7.99 8.75
19. Cous Maia1 197 1.28 0.93
20. Disoilinan Action 2683 16.88 19.51
No data available
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BRIGADE: WXXXXX Page: 1
ZZZZZZZZZZ Oct-Dec, 2008
BRIGADE: WXXXXX zzzzzzzzz
Assigned Strength: 4.198 195.142
A. HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR RATES
BRIGADE: WXXXXX zzzzzzzzzz
Total MACON RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rats Rate
Factor Incidents f"W 1os1 Incidents (or 10061 (per 10001
1.Deas 0 0.00 41 0.21 0.18
2. Accidents 0 0.00 37 0.19 0.21
3.91Tg 44 1048 1388 7.01 4.27
4. Suicide Gestures&Attempts 4 0.95 138 0.71 1.17
5. AWOQ 69 16.44 704 3.81 3.82
6. Dru Offes 6 1.43 229 1.17 1.35
7. Alcohol Offens 12 2.86 990 5.07 3.34
8. TraffViolatio 77 18.34 4185 21.45 13.03
9. Crimes aainst Poesons 65 15.48 1270 5.51 4.38
10. Crimes against Property 30 7.15 443 2.27 1.77
11. Spouse Abuse 12 2.86 329 1.59 1.19
12. Child Abuse 1 0.24 197 1.02 0.77
13. Financial Problems 237 58 46 7404 37.94 20.33
B. URINALYSIS TESTING
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rate Rate
Factor Incidents (oer 166) Incidents (oer 1001 (oer 1061
14. UA Samples Shioped 2138 509.29 120753 018.80 583.31
15. Positive UAs 41 9.77 170 9.02 7.24
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL ACTION RATES
Total MACON RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rate Rate
Factor Incidents fr1ose) nnts er 1ose ro1 of1 )
16 Wamrina Lette 77 0.85 0.68
17. Eviaton Not 2 0.02 0.05
18. Chapter Eliminations 1229 7.98 8.78
19. Court martial 197 1.28 0.93
20. Disiplinary Ations 2584 18.85 1.51
No data available
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BATTALION:XXXXXX Page: 1
Briqade: XXXXXX
ZZZZZZZZZZ Oct-Dec, 2008
Assigned Strength:
BATTALION: XXXXXX
807
zzzzzZzzZZ
195,142
A. HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR RATES
BslTAInon: xxxxxx
Factor
1. Do ts
2. Accidents
3. IRg
4. Suicide Oestures &Attempts
5. AWOLs
6. Drua Offeses
7. Acohol Offenses
8. Traffic Violations
9. Crimes against Pemons
10. Crimes against Property
11. Spouse Abuse
12. Child Abuse
13. Financial Problems
Actual
incidents
0
0
0
0
18
4
1
4
0
53
B. URINALYSIS TESTING
Factor
14. UA Samples Shipped
15. Positive UAs
Actual
Incidents
333
Rate
0.er 1o001
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
22.30
4.96
1.24
19.83
4.98
1.24
1.24
0.00
65.68
Rate
foer 1s@@
412.54
7.43
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL ACTION RATES
Factor
16. Warnina Letters
17. Eviction Noti
18. Chapter Eliminations
19. Courts martial
20. Disciplinary Actions
Actual
Incidlents
Rate
(per 1001
zzzzzzzzzz
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Rate
Inckents foe 10001 (per 10601
41 0.21 0.18
37 0.19 0.21
1388 7.01 4.27
138 0.71 1.17
704
229
990
4185
1270
443
329
197
7404
Total
Actual
Incidents
120753
1780
3.61
1.17
5.07
21.46
6.51
2.27
1.69
1.02
37.94
MACOM
Rate
(Der 0lse)
618.80
9.02
3.62
1.35
3.34
13.03
4.38
1.77
1.19
0.77
20.33
RRP ARMY
Rate
(per 199S1
583.31
7.24
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Rate
Incidents (per 10991 (per 1001
77 0.85 0.68
2 0.02 0.05
1229 7.98 8.78
197 1.28 0.93
254 18.85 16.51
No data available
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COMPANY: XXXXXX Page: 1
Briqade: XXXXXX
ZZZZZZZZZ Oct-Dec, 2008
COMPANY: XXXXXX ZZZZZZZZZZ
Assigned Strength: 290 195,142
A. HIGH RISK BEHAVIOR RATES
COMPANY: XXXXXX ZZZZZZZZZ
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rate Rate
Factor Incidents foer lse) Incidents foer 18661 DOr 1041
1. Deat 0 0.00 41 0.21 0.18
2. Accidents 0 0.00 37 0.19 0.21
3.STDs 4 13.1 1368 7.01 4.27
4. Suicide Gestures & Attempts 0 0.00 138 0.71 1.17
5. AWO 0 0.00 704 3.81 3.82
6. Drua Offenses 0 0.00 229 1.17 1.35
7. Alcohol Offense 0 0.00 990 5.07 3.34
8. Traffio Violations 0 0.00 4185 21.45 13.03
9. Crimes against Persons 0 0.00 1270 0.51 4.38
10. Crimes ainst Property 0 0.00 443 2.27 1.77
11. Spouse Abuse 0 0.00 329 1.09 1.19
12. Child Abuse 0 0.00 197 1.02 0.77
13. Financial Proble 0 0.00 7404 37.94 20.33
B. URINALYSIS TESTING
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rate Rate
Fact Incents (oer 10001 Incidents (per 1004) (or 1600)
14. UA Samples Shipped 156 527.03 120753 018.80 583.31
15. Positive UAs 1 3.38 1700 9.02 7.24
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL ACTION RATES
Total MACOM RRP ARMY
Actual Rate Actual Rate Rate
Factor Idents ose)00 Incients (per 19801 fwoE 10601
10. Wamin Letls 77 0.065 0.8
17. Eviction Not 2 0.02 0.05
18. Chanter Eliminations 1229 7.98 8.76
19. Coudts Martial 197 1.28 0.93
20. Disciplinarv Aio 25604 10.05 16.51
21
140
This report displays Unit risk factor incident rates (per 1,000 Soldiers) for each Unit within the selected Brigade. It also provides a comparison of Unit incident rates to
those of:
0 All Soldiers in the Brigade
" The Army
Installation data is displayed with a red, amber, or green bacground. based on incident rates. Red cells are intended to highlight potential problem areas. The legend
below the report offes a definition of these background colos. clicking on a red, amber, or green cell will bring up a trend graph displaying the selected Installation's
risk factor incident rates over time.
S elank cells indicate no data submitted
Risk Factots
All Soldiers nilts
Anny 1ST 1-7th 1.82nd 15th 2-5th 28th 1BCT BDE
Deaths 018 000
Accidents .21 0.00
STDs 427 1o48
Suicide Gestures & Attempts 117 0.0 3
AWOLs 3.2 18.4
Drug Offenses 135 13
Alcohol Offenses 3.34 2.8e
Traffic Violations 13.03 1e.34
Crimes against Persons 436 15.48
Crimes against Property 177 7.15
Spouse Abuse 1.19 2.Se
Child Abuse I 77 0.24
Financial Problems I20.33 ]F 5B.A
IUA Samples Shipped F583.31 5j9.29
Positive UAs 7.24 9.77
Warning Letters o.8
Eviction Notices o I5
Chapter Eliminations 878
Courts Martial o.03
Disciplinary Actions 1i.51
mmmrnmmm
II ~I II ~I II II
BACKGROUND COLOR DESIGNATION COLOR CODE CRITERIA
DANGER ZONE Greater than 2X Army Rate
AMBER CAUTION ZONE Greaterthan Army Rate but less than 2X Army Rate
SAFETY ZONE Equal To or Less than Army Rate
22
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The Matrix Report is a custom graphical "i"
report which ACSAP developed to mimic 1-7th 1-82nd 115th 2-5th
a spreadsheet. This report also helps
quickly display possible high-risk areas
within a selected group.
Each cell of the report displays a color and 2.
rate per thousand for one risk factor for
one unit. Group comparison levels are
displayed on the left after the risk factor
names.
The color breakdown is as follows: 10.39
BACKGROUND COLOR DESIGNATION COLOR CODE CRITERIA
DANGER ZONE Oreater than 2X Army Rate
AMBER CAUTION ZONE Oreater than Army Rate but less than 2X Army Rate
SAFETY ZONE Equal To or Less than Army Rate
2-8th 1BCT BD
23
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Fl
Each cell of the report displays a color and rate per
thousand for one risk factor for one unit. By clicking
on a cell a new trend line chart with corresponding
data is displayed.
luits
1-7th 1-82nd 115th 2-5th 2-8th 1BCT B3DE
9
C
Risk Factor Trends Graph
Unit : 1-7th
Through March2009
1-7th -- AFrmy
Traffic Violations
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
Mar 06 Sep06 Mar07 Sep07 Mar08 Sep08 Mar09
Quarter / Year
1-7th - Historical Data for Traffic Violations
Year, Fpuarter. FStrengt IncIdents Rate
2008 4 385 12 3117
2008 3 392 4 10.20
2008 2 408 3 7.36
2008 1 394 F 15 38.07
07 4 73 2 27.40
2007 3 52 1 19.23
2007 2 49 1 20.41
2007 1 37 0 0.00
2000 4 252 4 15.87
2006 F 3 371 7 18.87
2006 F 2 33 8a 22.04
2008 1 366 8 21.88
Red text indicates Entity rates that are greater than 2X the Army rate
Indicates No Data
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Commanders Package - LTC Commander Hood
..,.$$0 4j'7 us nMsco eti e
Shot Group
Descriptor This is a customzed graphical report based on currert Yew and QuatW. Risk factor incidert rates I the
selected unts are compared to those of the parert instalonMC. Unit incdert rates are displayed as bixiet holes on a
target.L In ationf)CO rates we displayed as icons("r), "O) on the rtaget. The whIe ring between the green and amber
zones represerts the oaverd Army rates for each fator.
UiR eaWR
1 OCT. 1ST CAV
2-th CAV SN
2-5th CAV SN
HQ, 15CT, 1CD
1-7th ARS SN
115th BDE SPT SN
1-82nd FA BN
STB, 1st BDE, 1 CAV
'a 1 %
Matrix Report
Descrlai: This repart dsplays uni Risk Factor cidence ries for the sedected Brigadesattalnsm as coarWed to the
overal Army rates rendered in Redlsiberreen backgrod.
unit 1STm
1 BCT, 1ST CAV
BAKROUND
Ass
DESIGNATION
DANGER ZONE
CATON ZONE
SAFErY ZONE
COLOR CODE CRITERA
Omraarthm 2X Amy Rate
GOaar ih Amy Res bt laesstha 2X Amy Ra
Elual To or tass than Amy Rae
Risk Factor Trends -Graphs
Descripolrr Date poers and regressionline graphs for the selected und we displayed for each every Risk Fastor over a
perod of time. Adronday, the instalenLrWCs trend line Is shown on each graph for comparison. This w daow
commanders to compare hlgh risk behavior incderts for their uis as compared to the parert nafltionAOC.
tnt naRe
1 BCT. 1ST CAV
2-8th CAV BN
2-5th CAV BN
HQ,1BCTlCD
1-7th ARS BN
115th BDE SPT SN
1-82nd FA BN
STB, 1st BDE, 1 CAV
R -URI -Summary of Results
DescrptOrc This report dsplays the rests of the anonymous reirtegrbon uit risk invertory(R-4) surveys taken by
the selected usd. This wi alow a coennader to view the survey resis of sders returnirg from deploymert.
intalation temw
Fort Hood
I
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The Commanders' Package is a group of
reports displayed in a quad slide format
based on rights and privileges granted to a
commander.
Each quadrant has a specific report chosen
to deliver information quickly and
efficiently with a minimum of clicking.
Commanders who become familiar with
the software can still run reports via the
wizards.
Commsandes Pactkage - LTC Comomander Hood
Shot Group
~0o~o0o00.~.ZO0o INA( RZot 0u Risk Factor Trends - Graphs=-~ oAA 0,Aw~w.
-4
Matrix Roport R - URI -Summary ofResults
I SCT, 1ST CAV Fort Hood
- DANGER1 ZONE Gi 0ACOR n RaE.
- mm" -- -- A. t
SAFETY ZME E.W T.. -0r L hM" any-
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7
**a-
I BCT IST CAV
C.Al
.C
1. AAS ON
115. ODE SP ON
1 -82,4 FA ON
S O I ODE, I
UNKU-
1 OCT IST CAV
::th CA 
ON
, CAV ON
.Q1IOC .ICD
I-11h A S ON
IISth ODE S ON
1-62.d FA ON
S-. - -. I -
0Reintegration Unit Risk Inventory Summary of Results of 2
for Army Active Duty Soldiers
XXXXXX 67 Persons Surveyed
Z7ZZZZZZ Administered1 1 Apr 2008
Conba Suppoit (CS) Unil Printed 6 Apr 2009
A. 1. Wle deployed, served with current unit: 4. Time since returningto home st"ion:
92% Yes 78% 3 months or les
8% No 18% 4-months
2. Most recert deployment: 4% 7 - 12 months
3% Enduring Freedom 3% More than 1 year
0% Noble Eagle
97% Iraqi Freedom 5. This questioononlyappliesto Army Reserve and Army
0% Other National Guard units.
3. Length of deploymnert:
2% 6 months or les
83% 7 - 12 months
15% 13-24months
0% Morethan2years
B. 6 -9. Results of the alcohol use questions. (T h e questions and the interpretation were derived fro m the AUDI T .)
Problem drinkers
Non-proble drinkers Problem Drinkers
11% xxxxxxNon-drinkers I
26% Combat Spport (CS)Unit
Non-response
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number Of Respondents
CID. Overview- Wile Deployed Since Returning
Presents the percentage ofrespondents Unit s Unit CS Survey Categorv
making significant (unfavorable) 0% 1% 1% 4% Alcohol and Other D rug Abuse
responses to the questions within each 9% 14% 10% 14% Unit Cohesion
survey category. 24% 33% 10% 24% Sel.Perception / Relationships
See next page for results by question. 4% 7% 2% 7% Financial Problem
3% 5% 2% 3% suicideindicates the unit had a greater 3
percentage ofsIgnificant responsesthan 0% Is 0% 2% Other Crimes
did all surveyed units of its unit type. - 1% 5% Verbal IPhyical Abuse
27% 42% Army Environment
21% 28% 27% 32% Combat/Deployment
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As part of the Deployment Cycle Support
Directive ACSAP developed The
Reintegration Unit Risk Inventory (R-URI).
The R-URI is a 79-item anonymous
questionnaire designed to screen for high-
risk behaviors and attitudes affecting unit
readiness and personnel well being that may
have occurred during deployment or since
redeployment.
ACSAP is currently incorporating R-URI
reports into the web-based Risk Reduction
application.
a 4 Reintegration Unit Risk Inventory Summary of Results Pae IofS
for Army Active Duty Soldiers
XXXXXX 67 Persons Surveyd
ZZ7 zzz Administeredl 1 Apr 2008
Conba Support (CS) Unit Printed 6Apr 2009
A il deployed, served with currerd unit: 4. Time since returring to home stanio
2 75% 3monthsorles
8% No 18% 4.5 months
2 Most recent deploymern: 4% 7.12months
3% Enduring Freedom 3% More than 1 year
0% Noble Eagle
97% Iraqi Freedom 5. This question onlyappliesto Army Reserve and Army
0% Other National Guard units-
3. Lenigth of deployment:
2% 8monthoNrlo
3% 7-12months
15% 13-24months
0% Morethan2yeats
B. 6 . Remris of the alcohol use qetions. (T hre questions and the interpretationee derived fro mthe AU DlIT.
Problem drinkers
Non-problem drinkers Problem Drinkers
I11%XXXXXXINon-drrinkers
29% comb~atsupport(CS)Unit
Non-response
0 5 10 15 28 25 30 3 40 45 5
Number OfRespondents
C.10. Overiew.
Presentstie percentage of reopondent;
iurigs gnrbcent(unfaotacble)
reopornses to"the questocowitbin each
survey category.
See nerd page trresuts by question.
.. indicates the unit had a greater
percentage of ignifluant responses than
di d al Isurveyed units of its unit ype.
Sefal. Deployed
Unit £0.
0% 1 %
0% 14%
24% 33%
4% 7%
3% 5%
0% 1%
21% 28%
Since Raiong
uni &
IS 4%
10% 14%418% 24%
2% 7%
2% 3%
0% 2%
is 5%
27% 42%
27% 32%
Alool and Other Drug Abuse
Unit Coleson
SollL~erceptior / Relatirnships
FinAnoial Problems
Suicide
Other Comes
Verbail / Phiynca Abuse
Army Environment
Comrbat IDeploymoent
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Don,'t Risk Readiness!
ACSAP CONTACTS:
Gary. Cunningham@conus. army.mil
Tony.Carrington@conus.army.mil
Carson.Phillips@conus.army.mil
Kim.Nguyen@conus.army.mil
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Appendix B - 2012 Army Posture
Statement, Addendum G: Army Force
Generation Cycle (ARFORGEN)
Source: United States Army. "2012 Army Posture Statement, Addendum G: Army
Force Generation Cycle (ARFORGEN)." Washington, DC. 2012.
<https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas-armyposturestatement/2012/adden
da/addenda-g.aspx>
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Addendum G - Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
2012 Army Posture Statement
Addendum G - Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
The Army's Core Process for Force Generation
Originally envisioned as a supply-based model, ARFORGEN has yet to be fully realized given the
operational conditions since implementation in 2006. With demand for war-fighting capabilities exceeding
the sustainable supply, unit readiness has been consumed as quickly as it has been created. ARFORGEN,
though implemented during a period of persistent conflict, has enabled the Army to successfully satisfy the
high demand for conventional ground
forces. The price of meeting this high ARFORGEN Force Pools
operational demand, has been the stress
on Soldiers and their Families due to
back-to-back deployments; acceptance
of strategic risk in other geographical
combatant commander (GCC) AORs; Tra -v-i*b'
and limited capability to meet emerging
operational requirements.
ARFORGEN is defined as the
structured progression of unit readiness
over time, resulting in recurring periods
of availability of trained, ready, and
cohesive units. These units are
prepared for operational deployment in
support of combatant commanders and
other Army requirements. As the Army
continues the transition to a supply-
based ARFORGEN model in Fiscal
Year 2012, it will be postured to RyufoAVaa Pool to tkeRESETPodl
accomplish both emerging and enduring operational and institutional requirements. Together, these
requirements drive Army priorities for recruiting, organizing, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, and
mobilizing units on a cyclical basis.
Using ARFORGEN, the Army builds readiness as units move through the three force pools: RESET;
Train/Ready; and Available. RESET (a six month period for active component (AC) and twelve month
period for reserve component (RC)) is a process that systematically restores units to a level of personnel and
equipment readiness that permits resumption of collective training in the Train/Ready pool. RESET
encompasses those tasks required to reintegrate Soldiers and Families; reconstitute personnel and
equipment; and execute individual training and, as units are able, crew and squad level training. It is
predicated on the concept of allowing Soldiers and Families the opportunity to recover and reverse the
effects associated with a sustained operational tempo. A unit begins planning for RESET during its last six
months in the Available pool.
If deployed, reintegration planning and coordination begins based on communication between the forward-
deployed unit and the rear detachment. The intent of this early planning is to identify total resource
requirements, determine shortfalls, and develop mitigation strategies to eliminate shortfalls so that when the
unit returns, a comprehensive and supportable plan is ready for execution.
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During the 180 day period prior to redeployment, units redeploy 100 percent of their deployed equipment
unless otherwise directed by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). Units turn-in 100 percent of
their Automatic Reset Induction (ARI) items as well as their battle-lost equipment in Theater. Commanders
also ensure hand receipt holders conduct 100 percent "eyes on/hands on" inventory of all equipment and
develop/update unit training plans and Institutional Training Support Plans (ITSP).
For non-deployed units, the intent for the RESET pool remains the same with an emphasis on Soldier and
Family reintegration. Guidelines for RESET are established by HQDA, Army Commands, and Army
senior commanders/senior operational commanders within established base operations funding levels and
Army priorities for requirements and resourcing.
During RESET, the unit receives its Available pool mission and begins reconstituting personnel and
equipment. The Army's Human Resources Command (HRC) fills AC unit field grade, company grade and
senior non-commissioned officer positions according to the Army Manning Guidance. HRC also maintains
specific enlisted personnel and supply management skills as high as possible within these units to enable
ongoing RESET actions. HQDA directs no training above squad level. Additional demands on returning
units by senior commanders and/or senior operational commanders are kept to a minimum in order to
maximize time available for Soldier and Family reintegration. Additionally, units do not receive equipment
that requires new equipment training (NET). Proper Soldier and Family re-integration enhances Soldier
fitness and facilitates resilience in the force. Concurrent individual training provides the Soldiers with basic
skills and professional development. At the end of the RESET, units are resourced to begin collective
training..
The RESET model is brigade-centric and focuses on unit, not individual reconstitution. Manning and
equipping Army units during RESET continues to represent significant challenges and requires focused
oversight. To address this issue U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), as the Army Command
responsible for RESET, continues to improve the process for integrating and synchronizing resources for
building unit readiness. Unit readiness is built via the ARFORGEN Synchronization and Resourcing
Conference (ASRC). The ASRC not only looks at a unit holistically, but develops a progressive resourcing
strategy for units with resource shortfalls, synchronizes RESET plans for units within the ARFORGEN
force pools and provides predictability and visibility of readiness as the unit progresses through RESET.
Through this quarterly conference, FORSCOM synchronizespersonnel fill with equipment arrival,
transportation, and institutional training. RESET of a unit is measured and tracked through the Army's Unit
Status Report (USR).
Following RESET, a unit transitions to the Train/Ready pool where the focus is restoring decisive action
war-fighting proficiency through unit collective training and by completing a Maneuver Combat Training
Center (MCTC) rotation or exercise. This ensures that the unit is ready to execute its Available pool
mission. Upon entering the Available pool, a unit may be designated a Deployment Expeditionary Force
(DEF) with an identified operational mission or a decisive action proficient Contingency Expeditionary
Force (CEF) to execute a contingency mission, operational plan, or other Army requirement. CEFs may
participate in mission options to include: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN)
Consequence Reaction Force; Global Response Force; Regionally Aligned Brigade (responsive to GCCs
for training exercises) and Theater Security Cooperation events around the globe (based on mission
demand); Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO) forces in support of Operational Plans (OPLANs); and other
validated and approved Joint or Army requirements.
To implement a supply-based ARFORGEN model as originally envisioned, the Army is working to
determinethe time and strategic risk involved in producing the model's primary output - a routinely
accessible mix of decisive action capable AC and RC units - based on the resources available. This output
is not a package or cluster of capabilities that progress through ARFORGEN simultaneously, although
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some units may conduct pre-deployment training together. The recent decision to implement a nine month
boots-on-ground (BOG) policy, combined with continued high operational demand and anticipated
declining resources, will continue to impact the composition of this output for several more years.
The Army has the ability to surge or curtail units moving through the process in response to changing
requirements, or to execute a rapid course change driven by many factors such as risk assessments and
resources. Regardless of the output's composition, the Army will use aim points, or benchmarks, to
synchronize the delivery of Soldiers and equipment with training at specific points during the ARFORGEN
progression. The notion of model output will increasingly serve the vital purpose of informing resource
programming. Eventually, the Army will provide, on a routine basis, two categories of forces moving
through ARFORGEN - the "Mission Force" and a "Surge Force" capable of meeting both current and
emergent requirements.
The Mission Force category is defined as the composition of forces (AC and RC) in the Available Force
Pool consisting of all DEFs and CEFs. The Mission Force provides the operational depth and strategic
flexibility to satisfy combatant commander and Army validated requirements. Included in the Mission Force
are theater assigned, globally available forces when in the Available pool. The Surge Force is comprised of
a selected number of CEF units in the Train/Ready pool that are designated for use in emergent or
contingency operations. The Surge Force includes a number of decisive action capable units that are
available for employment after the Mission Force capacity is fully committed or engaged. Alternatively, a
unit (or tailored capability) from the Surge Force could be used if it is the most feasible or acceptable course
of action to satisfy the force requirement. The Mission and Surge Forces are not part of a large organization
or package that progresses concurrently through the ARFORGEN process.
Implementing a supply-based model signals the beginning of predictable unit rotational cycles. The cycles
of time deployed and time at home are expressed in terms of BOG:Dwell ratio (1:2 for the AC and 1:4 for
the RC). BOG is the term used to describe the time that units are deployed while in the Available pool.
During this period they are either executing missions or are poised to perform short-notice emergent
requirements. Dwell is the term used to describe the time when Soldiers and units are in the RESET and
Train/Ready force pools, respectively.
The development of Mission and Surge forces will enable the Army to satisfy, respectively, the "new
normal" demands associated with Theater Security Cooperation activities and restoration of the critically
needed operational depth and strategic flexibility for the Nation. Availability of these forces will mitigate the
risk associated with the threats the Army and our Nation will confront for the foreseeable future.
Importantly, when supply-based ARFORGEN is fully implemented, the Army will finally put into place a
force generation construct that enables the National Security Decision Makers to understand the capabilities
and limitations of the Army when making decisions to employ the force. Furthermore, when fully
institutionalized, supply-based ARFORGEN will enable the National Security Decision Makers to assess
strategic risk and allocate the appropriate resources when global demand exceeds the available supply for
forces.
The critical contribution and integration of the Army's RC (Army National Guard and the U.S. Army
Reserve) to supply-based ARFORGEN is fundamental to meeting our Nation's security requirements.
Approximately half of the Army's capability resides in the RC. These units, to include division
headquarters, brigade combat teams, functional and multi-functional support brigades and other combat
service and sustainment units, are integral to achieving the Mission and Surge forces required by the Nation.
To secure a steady and predictable supply of trained and ready cohesive RC units for these categories of
forces in a manner that is most cost effective, the Nation must commit resources to operationalize the
Army's RC and conceive a way of guaranteeing assured access to its forces. With guaranteed access to the
RC, the Army will be able to restore the operational depth and strategic flexibility required of the Nation as
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well as begin providing forces to support combatant commander requirements at a tempo sustainable to the
all-volunteer force. Accomplishing these strategic objectives requires continued Department of Defense and
Congressional support and resolve.
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3349 (Physical
PHYSICAL PROFILE
For use of this form, see AR 40-501; the proponent agency is the Office of the Surgeon General.
1. MEDICAL CONDITION: (Description in lay terminology) INJURY? Or MO ILLNESS/DIAE 2 CODES (Table 3. P U ON E S
7-2 AR 40-501) Temporary
Permanent
4. PROFILE TYPE YES NO
a. T EMPOR ARY P ROF IL E (Expiration date YYYYMMDD) (Limited to 3 months duration)I lI]
b. P ERMANE NT PROFI LE (Reviewed and validated with every periodic health assessment or after 5 years from the date of issue) E
5. FUNCTIONAL ACTIVITIES THAT EVERY SOLDIER REGARDLESS OF MOS MUST BE ABLE TO PERFORM. IF SOLDIER CANNOT PERFORM ANY ONE OF
THESE TASKS, THEN THE PULHES MUST CONTAIN AT LEAST ONE "3" AND SOLDIER MUST BE REFERRED TO A MEB. CAN THE SOLDIER:
FUNCTIONAL ACTIVITY: YES NO
a. Carry and fire individual assigned weapon?
b. Evade direct and indirect fire?
c. Ride in a military vehicle for at least 12 hours per day?
d. Wear a helmet for at least 12 hours per day? A)
e. Wear body armor for at least 12 hours per day?
f. Wear load bearing equipment (LBE) for at least 12 hours per day? L
g. Wear military boots and uniform for at least 12 hours per day?D 
_ l
hn. Wear protective mask and MOPP 4 for at least 2 continuous hours per day? ] _j
i. Move 40lbs (for example, duffle bag) while wearing usual protective gear (helmet, weapon, body armor and LBE) at least 100 yards? E :
j. Live in an austere environment without worsening the medical condition?El 1 1
6. APFT YES NO ALTERNATE APFT (Fill out if unable to do APFT run otherwise N/A) N/A YES NO
2 MILE RUN jAPFT WALK
APFT SIT-UPS APFT SWIM
APFT PUSH UPS APFT BIKE
7. DOES THE SOLDIER MEET RETENTION STANDARDS IAW CHAPTER 3 AR 40-501?
YES [ NEEDS MMRB NO NEEDS MEB
8. FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND CAPABILITIES AND OTHER COMMENTS:
This temporary profile is an extension of a temporary profile first issued on
9 NAME, GRADE & TITLE OF PROFILING OFFICER 10. SIGNATURE 11. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
12. NAME & GRADE OF APPROVING AUTHORITY 13. SIGNATURE 14. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
15. Commanders can access the electronic profiles of Soldiers in their unit(s) by going to http://www.mods.army.mil/ and clicking on eProfile in the list of
applications. Commanders will be required to register and be approved in eProfile before they can gain access to profiles
16. PATIENT'S IDENTIFICATION 17. HOSPTAL OR MEDICAL FACILITY
a. NAME: (Last, First)
b. GRADE/RANK:
c. SSN:
d. UNIT: 18. PROFILING OFFICER E-MAIL
P 1 fl2DA FRIM 3349, SEP 20 0 rECViUU0 CUI t IVIOU NO E MDIT ULE It age vo
APD PE v1.00ES
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PHYSICAL PROFILE - PAGE 2 (OPTIONAL)
PATIENT'S NAME DATE (YYYYMMDD)
CONTINUATION (From page 1, Item 8)
DA FORM 3349, SEP 2010
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ARMY SUBSTANCEABUSE PROGRAM (ASAP) ENROLLMENT
For use of this form, see AR 40-66; the proponent agency is the OTSG
The person named below is being referred to the ASAP for a comprehensive assessment to determine whether or not the
individual meets the criteria for enrollment.
1. Name (Last, First. MI). 2. Rank/Grade. 3. SSN. 4. DOB (YYYYMMDD) 5. Yrs Act/Fed Svc.
6. Is Servicemember/Employee 7. Is Servicemember/Employee 8. Is Servicemember/Employee
expected to depart installation on flying status? involved in Personnel Reliability
within 90 days? Program?
YES NO []YES NO YES NO
9. Type of Referral: Biochemical (Type Drug) Self Command Supervisor
Investigation/Apprehension 1 Medical Other
10. Record of Civilian Arrests/Convictions, Courts Martial, Company Punishments, and Disciplinary Problems,
including those Pending: (Specific dates and offenses)
11. Performance: (Give specifics of fair cr unsatisfactory 'ratings)
Performance/ Efficiency: Excellent Good Fair Unsatisfactory
Behavioral/ Conduct: Excellent Good Fair Unsatisfactory
12. Reasons for Referral: (Check appropriate spaces)
a. Physical Signs b. Personality Changes c. Other Behavioral Indicators
Flushed Face Irritability Decreased Quality of Work
2 Nervousness Increased Defensiveness Sporadic Work
Red or Bleary Eyes Increased Use of Excuses Mood Changes after Lunch
Hand Tremors Intolerant of Co-workers or Drinking Before Lunch
Subordinates
Hangovers on.the Job [71 Drinking During the Day
Minor Illnesses Drinking After Lunch
Minor Injuries .Drinking During Duty
Unexcused Absences L Longer Lunch Hours
Other Absenteeism
L Improper Use of Drugs
d. Behavioral changes needed for soldier/employee to become
effective/functioning in until: unusual Excuses for Absences
Avoidance of Supervisor or
associates
13. PATIENT IDENTIFICATION (For typed or written entries give: Name - last,
or medical facility):
first, middle; grade; date; hospital
1 [~9
DA FORM 8003, FEB 2003 APD PE v2.00PAGE 1 OF 2EDITloN OF NO\/ 91 1S OBLOLETE.
SUMMARY OF OUTPATIENT REHABILITATION
DATE TYPE KEPT DATE TYPE KEPT DATE TYPE KEPT DATE TYPE KEPT
(YYYYMMDD) (YYYYMMDD) IYYYYMMDD) (YYYYMMDDJ
Type Code
S Screening I = Individual G = Group F Family
D = CMD Consult R = RTM T Testing M = MFR
A = Clinical Audit C = Collateral
ADDITIONAL CLINICAL TREATMENT
--V~--~ DATE EDATE
EVENT (YYYYMMDD) EVENT (YYYYMMD,
Drug & Alcohol Education Inpatient
Medical Evaluation Antabuse
Detox Case Staffing
DA Form 8002, FEB 2003 Page 2 OF 2
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EFFORTS
14. Other Problems Financial Marriage/Farnily Medica Other (specify)
15. Is soldier/employee seen by other helpinjagencies? Chaplain ]Other -
Community Mental Health Service
16. Commander's/Supervisor's Recommendation:
No further action needed at this time.
Soldier/employee needs alcohol and/or drug education.
I suspect soldier/employee has an alcohol and/or other drug problem.
Other (specify).
17. Immediate Supervisor's Name. 18. Date (YYYMMDD) 19. Phone.
20. Commander's/Supervisor's Signature. 21. Date (YYYYMMoo) 22. Phone.
REHABILITATION TEAM MEETING RESULTS (MANDA TORY FOR MILITAR Y)
Record of contact with commanders/supervisors concerning this referral - Record face-to-face
rehabilitation team meeting results or telephone concurrences, to include dates of programmatic
agreements.
Note: Results of rehabilitation team meetings must also be recorded on SF 600.
*TO: FROM: DATE: (YYYYMMCD)
1. Per your basic memorahdum and agreements made during rehabilitation team meeting on
, the following actions have been taken by the Army Substance Abuse Program
(ASAP) in an effort to assist referred soldier/employee with his/her problem(s):
I Returned to duty, no further action required -
Placed on extended evaluation (30/60 days).
Alcohol/drug education Date (YYYYMMDD) Time: . Bldg#:
Lj Rehabilitation: Track: Date (YYYYMMDD) Time: Bldg#:
2. If you have any questions, please call the following counselor:
at:
Clinical Director
* Note for Federal Employees: To be completed QONL Y with written consent of employee.
APD PE v2.00
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DA FORM 8003, FEB 2003
ASAP Supervisor
ARMY SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM
(ASAP)
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT FORM
(ACAF)
DATE:
DIRECTIONS: Respond to all questions using BLACK ink only. Be sure to fill in all
blanks. Use non-applicable (N/A) if an item does not apply. If you make an error, correct it
by drawing a single line over it, and initial above. Should you need additional space, use the
remarks section at the end of the form (Section IV), indicating the page and number of the
question you are answering. PRINT CLEARLY. If you have any problems filling out this
form, please ask for help. A counselor or staff member will review this form with you.
FULL NAME:
RANK:
UNIT:
SSN:
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC, Sections 1095 and 1079b: Executive Order 9397
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S): Information will be used to collect from private insurers for medical care provided to the Military Treatment Facility (MTF) patient. Such
monetary benefits accruing to the MTF will be used to enhance health care delivery in the MTF.
ROUTINE USE(S): In addition to those disclosu- - generally permitted under 5 USC 552a (b) of the Privacy A the information on this form will be released to your
insurance company.
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I DISCLOSURE: Voluntary. Failure to provide conplete and accurate information may result in disqualification for health care services from MTF.
PRINTED LAST NAME:
DSAS Clinical Assessment
LAST FOUR SSN:
TEST FORM
162
Page 2
ARMY SUBSANCE ABUSE PROGRAM (ASAP)
IDENTIFYING DATA
(FIRST)
Age: DOB: SSN#
Referral Information (Circle one):
Ethnicity:
Bio-Chemical (Urinalysis)
Gender: Male Female
Command Referral Self-Referral Medical I/A (DUI)
Who referred you to us? _
Branch of Service: Army
Job Title:,
ACTIVE DUTY /EMPLOYMENT HSTORY
Unit:
Rank:
MOS:
Highest Rank Held:
Time in Service: Time in Unit:
Where you are currently stationed? Ft Drum
Supervisor:
Commander:
____ # of Combat Deployments: Combat Time:
GT Score:
Work Phone #:
Work Phone #:
PRIOR MILITARY STATUS (prior service and active duty)
Prior Military Service:
Combat Service?
PTSD Diagnosed?
Prior PTSD Treatment?
Demotions?
TYPE OF DISCHARGE:
YES NO BRANCH:
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
YES __ NO
Honorable
_ Other (explain)
From: To:
Highest Rate/Rank:
Combat Location:
If YES, where and when diagnosed?
If YES, where and when treated?
Reason for any demotions:
Dishonorable _ General -Medical NA
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Status (select one) Active Duty Retiree Family Member
Marital Status:
Address:
Home Phone: Cell Ph
Sponsor's Name and address (if you are not the sponsor):
Emergency Contact (Name, Phone #, and relationship):
Civilian
one:
EDUCATION
What is your total number of years of education completed? H.S. DIPLOMA/G.E.D? YES
Year of Graduation/Completion: College Degree(s) Completed: Major:
Do you have a history of learning problems, ADD/ADHD, or special education? .................................................. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .YES
WHAT BRINGS YOU INTO TREATMENT THIS TIME? (Use the Remarks section if you need more space.)
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NAME:
(LAST) (MIDDLE)
Other
NO
NO
PRINTED LAST NAME: LAST FOUR SSN:
DSAS Clinical Assessment TEST FORM Page 3
II. DIMENSION 1-A: ALCOHOL & DRUG USE (INCLUDE PAST AND PRESENT)
ALCOHOL & DRUG GRID AGE AT AGE WHEN NUMBER OF AMOUNT USED USUAL WAY DATE OF LAST NUMBER
FIRST REGULAR TIMES USED EACH TIME USED (Oral, USE OF TIMES
(Complete fully for all USE USE BEGAN PER WEEK (Past Year--if no Smoked, Snorted, USED IN
substances used.) Write N/A if (Past year--if use in past year, IM, IV) LAST 30
never used. no use in past describe period of DAYS
year, describe heaviest use)
period of
heaviest use)
Alcohol (Beer, Wine, Hard
Liquor)
Nicotine (Cigarettes, Cigars,
Chewing tobacco, Snuff)
Marijuana
Cocaine (Crack)
Caffeine (coffee, sodas, No-
Doze)
Amphetamines
(Methamphetamine,
Ecstasy, speed)
PCP
Sedative-Hypnotic/
Anxiolytic
Benzodiazepines
(e.g. Xanax, Valium)
Tranquilizers, Quaaludes
Heroin (Opiates)
Opioids (e.g. Vicodin, Percocet,
Codeine, Oxycontin, Demerol,
Methadone)
Barbiturates (e.g. Nembutal,
Seconal, Phenobarbital)
Inhalants (e.g. Paint, Glue,
Gasoline, Aerosols)
Hallucinogens
(e.g. LSD, Mescaline, Peyote,
Shrooms)
Steroids
Muscle-building Supplements
(Rip Fuel)
Over the Counter (Nyquil,
Tylenol,)
OTHER:
PATTERN OF USE FOR ALCOHOL (circle primary pattern):
daily periodic weekends Binges alone with others other:
PATTERN OF USE FOR DRUGS (circle primary pattern):
daily periodic weekends Binges alone with others N/A other:
ALCOHOL USE DRUG USE (If you have NEVER used drugs, write N/A)
Number of times intoxicated in past year: Number of times high in past year:
Most drinks in one day: Most amt. used in one day:
Have you noticed your pattern of drinking changing over the past? Explain:
YES _ NO
PRINTED LAST NAME: LAST FOUR SSN:
DSAS Clinical Assessment TEST FORM Page 4
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1. Have you ever been hospitalized or treated for detoxification? YES NO
2. If yes, how many times and for what substances:
3. Have you ever received education or treatment for alcohol or other drug problems? YES NO
Name/Location of Dates of Reason for Type of Facility Did you How long did you stay
Previous Alcohol & Drug Admission and Admission (see above) Complete? abstinent after
Treatment Facilities discharge (Alcohol, Drugs (Yes or No) completion?
or Both?)
***Include military inpatient and outpatient programs***
4. What is the longest period of time you have ever stayed clean and sober?
5. Have you ever overdosed on drugs or alcohol? YES NO
6. If yes, how many times? 7. When was the last time?
8. Has anyone in your immediate family had any problems with alcohol or drugs? YES NO If yes, who?
9. Are any of the persons above in recovery, or abstinent at this time?
10. If Yes, then who, and for how long?
11. Were any of the drugs used prescribed by a doctor or dentist? YES NO
12. If yes, which ones?
13. Have you ever used intravenous (IV) drugs? YES NO
14. Have you ever experienced any of the following as a result of HOW MANY TIMES? DATE OF LAST OCCURENCE
alcohol and/or drug use?
A. Blackouts
B. Shakes
C. Eye Openers (drinking in the moming)
D. Seizures
E. Hallucinations
F. Delirium Tremens (DT's)
G. Flashbacks
H. Cravings
I. Passing Out
J. Tolerance changes
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Dimension 1-B: ALCOHOL & DRUG USE QUESTIONNAIRE (Shaded areas for interviewer use only)
1. Since you began regular alcchol use, do you drink a lot more or a lot less now to get the zme effect? YES NO Dl
2. How many drinks do you usually have each time you drink? (e.g. six 12 oz beers) How much of your drug do you usually use?
3. When did you last have a drink or use?
4. What did you have to drink and/or what did you use?
5. Have you ever had any withdrawal symptoms when you cut down or stopped using alcohol/dwg? (Headache, anxiety, vomiting, tremors,
sweating, etc.)? YES NO D2
6. Have you ever used alcohol/drug to avoid hangovers, shakes or other symptoms? YES NO D2
7. Has there ever been a time in your life when you drank/used daily? YES NO D5
For how long? When was that?
8. Have you ever taken the risk of driving after drinking/using any amount? YES NO D4
9. Have you ever wanted to stop using alcohol/drug, but couldn't? YES NO D4
10. Has there been a time when you used alcohol/drug in larger amounts or for longer periods than you intended? YES NO D3
11. Has anyone ever objected to your use of alcohol/dug, or expressed concern about your drinking? YES NO A4
12. Have you ever felt as though your life revolved around your use? YES NO D5
13. Have you ever spent most of the day using alcohol/drug, or getting over the effects of using alcohol? YES NO D5
14. Have you ever had problems with memory or concentration because of alcohol/drug use? (include blackouts) YES NO D7
15. Have you ever neglected responsibilities to yourself or your family because of alcohol/irug use? YES NO Al
16. Have you ever missed school or work (taken sick leave) because of drinking or shown up to work smelling of alcohol/druguse? YES NO D6
17. Has your use of alcohol/drug ever cawsed you to lose a jobor be expelled from school? YES NO D6
18. Have you ever been unable to do something you planned because of alcohol/drug use? YES NO D6
19. Have you ever been stopped or arrested for DUI/DWI? YES NO A2
20. Have you ever been arrested for Minor in Possession, Open Container, Drunk and Disorderly, or any other alcohol/drugrelated charge?
YES NO A3
21. Have you ever been in a hospital or emergency room because of alcohd/drug use? YES NO A2
22. Have you ever continued to drink/use when you knew you had a physical or emotional problem that might become worse with continued use?
YES NO D7
23. Have you ever had an injury while drinking/using? YES NO A2
Did you require medical attention? YES NO
DIMENSION 2 - BIOMEDICAL CONDITIONS AND COMPLICATIONS
1. How is your overall health now? EXCELLENT GOOD FAIR POOR
2. If female, are you pregnant? (If yes, how many weeks)? YES NO
3. Are you currently having any physical problems? (If yes, please indicate): YES NO
4. Are you currently under a doctor's care? (If yes, please indicate why):
5. What prescription medications are you currently taking?
6. What over-the-counter medications are you currently using, or regularlyusing?
7. How many times have you visited the ER or been on sick call in the past year?
Date of last visit?
Reason:
PRINTED LAST NAME: LAST FOUR SSN:
DSAS Clinical Assessment Page 6TEST FORM
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I. A re you being treated for physical pain ?. ........................................................................................................................................................................... Y E S N O
If yes, explain:
2. Indicate current level of physical pain by circling one:
(D%.~(No Pain) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Worst Pain)
. D oes your physical pain im pact on your daily activities?..................................................................................................................................................Y ES N O
. D oes your physical pain im pact on your substance use?................................................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .Y E S N O
S D o you currently have nutritional or dietary concerns? ................................................................................................................................................... Y E S N O
If yes, explain:
Are you experiencing problem s w ith nausea, vom iting, diarrhea or constipation? .............................................................. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .YES N O
I lave you had any significant changes in appetite or weight over the past few months? ........................................................ . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .YES NO
How many hours of sleep do you NEED eachnight?
How many hours of sleep do you GEr each night?
DIMENSION 3 Emotional/Behavioral or Cognitive Conditions and Complications
1. Are you currently or have you ever had any previous mental health treatment for problems other than alcohol/drug abuse? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . YES
(If yes, when and where)
2. A re you currently taking any m edications to treat m ental health problem s? ..................................................................................................................... YES
(If yes, what and for how long)
3. H as anyone in your fam ily ever had any kind of m ental health ................................. .................................................................. Y ES
(If yes, explain)
4. Have you ever had a significant period of any of the following that were not due to the use of alcohol/drug and other drugs?
Anxiousness Self-cutting/burning Violence
Sleep Disturbances Hallucinations Low concentration
Phobias/Paranoia/Delusions Serious Depression Referral to Mental Health
Inducing vomiting/purging Low mood x 2 weeks Death(s) of loved ones
Overeating/Starving Uncontrollable Anger Recurrent thoughts of death
Feelings of worthlessness Wt loss/gain -5% of wt
Reduced interest or Death(s) of loved ones
pleasure in things
5. H ave you ever attem pted to harm yourself or com m it suicide?....................................................................................................................................Y ES
If yes, How many times? When and how?
6. H as anyone in your fam ily ever attem pted suicide 9 . .. . ................................................................................................................................................... Y ES
If yes, explain:
7. A re you currently thinking of harm ing yourself or som eone else? .............................................................................................................................. Y ES
If yes, please explain:
8. Are you CURRENTLY experiencing any of the following: (Check all that apply)
_ Hopelessness Self-destructive Thoughts
Decreased Energy Taking Unnecessary Risks
Giving Away Valuable Possessions Thoughts of Harming Others
Moodiness Serious Problems at Home
_ Preoccupation with Death Serious Financial Problems
-Sleeping too little or too much Separation or Divorce
_ Feeling Withdrawn Problems with Sexual Functioning/Desire
Irritability Eating Too Much/Eating Too Little
Unresolved Grief/Loss Frequent Nightmares
9. H ave you ever been em otionally, physically, or sexually abused? ............................................................. . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . Y ES
If yes, by whom? _ If yes, have you received treatment for Ihis abuse? ................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
167
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10. D o you have any history of violence tow ard others?............................................................................................................................................ . . Y ES N O
If yes, explain:
If yes, what is the worst thing you have ever done to someone?
Has anyone ever ended up in the hospital because of anger or violence toward others? .............................................. ................................ ...YES NO
What were the consequences?
D id you ever receive treatm ent for anger or being violent? ............................................................................................................................. Y ES N O
When:
11. A re there any current dom estic violence incidents? ................................................................................................................................................. Y ES N O
Describe incident and consequences:
12. Have you ever been accused of physical, mental, or sexual abuse of any of your family members or others?..........................................................YES NO
DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY (Check all that applied to you when you were growing up)
Had significant childhood illnesses Had adjustment problems in school
Had disciplinary problems in school Was involved in many fights
Repeated a grade Truant from school more than 10 days in a year
Suspended or thrown out of school _ Destroyed other's property
Ran away from Home Set fires
Stole items costing $10.00 or more Hurt animals
Broke into cars or homes Dropped out of school
Hurt people Experienced a traumatic event (death, abuse, etc.)
SEXUAL HISTORY
I. Do you engage a high risk sexual behavior as a result of drinking (Unprotected sex, multiple partners, etc.)? ........................................................ YES NO
2. D o you use any form of birth contro l? ........................................................................................................................................................................ Y E S N O
If yes, please indicate what form (s):
OTHER ADDICITIONS: GAMBLING, INTERNET, SEX
1. What kinds of gambling do you engage in? (drcle one) N/A slot machines lottery cards other:
2. How many days out of the last 30 have you engaged in any form of gambling? Which kind?
3. W ould you like help w ith gam bling problem s? .......................................................................................................................................................... Y E S N O
4. How much time and money have you spent on sex during the past year (videos, 900 calls, strip clubs, prostitution, etc.)?
5. How much time have you spent on the Internet in the past week? Past month?
6. How much time do you spend on the Internet in a typical week viewing sexual material, cyber sex, or flirting?
LEGAL HISTORY
1. Do you have any current legal problem s or UCM Jaction(s) pending?.................................................................... .. .................. ............................Y ES NO
If yes, please describe:
PRINTED LAST NAME: LAST FOUR SSN:
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2. PRIOR LEGAL PROBLEMS: # of TIMES DATE(S) ALCOHOL/DRUG RELATED?
A. Article 15: YES NO
B. Civilian Arrests: YES NO
C. Civilian Convictions: YES NO
D. Assault/Battery: YES NO
E. Domestic Violence: YES NO
FAMILY AND SOCIAL HISTORY
1. RELATIONSHIP STATUS: (circle current status)
Single Married Separated Divorced Widowed Living as married
2. Flow many times married? How many times divorced? Length of first marriage:
3. If you are married, is your spouse willing to participate in the spousal program? ................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . .YES NO
4. If you have a significant other, do you believe this person has problems with alcohol ordrugs? ............................................ YES NO
5. W ere you raised in a biological, foster or adoptive fam ily? ....................................... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .YES NO
6. Is your mother currently living? Yes No If No, Cause of death:
7. Is your father currently living? Yes No If No, Cause of death:
8. What is your parents' marital status? STILL MARRIED NEVER MARRIED DIVORCED WIDOWED
If Parent(s) divorced or widowed, how old were you at time of divorce/death?
Father married times Mother married times
9. Who raised you? From age to age
If you were not brought up by your parents, who raised you?
Between what years? to Your Birth Order: of
10. How much contact did you have with your parents growing up? (if you were not brought up by biological parents, answer based upon your contact with the persons
you considered to be your parents):
Contact with mother growing up: _ NONE -INFREQUENT FREQUENT
Contact with father growing up: NONE INFREQUENT FREQUENT
I1. How many siblings do you have?
Number of brothers/half or step: Number of sisters/half or step:
12. A re you currently involved inan intim ate relationship? ...................................................................................................................... Y ES N O
13. Is there any violence in this relationship? .............................................. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y E S N O
19. How would you currently describe your relationships with the following people?
A. SPOUSE:
B. CHILDREN:
C. MOTHER:
D. FATHER:
E. SIBLINGS:
DIMENSION 4 -READINESS TO CHANGE
I. Do you think you have an alcohol or drug problem? Why or why not?
2. How severe do you think your problem is? (Circle number) Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Vety Severe
3. How do you rate your level of motivation for treatment at this time? (circle number)
Nonexistent 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very High
4. Do you feel forced into treatment or actively object to receivingtreatment? ............................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . YES NO
5. Is receiving treatment primarily to avoid a negative consequence or do you feel distressed about your alcohol/druguse? (explain)
6. If treatment is recommended, will you be willing to participate and do the necessary work? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . YES NO
PRINTED LAST NAME: LAST FOUR SSN:
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DIMENSION 5 -RELAPSE/CONTINUED USE POTENTIAL
1. Have you ever been told that you should seek help for alcohol and/or drug problems?....................................................................... YES NO
2. W hat skills/tools would have you used to redice or stop abusing/using alcohol or drugs? ................................................................ YES NO
3. What level would you estimate your craving or desire for alcohol/dugs is this week? (circle number)
(Low or no cravings) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (High cravings or desire)
4. Have you been able to stop using for a period of time and then began using again? ...................................................... YES NO
When?
5. How many times have you relapsed?
6. If the recommendation is to enroll, what steps can you take immediately to keep form drinking/drugging?
7. If enrolled, can you identify at least one or two things or activities you can plan which will support not drinking/drugging?
1. _2.
DIMENSION 6 -RECOVERY ENVIRONMENT
1. What are your present livig arrangements? (circle one) Barracks/Dorms W/ Family W/Roommate Alone Other
2. Who lives in your home with you nov_
3. D oes the person(s) you are living w ithdrink or use drugs? ................................................................................................................... Y ES N O
4. Who are your current sources of support for abstinence and recovery: (check all that apply)
SPOUSE/SIGNIFICANT OTHER _YES __NO __N/A SELF-HELP GROUP YES _ NO N/A
FAMILY YES __NO N/A CHURCH _YES _NO _N/A
EMPLOYER YES NO N/A FRIENDS YES NO N/A
OTHER YES _NO N/A
RECREATIONAL/LEISURE
1. What are your favorite leisure activities?
2. Describe how you spend a typical weekend:
FINANCIAL
1. A re you currently experiencing financial problem s? .......................................................................................................................... Y ES N O
2. What impact has your use caused to your financial condition?
3. Estimate what you spond weekly on using.
SPIRITUAL
I. What is your religious or spiritual orientation?
2. Does the church/synagogue/m osque/tem ple play a role in your life?..................................................................................................YES NO
3. Who or what provides you with strength and hope?
4. What impact has using had on your spiritual, religious practices, values or family?
5. Are there any spiritual/religious impediments or barriers you think may interfere with your treatment? ........................................... YES NO
(If yes, specify)
6. How much control do you feel you have over your goals and direction of your life?
7. W ould you like a referral to see a Chaplain or Spiritual Leader? ........................................................... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . ..YES NO
CULTURAL
1. What do you consider to be your culture/ethnicity?
2. How is sharing of intimate/personal details with "outsiders" viewed by your country?
3. Are there any cultural impediments or barriers you think may interfere with your treatment?..............................................YES NO
If yes, please describe:
4. How is the sharing of intimate/personal details with "outsiders" viewed by your culture?
5. How is the use of alcohol or drugs viewed by your culture?
STRENTHS/LIMIATIONS
1. What do you like most about yourself___
2. What are your chief talents?
3. What do you most dislike about yourself?
4. Describe your personality:
5. Is there anything else you think your counselor needs to know right now?
PATIENT SIGNATURE: DATE:
PLEASE STOP AND RETURN THIS FORM TO YOUR COUNSELOR
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DSM-IV-TR DIAGNOSTIC GRID
171
DIMENSION 1. Circle "E" if symptom ever occurred but was not reported in the past year.
DETOX/WITHDRAWAL + Circle "1" if symptom occurred only once in the past year.
DSM-IV DIAGNOSIS Circle "2" if symptom occurred two or more times In the past year.
INDICATOR ALC CAN SED/ HAL AMP COC OPI PCP INH OTHER
HYP
1. Tolerance E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 2 E 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
a. increased
b. decreased E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 12 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
2. Withdrawal E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
a. Withdrawal Syndrome
b. Using to avoid withdrawal E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
3. Using larger amounts or for E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
longer periods of time than
intended
4. Desire or unsuccessful attempts E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
to cut down or control use
5. Great deal of time spent E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
obtaining, using, or recovering
6. Social, work, or play activities E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 2 E 1 2 E 2 E 1 2
given up or reduced by use
7. Continued use despite recurrent E 1 2 E 1 2 E 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
physical or psychological
problems
Al. Failure to fulfill roles at work, E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
school, or home due to use
A2. Recurrent use in hazardous E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
situations
A3. Recurrent legal problems due E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
to use I
A4. Continued use despite social E 1 2 E 1 2 E 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2 E 1 2
or interpersonal problems
DATE OF LAST USE
SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE 303.90 304.30 304.10 304.50 304.40 304.20 304.00 304.90 304.60 304.90
(Pattern of impairment with three
or more indicators 1-7 occurring at
any time in the last 12 months)
SUBSTANCE ABUSE (Pattern of 305.00 305.20 305.40 305.30 305.70 305.60 305.50 305.90 305.90 305.90
impairment with one or more of
the indicators A 1-4 occurring
within the last 12 months
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I. DSM-IV-TR AXIS I DIAGNOSIS(ES):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
II. CHIEF PROBLEM(S): (note if problem will be
addressed, referred, or deferred)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
III. IMMEDIATE TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS (Include any referrals to address problems
identified above):
Abstinence
F/U meeting with ASAP counselor, DATE/Time
Other (specify)
IV. LONG TERM RECOMMENDATIONS (Include any referrals to address problems identified
above):
Abstinence Referral to ACS for stress/anger management
Attendance at ADAPT (education/prevention classes) Referral to Chaplain/Spiritual Advisor
Group therapy --week for _ weeks Referral to Medical for evaluation/examination
Individual Counseling: Frequency _ Referral for Mental Health evaluation
Patient education and evaluation for Antabuse/ Referral to Nutritionist
Naltrexone
(specifiy)
By my signature, I acknowledge that the above diagnosis(es) and immediate treatment recommendations have been explained to me:
PATIENT SIGNATURE:_
COUNSELOR SIGNATURE:
MariaMoustrouphisLCSW, LADC, CCS
ASAP Supervisor
DATE:
DATE
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INTEGRATED SUMMARY
1. IDENTIFYING DATA/DEMOGRAPHICS: is a 20 year-old single Caucasian male. he is currently working with
B CO 1-2 SCR. He has been in his unit for 8 months. He has been enlisted in the Army for 20 months. Deployment
history: Patient resides in the barracks. He is a Command-referral for this evaluation for alcohol.
2. If married, Soldier's permission to call spouse: Yes / No; Soldier signed DA Form 5018R.
Command consult
Other providers
3. PRESENTING PROBLEM(S): Patient reports that "he was .".
4. ASAM DIMENSIONS
Dimension 1 - Acute Intoxication and/or Withdrawal Potential: At this time there does not appear to be any current
assessed acute levels or intoxication or acknowledged withdrawal symptoms.
Alcohol Use History: Patient reports getting drunk for the first time at age 14. No evidence of acute
intoxication/withdrawal at this time. He denies any withdrawal symptoms currently.
ACSAP Background check: Negative.
From age 14 to 18 he reports
He denies a history of past substance abuse treatment. He reports black-outs in the past 12 months and lifetime.
He denies history of cravings. Denies any family history of substance problems. Briefed the patient of his AT
RISK status. He verbalized understanding the Genetic Link of substance use.
Other Substances: Patient denies other substances use.
Patient meets DSM IV-TR criteria for Alcohol Dependence as follows:
- Tolerance (numbers of drinks show increase in tolerance)
- Withdrawal- include nausea, headaches and irritability
- Alcohol is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than intended - multiple times per patient's
report.
- There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down alcohol use as per patient's report.
- A GREAT DEAL OF TIME SPENT in activities necessary to OBTAIN the substance. USE the substance, or RECOVER
from its effects.
- Important social / occupational / recreational activities are given up or reduced because of alcohol use.
- Alcohol use is continued despite knowledge of having a depressive disorder that is likely to have been caused or
exacerbated by alcohol.
Patient meets DSM IV-TR criteria for Alcohol Abuse as follows:
- Recurrent substance use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, school or home.
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- Recurrent substance use in situations in which it is physically hazardous.
- Recurrent substance-related legal problems.
- Continued substance use despite having a persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal problems caused or
exacerbated by the effects of the substance.
Dimension I Summary: Patient is free from intoxication or withdrawal symptoms.
Dimension 2 - Biomedical Conditions and Complications:
o Nutritional/Dietary: There were no clinical issues assessed concerning patient's Nutritional / Dietary
problems - Patient did not acknowledge any problems during the assessment.
o Pain Management: Based on the assessed information, there does not appear to be any chronic problems
with pain at this time.
o Tobacco Products: Based on the complete assessment there is no indication that patient is now using or
planning on utilizing tobacco products in the future - not of clinical concern at this time. He is interested to
stopping his tobacco use and is aware of the physical / health risks he could face if he continues smoking.
The patient is smoking 1 pack of cigarettes a day and was offered a referral to the Medical Clinic for tobacco
cessation classes. The patient declined the referral and is aware of the health risks by continuing the use of
tobacco products. The patient has been utilizing tobacco products for 8 months or 8 years.
o TBI: The patient endorses / denies any concussion, blunt force trauma, or other head injury - and -
or loss of consciousness.
o Relevant Hospitalizations: Other than for normal physical ailments, there were no significant
hospitalizations that would affect patient's treatment at this time.
o Sleep Complaints: The patient reports sleeping 5 hours a night and was offered a referral to the Medical
Clinic to assess the lack of sleep. The patient declined the referral.
o Medications: The patient reports he is not on any medications.
Dimension 2 Summary: The patient's biomedical conditions, if any, are stable enough for the patient to participate in
outpatient treatment.
Dimension 3 - Emotional, Behavioral or Cognitive Conditions and Complications:
Patient History / Psychiatric Illnesses: No Mental Health Problems from patient's current or past life assessed.
Stress / Depression / Anger / Anxiety Level Assessment:
- Stress: Some stress due to not getting along with his supervisor.
e Depression: The patient denies any.
m Anger: None reported
* Anxiety: The patient denies any symptoms.
History Of Sexual, Physical Or Emotional Abuse: The patient denies any history of abuse.
Developmental History: The patient denies/endorses numerous development issues.
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Sexual History: No indication that patient is now or in the past has engages in high risk sexual behaviors as a
result of drinking.
Family History: No assessed problems with Family of Origin mental health problems, suicidal or homicidal
history, and no indication of emotional, physical or sexual abuse.
Other Addictions: Gambling, Internet, Sex:
= There does not appear to be any current assessed/acknowledged problems with other addictions: gambling,
internet, sex.
Learning Needs:
= Patient's level of education and learning ability was assessed during the screening process - At this time
there does not appear to be any cognitive learning problems which will hinder the ability to participate in
various aspects of Psycho-Education and therapy.
Current Legal Problems / Concerns: Patient denies any significant legal issues or problems that would affect
his treatment at this time.
Dimension 3 Summary: The patient's mental health functioning is stable enough to participate in outpatient treatment.
Dimension 4 -Readiness To Change:
Turning Point for Change: At this time patient does not appear to see the need for any change in substance use
behaviors.
Patient Acceptance to Receiving Services: Patient verbalized willingness to obtain the recommended treatment
based on this assessment but does not believe that it is necessary.
Level of Motivation for Treatment: "7" on scale of 0-10 (1 O=high motivation)
Dimension 4 Summary: The patient wants to adhere to the treatment plan and attend all scheduled activities and the
patient admits to a substance abuse and mental health problem but requires monitoring and motivating strategies. A
structured residential program is not required presently.
Dimension 5 - Relapse, Continued Use or Continued Problem Potential:
Level of Craving/Desire to Use Alcohol/Illicit Drugs: Patient denies/ endorses cravings to used AOD currently.
Skills to Prevent Relapse: N/A /Limited
Trigger Awareness: The patient could not identify any triggers that lead to drinking.
Danger for Continued Distress: Patient does not appear to be in immediate danger of continued severe distress
and substance abuse behavior. The patient appears to have sufficient skills to cope with his substance use
problems in order to prevent continued use.
Dimension 5 Summary: The patient is able to maintain abstinence and pursue recovery goals with minimal support. /The
patient is assessed as being able to achieve or maintain abstinence and recovery goals only with support and scheduled
counseling sessions to assist in dealing with issues that include mental preoccupation with alcohol and drugs, cravings,
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peer pressure, lifestyle, attitude changes and other treatment plan issues./ The patient does not require an intensive level of
supervision and/or inpatient care.
Dimension 6 - Recovery Environment/Living Environment:
Living and Support Environment: Lives in barracks with other soldiers.
Recreational/ Leisure: video games, sports, working out.
Financial and Employment Status: patient report no financial problems.
Spiritual Assessment: The patient does believe in God. The patient's spiritual orientation does not
relate to alcohol misuse in terms of how the patient views of self as an individual of value and worth.
Patient did not espouse distressing experiences that involve loss or questioning of faith, problems associated with
conversion to a new faith, or questioning of spiritual values. No religious or spiritual issues were identified that
warranted the focus of clinical attention.
Cultural And Ethnic Influences: With the information assessed, there does not appear to be any significant
cultural issues or concerns which would affect therapy at this time.
Dimension 6 Summary: The situation characterized by a sufficiently supportive psychosocial environment makes
outpatient treatment feasible.
5. DSM-IV-TR DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSION:
Axis I:
Axis II:
Axis III:
Axis IV:
Axis V: GAF
305.00 Alcohol Abuse
303.90 Alcohol Dependence
305.10 Nicotine Dependence
305.20 Cannabis Abuse
304.40 Cannabis Dependence
V71.09 No Diagnosis
Patient did not acknowledge any
Occupational Problem
Legal Problem
Current - 61-70
medical conditions or pain at this time.
6. CLINICAL IMPRESSION: Strengths, Barriers, Assets to Treatment.
The patient is a 21 years old single Caucasian male who had 2 alcohol-related incidents. He was charged with
being drunk on duty.
MSE: The patient is a 21 year old single Caucasian male that appears to be about his stated age, appropriately attired in
duty uniform and well groomed. The patient's attitude was cooperative and an adequate level of rapport was achieved.
There were no abnormal behaviors or psychomotor activity noted. The patient's speech was WNR and spontaneous. There
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was no perceptual disturbance or abnormal process noted. Affect was WNR. Patient was appropriately oriented. The
patient adequately demonstrated an age appropriate general fund of knowledge. Judgment and insight as it relates to
alcohol or other drug use appears fair to poor. Patient denies current experience with homicidal/suicidal ideation.
Strengths: "outgoing." Weaknesses: "bad decision-making."
Assessment Interpretation: The patient was administered the following assessment instruments:
a. Alcohol Use Disorders Screening Test (AUDIT) = 10; alcohol-related problem. (A score between 8 and 15
indicates a medium level of alcohol problems and scores of 16 and above indicates a high level of alcohol
problems. Scores greater than 20 clearly warrant further diagnostic evaluation for alcohol dependence).
b. Nicotine Questionnaire above = 2; does not meet the criteria for Nicotine Dependence.
c. The patient was administered an OQ-45 questionnaire and had a total score of 67 significant >63; SD=31
significant >36; IR=22 significant >15; SR=14 significant >12. Item #8 (suicide) = 0; item #44=1 (violence).
7. RECOMMENDATIONS: Based on collaborative clinical interview, client input and diagnostic impression, the
following recommendations are made:
I. Enrolled in Level I treatment at ASAP.
o Group Therapy
o Individual Counseling
o Prime for Life-Educational Classes.
o Attend 2-12 step meetings
2. Attend appointment with MRO to verify diagnosis.
3. Make appointment with Mental Health to address depressive symptoms.
4. Make appointment with the Medical Clinic to address lower back pain.
5. Anger Management Classes.
6. Dietitian to address weight change.
7. Financial Counseling.
8. Tobacco Cessation Classes.
8. INITIAL PLAN:
1. Staff case
2. Contact Command for collateral interview
3. Scheduled RTM with Chain of Command
4. Abstinence
Maria A. Moustrouphis Date:
LCSW, LADC, CCS
ASAP Supervisor
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LIMITS OF CONFIDENTIALITY
For use of this form, see AR 40-66; the proponent agency is OTSG
1. Counselors in the Community Counseling Center (CCC) do the most they can to ensure your confidentiality. There are, however,
certain circumstances when disclosure of information to third parties must occur. Information relating to soldiers will be released to
individuals within the Armed Forces who have an official need to know. Releases of information to those outside the Armed Forces
concerning soldiers, and on all releases of information concerning civilian clients are governed by Part 2, Chapter 1, Title 42, Code
of Federal Regulations. Some of the more commonly requires examples are as follows:
a. If a counselor believes you might harm yourself or someone else.
b. If the counselor suspects that you or someone in your family has been involved in child abuse/neglect or spouse abuse.
c. If you or your family are an open case with the Family Advocacy Case Management Team (FACMT) your progress in
treatment and any information necessary for the FACMT must be presented to this team.
d. If you are involved in legal actions or proceedings your records and your counselor may be subject to subpoena.
e. If you are involved in, or have been involved in, any Illegal activities.
f. For active duty soldiers, if you have been involved in any activities prohibited by army regulation.
g. Commanders of active duty soldiers must be informed of any information pertaining to treatment recommendations and
treatment prognosis.
h. Qualified persons involved with quality assurance activities, clinical supervision or approved research projects may be
permitted access to your records.
i. If you are involved in a line of duty investigation.
j. If you fall under the nuclear or chemical surety programs then further information may be required to be given to your
commander.
2. It is the Intent of all CCC personnel to safeguard your confidentiality to the utmost extent afforded by law and Army Regulation.
However, total confidentiality in the military is only guaranteed to legal counsel (lawyers) who are representing you. If you have any
questions about the above information please discuss them with your counselor BEFORE proceeding with the interview.
3. STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING: I have read the above and understand that information about me will be safeguarded
within the limits of confidentiality outlined above and as contained in the Privacy Act Statement.
Signature Date
4. CCC COUNSELOR'S STATEMENT: I have inquired to ensure that the patient understands the above description of the limits of
confidentiality.
Signature Date
5. PATIENT IDENTIFICATION (For typed or written entries give: Name - last, first, middle; grade; date; hospital or medical facility):
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ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION & CONTROL PROGRAM (ADAPCP) OUTPATIENT
MEDICAL RECORDS - PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION
For use of this form, see AR 40-66; the proponent agency is OTSG
This form is not a consent form to release or use health care information about you.
1. AUTHORITY FOR COLLECTION OF INFORMATION INCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (SSN).
Title V, Public Law 92-129; section 501, 42 USC section 290dd.
2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSES OF OUTPATIENT MEDICAL RECORDS.
a. To provide necessary information to evaluate the existence of and, if appropriate, the nature and
extent of the patient's alcohol and other drug problem.
b. To provide baseline information for monitoring the patient's progress during rehabilitation in the
ADAPCP.
c. To ensure continuity of care of patient enrolled in ADAPCP rehabilitation.
d. As part of the Active Army soldier's medical record, to provide information to military physicians in
diagnosing other medical problems and in prescribing medication.
e. To provide statistical information for program evaluation.
3. PRINCIPAL PURPOSES OF OUTPATIENT MEDICAL RECORDS.
a. Active Army Soldiers. Release of any information from this record is subject to the restrictions of
21 USC 1175 as amended by 88 Stat 137; 42 USC 4582 amended by 88 Stat 131 chapter 1, title 42,
Code of Federal Regulations. Under these statues and regulations, disclosure of information that
would identify the patient as an abuser of alcohol or other drugs is authorized within the Armed Forces
or to those components of the Veterans Administration, furnishing health care to veterans. AR 600-85
further limits disclosure within the Armed Forces to those individuals having an official need to know (for
example, the physician or the patient's unit commander). All other disclosures require the written
consent of the patient except disclosures (1) to medical personnel outside the Armed Forces to the
extent necessary to meet a bona fide medical emergency; (2) to qualified personnel conducting
scientific research, management, or financial competent jurisdiction.
b. Civilian employees and other personnel. Release of any information from this record is subject to
the restrictions of 21 USC 1175 as amended by 88 Stat 137-42 USC 4582 as amended by 88 Stat 131
and chapter 1, title 42, Code of Federal Regulations. All disclosures require the written consent of the
patient except disclosures (1) to medical personnel to the extent necessary to meet a bona fide medical
emergency; (2) to qualified personnel conducting scientific research, management, or financial audits or
program evaluation or (3) upon the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
4. MANDATORY / VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON AN INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING
INFORMATION.
a. Disclosure is mandatory for Active Army soldiers. Failure to obey order from competent authority
to provide required information may be subject to appropriate disciplinary action under the UCMJ.
b. Disclosure is voluntary for civilian employees and other personnel. The failure to disclose the
information will result in a reduced capability of the program to provide treatment and services.
5. Signature of Patient or Sponsor 6. SSN of Member or Sponsor. 7. Date.
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ASAP LIMITED USE POLICY (AR 600-85)
The Objective of the Limited Use Policy is to facilitate the identification of alcohol and drug
abusers through self-referral, an the treatment and rehabilitation of those abusers who
demonstrate the potential for rehabilitation and retention. It is not intended to protect a
member who is attempting to avoid disciplinary or adverse administrative action.
Limited Use prohibits the use of the following evidence against a soldier in actions under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice or on the issue of characterization of service in separation
proceedings:
(1) Mandatory urine or alcohol breath test results taken to determine a soldier's fitness
for duty and the need for counseling, rehabilitation, or other medical treatment or in conjunction
with a soldier's participation in ASAP.
(2) A soldier's self-referral to ASAP.
(3) Admissions and other information concerning drug or alcohol abuse or possession
of drugs incidental to personal use occurring prior to the date of initial referral to ASAP
provided voluntarily by a soldier as part of his or her initial entry into ASAP.
(4) Admissions made by a soldier enrolled in ASAP to a physician or ASAP counselor
during a scheduled interview concerning drug or alcohol abuse or possession of drugs
incidental to personal use occurring prior to the date of initial referral to ASAP.
(5) Information concerning drug or alcohol abuse or possession of drugs incidental to
personal use obtained as a result of a soldier's emergency medical care for an actual or
possible drug or alcohol overdose, unless such treatment resulted from apprehension by
military or civilian law enforcement officials.
The Limited Use Policy does not prevent the counselor from revealing to the appropriate
authority, knowledge of certain illegal acts. These would be acts that may have an adverse
impact on or compromise mission, national security, or the health and welfare of others. The
reporting in such an instance is from the counselor, to clinical director, to Clinical Consultant, to
the patient's commander, not directly to any other agency. The commander will report the
information to the appropriate authority. Likewise, information that the patient presently
possesses illegal drugs or that the patient committed an offense while under the influence of
illegal drugs or alcohol is not covered under this policy.
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PATIENT RIGHTS
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT
COMMUNITY COUNSELING CENTER
1. Every patient shall have his/her fundamental human, civil, constitutional, statutory and individual
rights supported and protected by the Community Counseling Center (CCC).
2. The personal dignity of the individual shall be maintained. Access to treatment shall be impartial,
that is free of discrimination of race, religion, sex, ethnicity, age or handicap.
3. The personal privacy of the patient shall be maintained within the constraints of the individual
treatment and standards governing confidentiality.
4. Each CCC patient shall be informed regarding the following:
a. His or her rights.
b. The clinical staff responsible for his or her care and those staff members' professional status
and staff relationship.
c. The nature of the care, procedures, and treatment which he or she will receive.
d. The present and future use and disposition of products of special observation and
audiovisual techniques such as tape recorders, television, movies or photographs.
e. The risks, side effects, and benefits of all medications and treatment procedures used.
f. His or her participation in any research project that introduces additional inconvenience or
risk.
g. The alternative treatment procedures that are available.
h. The right to refuse to participate in any research project, without compromising access to the
program's services.
i. The right to refuse specific medications or treatment.
j. The program's responsibilities when patient refuses treatment, to terminate the relationship
with the patient upon reasonable notice; either at the time of refusal or immediately after
patient refuses to attend two consecutive counseling sessions without excuse by the
Commander/1 SG or appropriate person.
k. Any proposed change, and the reasons for such change, in the clinical staff responsible for
him or her, or any transfer of him or her within or outside the program.
I. The rules and regulations of the program applicable to his or her conduct.
NAME RANK SSN
UNIT DOB DATE
SIGNATURE DATE
WITNESSED DATE
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CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
NICOTINE QUESTIONNAIRE
Do you smoke / chew tobacco products: Yes No
o If "NO" you do not have to continue with this questionnaire.
- How long have you used tobacco products? Start (Age) Date. -
- Are you interested to stopping your tobacco use? Yes No
- If you are not interested !n stopping your tobacco use, are you aware of the physical / health risks
you could face if you continue smoking: Yes No
symptom Yes No
Do you need markedly increased amounts of Tobacco Products to achieve the
desired effect? Start Amount:
Using Now:
When you stop using Tobacco Products do you experience any of the following:
- Depression
- Insomnia (Cannot Sleep)
- Irritability, Frustration or Anger
- Anxiety (Circle All That Applv)
- Difficulty Concentrating
- Restlessness
- Decreased Heart Rate
- Increased Appetite / Weight Gain
Are you using Tobacco Products in larger amounts / over a longer period than you
intend to?
Have you tried previously to stop, cut down or control your Tobacco Use?
Do you spend a great deal of time using Tobacco Products (e.g. Chain Smoking /
Chewing)?
Has your social, occupational or recreational activities been hindered / delayed
because of your Tobacco Use?
Have you continued to use Tobacco Products despite your knowledge of possibly
having persistent, recurrent or future physical problems?
TOTAL SYMPTOMS
Patient's Signature DATE
RECORDS MAINTAINED AT: FORT DRUM ASAP
NAME:,
RANK: UNIT:
_SSN -DOB: 7
CONFIDE N T IAL INFO RMA TION
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OUTCOME QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: Looking back over the last week, including today,
help us understand how you have been feeling. Read each item carefully and
mark the box under the category which best describes your current situation.
For this questionnaire, work is defined as employment, school, housework,
volunteer work, and so forth. Please do not make any marks in the shaded
areas.
(00 -45.2)
Name
Age: _ yrs. Sex: [M EF
ID #
ISession # Date / /
Never Rarely Sometimes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
I get along well with others.
I tire q u ic kly ....................................................................................
I feel no interest in things.
I feel stressed at work/school...........................................................
I blame myself for things.
I feel irritated..................................................................................
I feel unhappy in my marriage/significant relationship.
I have thoughts of ending my life.......................................................
I feel weak.
I fe e l fea rfu l.....................................................................................
11. After heavy drinking, I need a drink the next morning to get
going. (If you do not drink, mark "never")
12. I find my work/school satisfying........................................................
13. l am a happy person.
14. I work/study to much.......................................................................
15. 1 feel worthless.
16. I am concerned about family troubles................................................
17. I have an unfulfilling sex life.
18 . I fe e l lo ne ly .....................................................................................
19. 1 have frequent arguments.
20. I feel loved and wanted...............................................................
21. I enjoy my spare time.
22. I have difficulty concentrating...........................................................
23. I feel hopeless about the future.
2 4 . I lik e m yse lf....................................................... ...........................
25. Disturbing thoughts come into my mind that I cannot get rid of.
26. I feel annoyed by people who criticize my drinking (or drug use)
(If not applicable, mark "never").............................................
27. 1 have an upset stomach.
28. I am not working/studying as well as I used to..................................
29. My heart pounds too much.
30. I have trouble getting along with friends and close acquaintances.......
31. I am satisfied with my life.
32. I have trouble at work/school because of drinking or drug use
(If not applicable, mark "never").............................................
33. I feel that something bad is going to happen.
34. I have sore muscles.......................................................................
35. I feel afraid of open spaces, of driving, or being on buses,
subways, and so forth.
36 . I feel ne rvo us .................................................................................
37. I feel my love relationships are full and complete.
38. I feel that I am not doing well at work/school.....................................
39. I have too many disagreements at work/school.
40. I feel something is wrong with my mind............................................
41. I have trouble falling asleep or staying asleep.
4 2 . 1 fee l blue ......................................................................................
43. I am satisfied with my relationships with others.
44. I feel angry enough at work/school to do something I might regret......
45. 1 have headaches.
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ALCOHOL USE DISORDERS IDENTIFICATION TEST (AUDIT)
Please check the answer that is correct for you.
1. How often do you have a drink containing alcohol?
El Never L Monthly El Two to four L Two to three L Four or more
or less times a month times a week times a week
2. How many drinks containing alcohol do you have on a typical day when you are drinking?
n 1 or 2 l 3 or 4 j 5 or 6 l 7 or 9 l 10 or more
3. How often do you have six or more drinks on one occasion?
D Never D Less than Monthly [I Monthly LI Weekly EL Daily or almost daily
4. How often during the last year have you found that you were not able to stop drinking once you had
started?
l Never L Less than Monthly L Monthly Li Weekly Li Daily or almost daily
5. How often during the last year have you failed to do what was normally expected from you because of
drinking?
L Never Li Less than Monthly L Monthly Li Weekly Li Daily or almost daily
6. How often during the last year have you needed a first drink in the morning to get yourself going after a
heavy drinking session?
Li Never Li Less than Monthly l Monthly Li Weekly Li Daily or almost daily
7. How often during the last year have you had a feeling of guilt or remorse after drinking?
l Never El Less than Monthly Li Monthly Li Weekly Li Daily or almost daily
8. How often during the last year have you been unable to remember what happened the night before
because you had been drinking?
L Never El Less than Monthly L Monthly L Weekly Li Daily or almost daily
9. Have you or someone else been injured as a result of your drinking?
Li NO L Yes, but not in the last year L Yes, during the last year
10. Has a relative or friend, or a doctor or other health worker, been concerned about your drinking or
suggested you cut down?
L NO Li Yes, but not in the last year L Yes, during the last year
NAME RANK SSN
UNIT DOB
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Appendix E - Comprehensive Soldier
Fitness Brochure
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composition and flexibility derived
and training.
-ough exercise, nutrition
and actions.
communication including a comfortable exchange of ideas,
views and experiences.
strength.
a healthy and secure environment.
- --------- --  - -- ................ 
Appendix F - Executive Summaries for
Selected Site Visits
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Case Study of the Behavioral Health
Delivery System at Site A
MAJ Shane Scott
Andrea Ippolito
Dir. Jayakanth Srinivasan
Purpose:
The Post Traumatic Stress Innovations (PTSI) team from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology's (MIT) Lean Advancement Initiative (LAI) conducted a week-long site visit to
Site A as a part of its data gathering regarding the military's care delivery enterprise for Post
Traumatic Stress and related conditions. The team collected information from stakeholders
from Forces Command (FORSCOM), the US Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), and US
Army Installation Command (IMCOM) at Site A through a series of interviews conducted by
the authors. The interviews focused on how each stakeholder participates in care delivery
services for Post Traumatic Stress to both service members and their families during both
deployment and home station operations. This case study presents the findings regarding
the architecture of the enterprise and the processes by which the enterprise delivers care.
Site Demographics:
Site A is home to one of FORSCOM's combat divisions, and two nonconventional Army units
consisting of approximately 30,000 military personnel, 8,000 civilian employees, and 51,000
family members. It is located in a rural community with a population around 100,000,
approximately sixty miles from the closest major city. The installation is home to an Army
Community Hospital with 68 operating beds, and additional medical support is provided by
five off-post hospitals within 75 miles.
Deployment History:
The division has deployed twice in the past three years, and is beginning preparations for its
next appointment scheduled for the end of 2012. Three of four brigade combat teams are
currently at home station with the 4th brigade combat team scheduled for return within the
next sixty days.
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Behavioral Health Delivery in During Deployment
An integrated, unit-focused Level 1 Care Team delivers behavioral health services
during deployments for the soldiers assigned to Site A. The Level 1 Care Team, shown in
Figure 1, remain in constant communication and work toward the common goal of ensuring
that soldiers remain fit for duty, so that the unit may accomplish its mission.
Chaplains
SBrigade Command
Polic Provider 
Team
Combat Individual Augmentees
tress Team BDE 68Xs
Level 2 Care Team
Figure 1. Site A Deployed Behavioral Health Architecture.
The Command Team is highly attuned to the needs of their soldiers as well as the
soldiers' living conditions and experiences, which may vary greatly from unit to unit during
deployments. Particularly at the junior Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) level, leaders have
a great deal of fidelity of understanding regarding their soldiers' personalities, and are
capable of detecting even slight changes in their soldiers' demeanors that may be indicative
of problems relating to behavioral health. Officers and senior NCOs at the company and
battalion levels rely heavily upon the young NCOs to remain vigilant in caring for junior
soldiers, and recognizing when the soldiers need help. Tactical unit leaders need soldiers
who are fit for duty for accomplishment of the mission, and they are heavily invested in
ensuring that those in their command get the assistance that they require. The command
team depends on the battalion's organic medical assets and chaplains to ensure the physical
and spiritual wellness of each member of the unit. These three members of the Level 1 Care
Team work with the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) psychological clinician to ensure soldiers'
emotional wellness.
Medical assets assigned to the fighting battalions, specifically the battalion PA and
unit medics, help the commander to understand the soldiers' needs from a medically-trained
point of view. Additionally, these personnel have access to protected medical records that the
commander does not, and can serve as a front line case manager to ensure continuity of care
and also to keep commanders informed of issues that may affect soldier fitness for duty. The
unit medical team works closely with the command team to identify soldiers who may
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require behavioral health care for command referral to a provider who may administer the
required services.
The third member of the battalion's Level 1 Care Team is the unit chaplain who is
charged with providing spiritual ministry to the battalion's members and to ensure that all of
the unit's soldiers may freely practice their chosen religion. Chaplains additionally serve as
nonclinical counselors and advisors to soldiers in their units, and they are generally accepted
as the first line of defense for behavioral health care. Most soldiers speak freely with the
chaplains because they know and trust these officers who live, eat, sleep, and most
importantly, go on missions with soldiers. Because they live the life of a soldier it is easy for
the chaplains to make relationships with those for whom they care. Soldiers trust the
chaplains and they know that the chaplains care about them.
"Soldiers don't care what you know until they know who you are. You have to
build a relationship with a soldier before you can help him." - Battalion
Chaplain
The 4th member of the Level 1 Care Team is the BCT's behavioral health clinician, a
Licensed Clinical Counselor. This officer is the psychological health specialist in the team, and
also lives and works in the same conditions as their patients. With one behavioral health
provider assigned for the brigade, this officer is effectively a member of four Level 1 Care
Teams, and is responsible for providing clinical care for 4000 soldiers. This ratio of patients
to providers creates challenges for care availability, but the provider, in nearly all cases,
makes up for the lack of numbers through hard work and constant mobility on the
battlefield.
"Our brigade psych was outstanding. She was all over the battlefield, all the
time, helping soldiers where they were. She wasn't satisfied to stay cooped up
on the FOB." - Battalion Commander
The most remarkable feature of this team is that they provide consistent care under
extremely demanding conditions as an integrated unit. These four stakeholders each
understand their role and the importance of working closely with the other stakeholders,
since none of the stakeholders can individually provide the necessary spectrum of care. They
are held together by the shared objective of ensuring soldier fitness for duty, so that the
soldiers may accomplish their mission. Key enablers for this team are physical proximity to
the other stakeholders, a shared understanding that what affects one affects all, and a
common set of experiences that bind them in both spirit and purpose.
For the soldiers for whom the Level 1 care is not enough, Level 2 care is administered
by Combat Stress Teams. These teams are composed of Mental Health Specialists (68X) and
individual augmentee clinicians who maintain special facilities on the BCT Forward
Operating Bases (FOB) in which they provide care in a clinical setting. This allows for the
evacuation of a soldier from the Combat Outposts (COP) to a physical location where stress is
lower. At the Level 2 facilities soldiers are not only given clinical care, but they also receive
resiliency training, nutritional training, and classes on sleep discipline. Soldiers who are
evacuated from battlefield are escorted to the Level 2 care facilities by an NCO, and they are
typically at the Level 2 facilityfor treatment for three days.
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The strength of the architecture for care while deployed is that the first-line providers
are located at the point of need and are closely integrated with one another. There is a
consistent and a predictable process by which soldiers may seek and receive care, and there
is a standardized process for elevating soldiers to an appropriate level of care above Level 1
as necessary.
Weaknesses in the architecture stem from a lack of organic clinicians, and waste while
waiting for movement between duty location and Level 2 care facilities. The Army has
recognized and begun to address the need for more clinicians at the brigades by modifying
the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) to allow for two clinicians per
BCT. Waste generated by waiting can keep a soldier out of his place of duty, as well as his
escort, for up to two weeks. Whether waiting on aerial transport or a supply convoy to
return the soldier to his place of duty, the other soldiers in the unit from which he came have
to work harder to make up for the loss of two soldiers, and adds to the stigma associated
with seeking care.
"You know you have to have to send a soldier for care when he needs it, but it's
painful because it takes him and an NCO out of the fight for two weeks.
Everyone else has to work that much harder to make up for their absence."
- Company Commander
Behavioral Health Delivery at Home Station
When soldiers redeploy to Site A, there
is a change in the behavioral health model, due
to the change in operating environment and an
addition of stakeholders to the enterprise for
care delivery. MEDCOM providers at the
community hospital at both the Behavioral
Health Department and the Emergency Room
replace the Level 2 Care Team, while the Level
1 Team changes in both composition and
mission. Figure 2 shows that the Command
Team has been removed from the Level 1 Team
as well as the Battalion PA and the unit medics.
They maintain relationships with Level 1 care
providers, but only for the purpose of
generating Command-directed mental health
screenings or referrals from the soldier's
primary health care provider.
Chaplains at home station continue to
provide nonclinical counseling services to
soldiers, but also become responsible for
providing ministry to families. Additionally,
the chaplain is required to execute Chapel Le
Programs, which take away from his time to
interface with his unit. Fig
October 2011
PA / 68W CommandTeam
Emergency Behavioral
Room HealthRoom Department
vel 2 Care Team
ure 2. Site A Home Station Behavioral Health
Architecture
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The BCT's Clinical Provider transitions from exclusively providing care to executing
numerous staff functions and administration. The result is that there is a significant
reduction in the hours that they can dedicate to care provision. At home station, the Division
Psychiatrist also provides clinical care, which contrasts with his wartime mission of staff
work and policy creation. Like the BCT providers though, most of the Division Psychiatrist's
time is dedicated to duties other than providing clinical care, which minimizes his effect on
the mission.
Because the Division's and the BCT's organic providers are required to spend the bulk
of their time with other duties, the Military Family Life Counselor (MFLC), who is owned by
IMCOM but works for a Battalion Commander, is added to the Level 1 Care Team. This
employee, who is contracted for six-month intervals, is a clinical counselor that provides
services for soldiers and their families. The addition of one MFLC per battalion offsets the
reduction in care provision by the BCT providers, since they are a single provider for one
quarter of the number of patients normally seen by the organic provider. It must be noted,
however that since the MFLC is not a uniformed service member and has not deployed with
the unit, the provider does not have the contextual background on the unit that the BCT
provider has. It should not be implied that the MFLC's contribution is not valued, because all
commanders at Site A report that the MFLC adds value to the battalions.
"I spend over half of my timefilling out paperwork and going to meetings. Who
suffers for it? My soldiers." - BCT Behavioral Health Provider
Site A is in the "surge period" for post-deployment behavioral health related events,
and there is an overwhelming demand for services. Because of the process flows for soldiers
seeking care and providers administering it, weaknesses in the behavioral health system
architecture significantly inhibit that system from delivering the value that it should provide.
MEDCOM IMCOM FORSCOM
Behavioral
Health1
Departrnent
ASAP 2 Soldier
Off PostLe 1Car
Network Lee 1 Cre
BCT Provider 3- 
MFLC 4
8
Chaplain -6 -
SRP -17 -
Emergency 8
Figure 3. Site A Behavioral Health Process Flow
The existence of eight distinct points of entry into the behavioral health system
prevents consistent process flows for care provision. Figure 3 shows that a soldier with a
behavioral health need could enter the system through the MFLC, the Battalion Chaplain, the
BCT's 68Xs, his BCT provider, through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP), through
the Behavioral Health Department at the hospital, the SRP Site, or at the installation's
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Emergency Room. Because all these options are available to the soldier there is no consistent
or predictable execution of a plan for providing triage, or elevation of the need to the
appropriate care provider. Because soldiers routinely enter the system at any and all of the
points of entry listed, each of the stakeholders is inundated, often with soldiers who have
needs that should be dealt with at a much lower level.
"I am the person who should best understand the system, but if I had a
behavioral healthcare need, I'm not sure where I would start." - Division
Psychiatrist
Figure 3 also shows the process by which the Site A architecture enables the soldier to
get behavioral health care. The first point of entry, the Clinicians in the Level 1 Care team
from Figure 2, conducts triage to determine the appropriate level of care, and if they can
treat the soldier at that level, then that is what they do. Cases that require more acute care
are referred to Level 2, typically to the Behavioral Health Department at the Hospital. At Site
A, however, the soldier may also self-refer directly to the Behavioral Health Department or
the Emergency Room. For cases that require inpatient care, the Level 2 facilities must refer
the patient to off-post providers in order, since there is no inpatient capability on the Site.
Due to the surge in demand, Level 1 care is typically inundated with patients, and
soldiers cannot see a provider near their place of duty, so they self refer to Level 2. The
Behavioral Health Department at Site A has a typical wait time for appointments of six weeks
per visit because this clinic is the overflow for four BCTs worth of Level 1 patients as well as
the treatment center for Level 2 patients. The result is that a non-acute patient that self
refers to the Behavioral Health Division may wait six weeks for an initial screening and
triage, only to find that they need to make another appointment with a provider
commensurate with their need, so they must wait up to three full months before receiving
care.
Acute self-referrals move to the front of the line and cause the cancellation of
appointments for non-acute cases, or they are referred from the hospital to the off-post
network of providers. Once the soldier leaves the military reservation, they enter an
"information void" since non-military providers do not have access to the Armed Forces
Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA). It must be stated though, that AHLTA
is an imperfect system and it is not uncommon for information fidelity to be below the level
needed to adequately share information between on post providers. The most prevalent
outcome of the information gap is the emergence of poly-pharmacy. Since soldiers can freely
enter the system at multiple points there exists the often realized possibility that soldiers can
be given multiple prescriptions that have unexpected synergistic effects. This issue is
compounded by the chain of command's lack of knowledge and/or understanding of the
drugs prescribed to their soldiers.
"Poly-pharmacy is my biggest issue right now. Soldiers here can go to three
different doctors and get three different prescriptions, and none of us know
about it. " -Division Surgeon
Site A's home-station architecture lacks integration with the chain of command at the
battalion and company level. The officers and NCOs who are closest to, as well as charged
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with the care of soldiers, are the least informed stakeholder in the enterprise. Company
grade and field grade leaders at Site A have a nearly universal distrust of the behavioral
health system outside of FORSCOM which excludes them from the care plan and process - a
stark contrast to the deployed architecture. MEDCOM and off-post providers do not receive
input from the chain of command that may be relevant to the soldiers' psychiatric state even
when it is proactively offered by the chain of command. This is less of a problem for
providers that are at the BCT level and below due to common experiences with the soldiers
and an understanding of the events in soldiers' lives gained through mutual deployments.
Providers outside of FORSCOM could and should benefit from this information, but they do
not either because of time limitations with the soldier, or in some cases deliberately severing
the lines of communication with the chain of command.
Conversely, the chain of command at the battalion and company level does not
understand the care plan or the timeline associated with that plan for behavioral health care.
Commanders report that the system is an "information void" that their soldiers freely enter
and commonly returned to the unit with a "bag of pills" and an ambiguously written profile
that all too often takes their soldiers out of the fight. Many of the stakeholders involved in the
ABH enterprise report a need for a better behavioral health profile system that informs the
unit's organic providers of the medicines that their soldiers are taking, and to give the chain
of command a clear Fit for Duty recommendation along with the path forward and timeline
for those soldiers who are not declared Fit for Duty.
"The [behavioral health doctors] hand my soldiers a bag full of pills, and
nobody tells me about them or what they do. Then I hand them an automatic
weapon. Tell me how that makes sense." - Battalion Commander
The system's architecture, which allows unfettered access to all points of entry,
coupled with the HQDA-directed systemic response to a soldier who declares himself suicidal
or homicidal has precipitated the most damaging emergent property of the system.
Company and field grade commanders agree that over 50% of those who self refer to the
Behavioral Health Department are overstating the severity of their condition, or they are
using the open, unquestioned access to avoid undesirable duty, imminent adverse
administrative or legal action, or as a pathway out of military service altogether. It is
generally believed among the stakeholders who are close to soldiers, and evidence suggests,
that malingering is a significant factor in overwhelming the behavioral healthcare system at
Site A.
"'It's a lose, lose proposition for the units, because nobody wants to be the
person who holds someone back from getting the help that they may really
need, but you can't tell one person yes, and another person no. Soldiers are in
behavioral health treatment, playing the game, and are still on the unit's books,
so we cannot get a replacementfor them." - Company First Sergeant
Given the complexity of the system and the challenges presented by the structural
makeup of that system, it may be inferred that the solution to the adult behavioral healthcare
challenges must be holistic in nature, starting with an examination of the home station
enterprise's value proposition and then re-architecting the system so that it best delivers the
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proposed value to the enterprises customer, the soldier, who is likewise a system
stakeholder.
This re-architecting must begin by moving healthcare providers closer to the point of
need in numbers that are appropriate for the numbers of patients. The providers must be
integrated with one another and with the chain of command to establish information flow
and trust. By moving the providers closer to the point of need, and providing consistent,
repeatable processes for care seeking and provision, the ambiguities surrounding the
question "where do I go to get help?" will be eliminated. Chain of command involvement,
coupled with dedicated providers for the units, will allow identification and treatment of
behavioral health problems at the lowest possible level starting with appropriate triage and
elevation to a higher level of care as necessary. "Professional malingerers" will be identified
early, offered care at the appropriate level, returned to duty, and will not be permitted to
create bottlenecks within the system.
Effective Adaptations to meet Emergent System Needs
The behavioral health system of care at Site A was historically not designed to meet
the stressors and strains of a decade of war. As a result, there have been a number of local
adaptations to support the rapid surges in demand that occur both prior to deployment and
during reintegration. These innovative practices have occurred across the system of care at
the ASAP, the Behavioral Health Clinic, the Warrior Transition Battalion and the Installation.
We will highlight examples from each of the areas.
ASAPs Care Continuity Tracker & Education Groups
The ASAP clinical director at Site A recognized that soldiers that were undergoing
therapy for alcohol and substance abuse were being deployed even if they had not completed
their outpatient treatment program, and that the system was not designed to ensure effective
recapture of those soldiers when they returned from theater. As the clinical director noted,
"Once they went into theater, we lost them, and had no means of ensuring that
they finished their treatment program."
The team developed a tracking mechanism wherein every soldier that was being
deployed prior to program completion would be placed in a tracking list. The division
surgeon working together with the ASAP clinical director would scan the manifest of every
returning flight from theater against the tracking list to ensure that returning soldiers were
afforded the opportunity to reengage in their treatment plan.
An additional challenge that surfaced in our discussions with soldiers across the chain
of command, was the ASAP referral that was triggered when the threshold was exceeded
with respect to alcohol consumption during the R-SRP process. The soldiers interviewed
universally noted that they routinely prevaricated in response to the question - the most
common answer being
"I was in an alcohol-free combat environment, and hence I don't drink"
October 2011 Page8 of10
196
As one soldier pointed out, "visiting ASAP was like walking down loser's lane". The
ASAP team had to figure out an effective means of engaging patients in a process that would
enable them to safely reflect on whether they needed to get more focused care. They started
an educational group that would allow the soldiers to gather as a cohort and understand the
stages of addiction and the impact it had on their lives. If the soldier at the end of the
educational group sessions felt that they did not need help, then they were considered to
have met the referral requirements, and no further action was necessary on their part.
High Interest Program
One of the critical capability gaps in Site A is the lack of in-patient psychiatric care. As
a result all acute cases are being sent into one of four facilities in the civilian care network
surrounding the post, and once they are full being sent to locations in neighboring states that
are over 150 miles away. While these facilities meet the immediate needs of the Army, the
handoff processes when the soldier leaves in-patient care vary significantly from site to site.
The major complaints that we heard from both providers and commanders being: the lack of
understanding of Army policies on the part of network providers (prescribing inappropriate
medication); the lack of understanding of Army culture (return to limited duty with constant
supervision); commanders being unaware of their soldier returning to the post; and the
provider being unaware of the care that the solider was provided as an in-patient because
the medical record was incomplete or not sent. While Site A leadership has been actively
engaged with their network hospital partners, they recognized that they needed to develop
an internal mechanism to ensure that soldiers did not fall through the cracks.
The High Interest Program was created to identify, track, and manage soldiers who
had been admitted to in-patient psychiatric care, and who needed to get continued support
as they recovered after their in-patient care. The behavioral health clinic team in
collaboration with the division surgeon, ensure that commanders are kept in the loop with
respect to the status and care of their soldier. Also, the active case management of the soldier
in the program ensures that the soldier receives the care that he/she needs (appointment
reminders, progress tracking) until they are assessed to have improved to the point that they
can be managed using the regular outpatient process.
WTB Quad Chart
The WTB commander at Site A has developed a tracking tool to assess the progress of
the soldiers in the WTB. He realized that there were a number of soldiers that were in the
WTB who had been in the unit for over a year, and were in limbo either because the MEB
process had stalled, or because the soldier was uncertain about the path forward. The Quad
Chart is a tool that synthesizes the soldiers' case into a single viewgraph that provides senior
leaders with an overview of the soldier's history, the progress that the soldier had made over
the time period, his/her development plan, and duration in the WTB. Every soldier that has
been in the WTB over 270 days automatically gets a face-to-face meeting with the WTB
commander who reviews the soldier's progress with the soldier, and then follows up with
installation infrastructure to ensure that any process hurdles in the MEB process are
overcome. As the WTB commander noted,
"In some cases, it wasjust a question of calling the clinic and making sure that
the narrative summaries were completed"
October 2011 Page 9 of 10
197
This tool serves as an effective communication tool between the WTB commander and other
senior leaders in the division and the installation. It provides situational awareness, and
creates a process for reviewing critical cases that may have otherwise lingered.
Community Health Promotion Council
The increased emphasis on behavioral health has resulted in an explosion of
programs and services across the installation. This proliferation has led to overlapping and
duplicated programs that are not only an ineffective use of scarce resources, but also lead to
confusion on the part of key enterprise stakeholders on where to direct a solider who needs
help. To address this challenge, Site A established the community health promotion council
(CHPC), which was a process for brining together key stakeholders who ran the various
programs (ACS, Chaplains, Behavioral Health, MFLCS, ASAP) to first document the programs
that were available (they identified 166 programs, and 355 subprograms on post), and
identify key gaps that needed to be filled. The CHPC owner pointed out,
"CHPC is a process - it brings together key stakeholders to identify where they
overlap and support each other, because we are all trying to take care of
soldiers. It does not replace the regular chain of command - what it does it
provides an avenue to senior leadership to highlight needs and issues."
The two key outcomes of the CHPC process are: the commander's resource guide,
which identifies all of the programs on the installation, and provides points of contact for
them; and the community health dashboard, which provides key risk indicators that senior
leaders can use to understand the state of the installation.
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Appendix: Stakeholders Interviewed & Significant Data Gathered
FORSCOM:
ADC-O
- Human Resources Command is adding stress by moving families at R+90. It
is at this time that most behavioral health issues first begin to manifest
themselves, and we only add stress (financial and family) by moving soldiers
at that time.
- Counterproductive to move ASAP from MEDCOM to IMCOM. ASAP provides
medical services, so they should belong to MEDCOM
- Lack of trust between behavioral health providers and the Command; no
communication in either direction.
DIV Surgeon
- Polypharmacy is the biggest issue. Soldiers go to multiple, unlinked
providers, who each prescribe medicines without knowledge of the
medicines that the soldier is already taking. We are working on a tracking
tool to eliminate poly-pharmacy for every soldier in the division, but it's a full
time job to maintain.
- Wait times for behavioral health appointments are unacceptably long.
- The medical command does not know about the forces command drug
policies, specifically the drugs that make soldiers non-deployable.
DIV Psych / BCT Psych
- There is no structure to the behavioral health care system. Distributed care
is good, but does not allow for triage and a deliberate plan for care.
- Off post providers do not understand the military, and the environment that
the soldiers live in daily. Normal for the soldier is extraordinary for most
non-military members. Because their baseline for diagnoses is non-military,
the usefulness of their work is reduced.
e Division and BCT providers are insufficient in number to provide the care
that is needed. Most of their time is spent fulfilling administrative
requirements. They need more people in the BCTs.
BCT Commander
- One of the best tools that we have in theater for treatment of potential
behavioral health issues is the Critical Event Debrief Team. This team is
composed of a chaplain, the brigade psych, and doctors who rapidly deploy
within the theater to visit units who have been involved in a critical or
catastrophic event. Because of the composition of the team, death is an issue,
but we overcome this challenge with mobility.
e Why don't we give junior leaders authority at home that they have forward?
From squad leaders, to medics, to company commanders a great deal of
authority is stripped away at home station. The soldiers feel like the only
time they really get to do their jobs and utilize their expertise is on
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deployments. It is impossible to imagine that a reduction in authority and
capability at home station increases the effectiveness of the soldiers on
deployments. Likewise, it is likely that this stripping away of authorities
inhibits the function of home station systems. For example, a medic in
combat can perform life-saving steps, treat severe trauma, and attend to a
wide array of medical needs. At home station the same medics are not even
allowed to freeze a wart, but are instead relegated to menial tasks below
their training and experience.
Human Resources Command pulls leaders away immediately after
deployment, likewise our specialists depart the unit at the same time. This
does an injustice to the soldiers to the commanders and to the families
because the leaders who know the soldiers best depart before the
manifestation of behaviors associated with behavioral health issues arise.
New leaders are unable to perceive changes in the soldier's personality
because they do not have a baseline for normal for a soldier. Combat is a
unifier, we must take care not to break apart our team prematurely.
BN Commander/CSM (x4)
- We do not want our soldiers sent to providers that do not have a baseline
understanding of what soldiers have gone through. Embedded psychological
care is awesome, but is spread too thin. "Is one or counselors/psychologists
per brigade the best that this country can do?"
- Because we have so many programs to help family members with every
conceivable problem, we have created an unsustainable Army welfare state.
Young spouses have never been in an Army that did not have all of these
programs, so they feel that they are entitled to help with every problem that
they may have. Families are in the Army too, and they need mandatory
training on life skills just like soldiers do, so they can help themselves.
- Does the Army have any helpful risk assessment tool for behavioral health?
Yes: Junior leader involvement in soldiers lives. The paper surveys that they
give us are absolutely worthless. Most of the time we just throw them in the
trash.
- Behavioral health has become a get out of jail free card for soldiers and they
know that. If a soldier seeks behavioral health care they cannot be
prosecuted under the UCMJ for malingering. The chain of command must be
involved and this aspect of their soldiers' lives in order to halt malingering. A
commander's business is underwriting risk, and although it is not palatable
for some to allow commanders this kind of leeway, it may be the only way to
keep the system from becoming overwhelmed so that soldiers who really
need help can get help. Our battalion needs an embedded behavioral health
capability, to solve soldier problems at the lowest possible level. We need
someone who works for the command, not someone who works for someone
who was removed from the system.
- Do not, do not, do not take away my FRSA.
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CO Commander/1SG (x-20)
- Behavioral Health is seen as an easy escape from impending adversity. There
is no punishment for working the system. Commanders have no leeway for
telling a person that they need to go back to work. It's a lose, lose
proposition for the units, because nobody wants to be the person who holds
someone back from getting the help that they may really need, but you can't
tell one person yes, and another person no. Easy, no-questions access yields
the chronic abuse of the system.
e We need to do a better job screening people for behavioral health issues
before we put them in the Army. This should start with recruiters, then
MEPS, and should continue through Basic Training and AIT. It should not fall
on the combat unit to straighten out a guy who should have never been put in
the Army in the first place.
- If the Army takes something seriously, they need to resource it with money
and people. One brigade behavioral health provider cannot be everywhere,
and even if they were there aren't enough hours in the day for one person to
see everyone that needs some help. Brigade is too high [in the organizational
structure] for the first providers. Soldiers are anonymous at that level.
FRSA
e There is not enough help available for behavioral health. It takes too long to
get an appointment, and families are not allowed to go to behavioral health
appointments. This is true even if the servicemember and their family desire
family involvement in behavioral health care.
- New spouses seem to have this sense of entitlement that the Army is going to
cater to their every need (marital, financial, grass mowing). The army is not
a welfare system.
- FRSA standardization and enforcement of those standards is a necessity.
Utilization of the FRSA varies from unit to unit with the priorities of the
commander. FRSA's are employed to provide a standard set of services and
are often underutilized. This occasionally causes confusion for families who
are new to a unit because they are used to a certain set of services to be
provided by the FRSA at their new unit because they were provided by the
FRSA at the last unit. At this time minimum standards for FRSA's are not
being enforced.
MRTs
- Leaders should be sent through the resiliency training program. We should
push down the training to platoon sergeants and squad leaders, so that they
may conduct impromptu training events when time is available.
e In most cases there are more stresses at home station and on deployment.
Soldiers come home and try to get help for their problems but they get
turned away because the system can't handle the surge. The soldiers get the
message that they're not trying to kill themselves, not important enough to
be seen for six weeks.
e Commanders need to understand MRT's, their capabilities, and how they
align with the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program.
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MEDCOM
Behavioral Health Department Head
e It takes 4 weeks to credential a motivated doctor. Most of this delay is
systemic. After credentialing it takes a provider another month of learning
how to do the job at this site.
e It is difficult to hire people to come to the rural area at Site A. There are
many locations in the Army that are much more desirable.
" It would be helpful if the military entrance processing stations information
was readily available. We cannot currently see the history of new soldiers.
We do have a good transfer of information from combat theater now.
IMCOM
Installation Commander
e ASAP doesn't follow from post to post, so often the first time you see a
soldier's ASAP issue is on the blotter. During high turnover times 200-300
soldiers/month PCS, so how is a commander supposed to know if he's getting
a soldier with a dependency issue?
- Commanders and 1SGs get frustrated by the system when they constantly
run into the HIPPA wall when they try to get information about their soldiers.
We need education on both the behavioral health and the Command side on
how to work together.
e No organic inpatient care for suicide risk. High-risk soldiers are sent to
programs off post at the cost of -$1000/day
ASAP
- The transition to IMCOM from MEDCOM has been very difficult. Medical
command is into medicine, and ASAP is into medical treatment. IMCOM
doesn't have as much money as medical command, so they must plan for
budget a year ahead. ASAP is held to the standards of physical health
providers for sanitation but because of medical command credentialing.
Likewise, MEDCOM credentials the ASAP providers. This means that
MEDCOM finds all the problems, but has no stake in fixing the problems.
- No capability or resources to help family members.
e Cannot track down soldiers with known dependency issues after
deployments to help them.
- Contact information changes.
- Need to catch them somehow.
- Need coordination of care among providers on the post.
CHPC
CHPC participation is not mandated for organization leaders, but is
mandated for each organization. Relationship building with members of the
organization is key to the success of CHPC. Relationship building between
organizations reduces the need for resources because friends will always
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help friends. Additionally resources are tied to strategic objectives. When
resources go away, how do we decide what is most important?
- The organization is not sure why ASAP has moved to the Garrison. They are
in medical treatment business.
- The operating environment is not changing. When budgets are reduced we
must expect that services will likewise be reduced. All the hard work in the
world is not going to replace resources; it will only serve to burn people out.
We need to stop making more programs and let people work on the ones that
we're already executing.
WTB
e At Site A, all WTB providers are military or former military. This allows the
providers to better understand the soldiers.
- The biggest pain point for the warrior transition Battalion is the bulk of
paperwork required for interfacing with the other agencies. Most of the
Warrior Transition Battalion soldiers just want to get on with their life, but
the paperwork drill is slowing them down.
- Warrior transition Battalion entry criteria, dictated by HQDA FRAGO 3 sets
the appropriate number of gates for a soldier to enter the warrior transition
Battalion. This is good because some soldiers just show up at the Warrior
Transition Battalion thinking that they can just join the unit.
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Case Study of the Behavioral Health
Delivery System at Site C
MAJ Shane Scott
Dhaval Adjodah
Dr. Jayakanth Srinivasan
Purpose:
The Post Traumatic Stress Innovations (PTSI) team from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology's (MIT) Lean Advancement Initiative (LAI) conducted a week-long site visit to
Site C as a part of its data gathering regarding the military's care delivery enterprise for Post
Traumatic Stress and related conditions. The team collected information from stakeholders
from Forces Command (FORSCOM), the US Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), and US
Army Installation Command (IMCOM) at Site C through a series of interviews conducted by
the authors. The interviews focused on how each organization, as a stakeholder in the Site C
Enterprise, participates in the delivery Behavioral Health services to both service members
and their families during home station operations. This case study presents the findings
regarding the architecture of the enterprise and the processes by which the enterprise
delivers care.
Site Demographics:
Site C is undergoing the final stages of a transition in its primary mission from an installation
with a focus on institutional training to a new mission, serving a FORSCOM Heavy Division.
Prior to the change in mission, the installation's soldier population was around 8,000;
however, with the arrival of the combat division and departure of the TRADOC units, the
population has grown to nearly 30,000 soldiers. Although the civil infrastructure on the
installation and in the neighboring town has grown to suit the larger population, the service
industry, both on and off the installation, are still in a period of transition and growth for
accommodating the population change. The Site is home to an Army Community Hospital
with 16 beds dedicated to inpatient behavioral health care. Two nearby civilian hospitals
provide the balance of the required in-patient care delivery.
Unit History:
The division, at all echelons, has arrived to the Site within the past three years, with all BCTs
having arrived prior to the establishment of the Division HQ. This approach has created
challenges for the Division leadership to unify the BCTs by common operating procedures,
battle rhythms, and information sharing protocols. The Division currently has two BCTs
deployed to two separate theaters, with the third scheduled for deployment in the next
calendar year. The Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) is newly arrived to the installation, and
has redeployed from combat operations within the past three months.
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Behavioral Health Delivery Architecture
Deployed behavioral health care for the units at Site C is similar in nearly every way to
the models presented at Sites A and B. All concerned regard downrange behavioral health
care as outstanding due to the proximity of the providers to the soldiers, frequent interaction
and full integration with both the chain of command and primary care providers. When
asked directly about why care is perceived as "better" on deployments, a uniformed provider
stated that in addition to the mentioned factors, when the Army is deployed there are no
distractions from the mission of providing medical care to soldiers. Further, the provider
stated that most uniformed providers joined the military to take care of soldiers, so there is a
great deal of job satisfaction while deployed because
the doctors are able to what they signed up to do.
Jokingly, but tellingly, the provider stated, "when "You don't have anything else
you're deployed, you don't have anything else to do, so to do when you're downrange,
you might as well do your job." Soldier satisfaction so you might as well do your
with downrange care reflects this increase in provider ,,
availability, and likewise, all service members report job.
an increase in the quality of care as a result of more - Uniformed Health Care Provider.
time allocated per patient encounter.
At home station the architecture for the delivery of behavioral health care is
drastically different from that downrange. The soldier population at Site C is geographically
dispersed due to both the size of the installation as well as the necessary concept of Military
Construction (MILCON) for accommodation of newly arrived mechanized/armored units and
associated equipment. Conversely, Behavioral Health services and facilities are centralized
and geographically separated from the soldier population, as it was developed to serve a
smaller, centralized TRADOC population. For delivering value to FORSCOM, the architecture
eliminates the characteristics of deployed care that are perceived as quality enablers:
proximity to patients, and trusted relationships between providers and unit leaders.
From a systems perspective, the MTF behavioral health assets are distributed across
four discrete locations on the installation. The first is a triage and assessment clinic,
established to see walk-in patients who are in crisis, and executes needs assessments by
licensed clinical social workers and psychologists to effectively direct patients to the
required level of care. They either refer patients on for regular outpatient care, or for acute
cases they refer patients directly to inpatient facilities for supervision and treatment. In
addition to This clinic leverages two psychiatric nurse practitioners for medication
management. This clinic sees 30 to 40 patients on an average day.
Outpatient treatment is executed by two clinics - one for service members, and one
for both service members and their families. These clinics are staffed by licensed clinical
social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists, who are capable of providing the full
spectrum of outpatient care. Typical wait time for appointments at these clinics is between
four to six weeks per appointment. This excessive wait time is a result of an overwhelming
need for services and a shortage of providers in the clinics.
The installation executes inpatient care through a 16-bed inpatient psychiatric care
ward at the Army Community Hospital. The intent of the facility is to provide oversight and
treatment to acute or imminently dangerous patients. Because of insufficient capacity for
providing the required number of inpatient beds, two off-post facilities augment the
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inpatient capabilities of the hospital. The providers
assignment to a specific Level 3 facility (ref: Figure
acuteness or condition.
Gatekeepers Level 1 Care
in charge of these
1) is a function of
Level 2 Care
facilities stated that
bed availability, not
Level 3 Care
i SRP Site
Self Referral
ldier No Chain ofCommand
Figure 1. Behavioral Health Architecture - Site C
In addition to the care clinics, Site C is home to a DoD pilot program designed for
intensive outpatient care. This center conducts a six-month, program for a cohort of 30
soldiers who are identified as severe PTSD sufferers. Additionally, soldiers admitted to this
program must have a minimum of two years remaining on Active Duty and have the
endorsement of their chain of command prior to entry. The program executes multiple
modes of conventional and alternative therapies, and currently has a 67% success rate,
defined as graduates returned to duty at their unit.
In addition to the clinics where Military and DA Civilian providers administer triage
and treatment, Figure 1 shows an array of entry points, labeled "gatekeepers" into the
behavioral health system. The function of these have been discussed in previous reports, so
discussion of these gatekeepers will focus on what is different at Site C.
The first significant difference is a gatekeeper that is unique in our findings to Site C -
the Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC) Teams. The COSC team is staffed by licensed
clinical social workers, who serve in a variety of roles and functions at the unit level. Their
primary purpose is to advise and assist commanders in the identification of treatment
options and services for high and medium risk soldiers. Additionally, COSC team members
track and work with the high and medium risk soldiers immediately upon redeployment
from theater. COSC utilization varies from commander to commander, but is generally
accepted as a useful resource for the command. It was reported by the commanders that we
spoke to, that the principal people that the three people they could name in behavioral health
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were the head of behavioral health, the head of the in-patient care facility, and the COSC
social worker who was assigned to their unit.
A second Site-specific attribute of the Site C architecture is the challenge faced by the
Chaplain corps. An alarming number of battalion level chaplain positions are unfilled. The
worst case is the CAB, in which no battalion has a chaplain, and the brigade chaplain is
expected to depart before summer of next year. One
position left vacant for three months prior to his
arrival, stated that he was shocked at the state of his
unit, and that he was unable to make any good
progress in prevention and education programs
because he is trying to remedy the myriad of spiritual
issues that have piled up with no predecessor to act as
the unit's first line of defense in behavioral health
matters.
chaplain interviewed, who filled a
"There wasn't a chaplain in my
unitfor three months.
Problems have been piling up
that long, and I'm in damage
control mode right now."
Next, Site C has a unique Soldier Readiness - L T Battalion Chaplain.
Processing (SRP) station, which was established for
the purpose of facilitating smooth mobilization and demobilization for the 20,000 Reserve
and National Guard soldiers who are processed annually at the Site. Activated Reservists
maintain a permanent facility that assesses the need and generates referrals and consults for
follow-on treatment at soldiers' home stations after demobilization. Soldiers with acute
needs are retained on Active Duty for treatment within the military system until they are no
longer acute, during which time they are assigned to the Warrior Transition Unit. The role of
the SRP site has grown significantly from its original intent to accommodate the quarterly
SRP for the entire FORSCOM division in addition to its Mob/De-Mob function. Active Duty
soldiers assigned to the installation are referred out for treatment on post by the SRP site
upon identification of a need. This is shown in Figure 1, above, as a referral to the Triage and
Assessment Clinic.
The next peculiarity of Site C's architecture is a seemingly preferred use of off-post
outpatient providers by a large segment of the gatekeepers (ref: Figure 1). Figure 1 shows
the pathways to these off-post providers beginning with the Military Family Life Counselors
(MFLC) and Chaplains. Those interviewed stated that they greatly prefer using off-post
providers because they know that their soldiers can get "more immediate and better" care
than they can get on post. This perception flows from
the overtaxed, under-resourced military system
described above and not a function of the quality of
the providers in the system.
The final site-specific attribute of Site C's
architecture is the absence of BCT-assigned
psychological providers throughout the division. Two
of five brigade-sized elements have had this
authorization filled very recently, although the psych-
health providers assigned to the units were attached
"If my guys need [behavioral
health] care, I send them off
post, because they're going to
get more immediate, and
probably better care."
- Site C Chaplain.
specifically in preparation for, and just a few weeks prior to, impending deployments. The
result of these absences, coupled with the very recent addition of a division psychiatrist, is
that the FORSCOM behavioral health providers are not yet a functional part of the Site's
behavioral health architecture. Further, since the FORSCOM providers are latecomers to an
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established system, it is likely that these officers will be forced to overcome significant
challenges integrating themselves into the established architecture.
The challenges of the system emerge from medical TDAs and architecture developed
and optimized for an 8,000-soldier community with a training mission, and unfilled
FORSCOM MTOE positions vital to the proper execution of unit-level behavioral health care.
The system did not adapt quickly enough to facilitate the demands of units with a combat
mission and multiple deployments. The leaders of the system understand that they need to
grow their capability and change their approach to care provision, and they have an
appropriate commander's intent and end-state. Execution of the key tasks that will
transform the organization from the current state to the desire future state will be difficult
since what is needed differs greatly from the current concept.
Other Behavioral Health Stakeholders
The Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP)
The Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) at Site C is fully staffed by substance
abuse counselors and a psychiatrist who provide weekly counseling and, as-needed, clinical
psychological assessment and treatment to service members enrolled. The program,
formerly owned by MEDCOM, was transferred to IMCOM to bring together the education and
prevention work with the clinical counseling and treatment. MEDCOM continues to
credential both employees and the facilities, and the ASAP psychiatrist is on loan from
MEDCOM.
Induction into ASAP is exclusively on a command-referred basis, as there is no self-
referral program at the Site. The ASAP employees report that their functional relationships
with commanders are highly dependent on the command team with which they engage. This
was likewise reflected in meetings with unit level commanders, as some reported that ASAP
was helpful (although understaffed), while others reported complete dissatisfaction with the
program. These descriptions stand as evidence of the importance of deliberately developed
person-to-person relationships created, if for no other reason, to foster cooperative
professional functionality in the interest of caring for soldiers.
In addition to treating soldiers ASAP serves the important function of aggregating risk
behaviors for the installation. In accordance with the FORSCOM risk reduction plan ASAP
collects data on most, but not all, behaviors indicative of underlying behavioral health issues.
The aggregated data is used at the installation level to inform commanders of trends and
drive reactive, focused, mitigation and education efforts. The data is likewise filtered for
individual units, and is briefed periodically down to the company level to serve the same
function at the tactical level.
Community Health Promotion Council (CHPC)
The Community Health Promotion Council, an IMCOM activity, is in a nascent stage of
development. "The Site C CHPC's mission is to identify and set priorities for community
health promotion and wellbeing programs while directing the integration and synchronizing
of installation programs and services."i Although the program is not mature at this time, the
program's director envisions his role as an informal integrator of community health services,
serving to build relationships between stakeholders at the personal level. Relationship
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building will enable meaningful stakeholder value exchange based on shared strategic
objectives where deliberate, policy-driven, relationships do not exist. This is an important
need that is best illustrated in a quote from one of an employee of one of Site C's Behavioral
Health stakeholder organizations, "We've got 10,000 programs on this post, and none of
them are connected."
The CHPC serves the secondary function of "We've got 10,000 programs
providing information on its members' services to the on this installation, and none
community. Again, the organization is new at the on this areaonnd.nn
installation, but work is underway to build a catalogue of them are connected."
of programs that is internet accessible, so that service -ACS Employee, Site C
members and their families may have a single point of
reference to locate the resources that they require, which include auxiliary Behavioral
Health-related activities. Currently the CHPC provides this service by telephone and a
growing web site. In addition to direct access for the end user, CHPC will serve the same
function for Family Readiness Support Assistants who in turn provide this type of
information at the unit level.
Family Advocacy Program (FAP)
JK to ADD
Warrior Transition Unit (WTU)
The Warrior Transition Unit at Site C provides case management and "coordination
and synchronization of care, treatment, and services" for the soldiers assigned. The primary
group of soldiers assigned to the unit are those who are require complex medical care and is
unable to perform his/her duties for six months or longer. Since Site C serves as a
mobilization and demobilization site for the National Guard and Army Reserve, the WTU
additionally provides a unit of assignment and accountability activity for soldiers from these
components who require intensive post-deployment treatment before de-activation.
The commander of this unit is a medical officer who has full access to medical records
and can provide organic medical expertise as necessary. The entire WTU cadre is HIPPA
trained, and is fully capable of case management on a formal or informal level. This is a great
benefit to the soldiers in the unit because there is never an information barrier that would
preclude their chain of command from helping their soldiers to get the care that they need.
In addition to medical care, the WTU has habitual relationships with nearby colleges and
vocational training activities both on an off post that help soldiers make a successful
transition to employment outside the military. This activity is far more prevalent at Site C
than any other site visited to date, and is a practice that should be transferred to other units
of this type.
A second difference in the WTU at Site C is a longer period of time for soldier/patients
to be assigned to the unit. Typically, a soldier is expected to be assigned to a WTU for one
year or less, after which they leave the service or return to duty. Average time for the WTU
at Site C is much greater than one year with some instances of soldier assignment exceeding
1,000 days. These outliers may be a function of the addition of Comp. Two and Three
soldiers to the unit, and requires further data collection to determine why this is the case.
The outcome of the extended time of assignment is the perception on Site C that the WTU has
become a medical holding unit. Again, further study is required to determine the cause, but
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leaders should initiate efforts to eliminate the causes and effects of this perceived function of
the facility.
Analysis of the Current State Architecture's Performance
The defining artifact of the Behavioral Health Enterprise at Site C is the operational
separation of IMCOM and MEDCOM Behavioral Health Stakeholders from FORSCOM units
and their organic medical assets and attached Behavioral Health counselors (COSC teams).
This fragmentation of institutional Behavioral Health stakeholders and the deployable force
is a function of spatial separation that precludes person-to-person information exchange,
automated information system shortcomings, and weak accountability policy. When
considering the evolution of the system's architecture, growth of the installation's population
by the introduction of an effectively new organization, and the effect of the ARFORGEN cycle
on subordinate unit integration into the installation's systems, these defining artifacts are not
surprising.
Since FORSCOM is a new entity on Site C, and the installation's infrastructure was
developed prior to its arrival, pathways for accountability and information sharing are only
now being formalized. Behavioral Health organizations developed standards for operational
procedures and established themselves in fixed structures that were each suitable for
supporting the TRADOC population that they formerly supported. Their procedures and
locations, although acceptable for a relationship with a training unit, are not well -suited for
supporting a deployable force focused on mission readiness. This manifests itself in a few
ways.
The first evidence of this is accountability loss of patients in the handover from the
fighting unit to MEDCOM. FORSCOM providers were told specifically not to use a clinical
consult when sending their soldiers to the Triage and Assessment Clinic, as the resultant
accountable demand for services would overwhelm its capability to conform to access to care
standards. The result of this operating procedure threefold. First, the system generates a
gap in patient accountability within the medical system. Since no patient is formally referred
into the system, then every patient is a walk-in, and prioritized by the front desk at the clinic.
Second, since every patient becomes a walk-in, then the system does not consider the patient
to be in the care of any specific doctor, and there is a loss of traceability to any unit. Third,
the system loses its feedback mechanism for primary care from specialty care. Providers at
the unit no longer receive specific, focused feedback, but instead are forced to reference a
Behavioral Health provider's AHLTA note, which all providers have acknowledged as having
significant limitations for the transmission of Behavioral Health-related data. It must be
noted that the Behavioral Health system and the Primary Care physicians have noted this
deficiency and at the time of our departure from the Site, were working together to close this
gap.
The second evidence of a system that is removed from the population that it supports
is the physical separation of the system's entry point from the warfighting units. As
discussed above, the Behavioral Health infrastructure was developed for a much smaller
installation with a proportionally smaller patient population. When FORSCOM moved an
entire division to the site, the BCTs had to be placed in an area that could support the
requirement for living areas, offices, motor pools, etc. The combination of these two factors
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results in a soldier population on one side of the post, and the entry point for the Behavioral
Health system on the opposite side. This physical separation leads to difficulty in accessing
the system and a reduction in capability for development of cohesive relationships and
standardization of procedures between primary care and specialty care. Once again, the
Behavioral Health leaders at the site have recognized this challenge for their system and have
developed a future state vision that, if fully implemented, will address these difficulties. This
may be made more difficult by the recent upgrades and expansion of the Triage and
Assessment Clinic, and leaders should be aware of and plan to mitigate the effects of physical
separation from the patient population.
The single point of entry described in this
section remains in place, so that the system can
execute the necessary identification of urgent
patients for immediate care. An unintended
consequence of the site's architectural evolution,
though, is a structural chokepoint that results in an
accountability gap. When accountability is lost at
the entry point, the effects resonate throughout
the system, frustrating Behavioral Health provider
efforts, continuity with primary care, and
commander confidence in the system. Nearly all
stakeholders at the site remarked that they would
benefit from a better relationship with the other
stakeholders, but they don't have the time or
information to develop them.
Figure 2 shows another set of stakeholders
in the Behavioral Health enterprise that are
likewise separated from the others. Off post
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Care Care T Counselling
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Army Behavioral Health Enterprise
Chain of
Command
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Figure 2. Site C Behavioral Health Enterprise
providers to which soldiers are referred by TRICARE and One Source are disconnected in
terms of accountability and information. Providers and Commanders at Site C (and all other
sites) report that when soldiers leave the installation for care, there is no coordination with
or feedback to the on-post enterprise. The TRICARE network is essential to close the gap
between "care required" and "providers available"; however, the information disconnect
results in two significant challenges.
First, since off-post providers do not have access to AHLTA or unit information, they
have no clinical history or background information on the soldier/patient for which they
provide care. The result is a treatment restart for the soldier each time he/she starts with a
new provider, resulting in frustration. Second, the lack of a feedback mechanism from the
TRICARE network creates the potential for incidents of poly-pharmacy or prescription of
deployment-disqualifying drugs. Prescriptions from off-post providers are not automatically
reconciled against existing prescriptions in any sort of med management system unless a
provider or pharmacist on post extracts the prescription information from CHCS (the system
underlying AHLTA) and manually enters it back into the proper fields in AHLTA. The
information is only available in CHCS if TRICARE pays for the prescription; if the soldier pays
out of pocket the information is never available. Once the on-post agent enters the
prescription into AHLTA, it becomes available to the entire network at the next AHLTA
update, which occurs every 72 hours. This means that in the absolute best-case scenario, the
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provider on post discovers and enters the data immediately after the prescription is filled
and three days later the soldier's provider finds out about it. Any delay between the soldier
filling the prescription and the movement of the information from CHCS to AHLTA adds to
that number. Additionally, delay is added by the primary/specialty care provider who does
not reconcile his patients' medicine at the exact time that AHLTA updates. In a system that is
as overwhelmed as that at Site C, some delay in entry and reconciliation is a certainty, and 72
hours to identification of poly-pharmacy is unrealistic. Once again, the Behavioral Health
providers at Site C have recognized this deficiency and scheduled a symposium to educate
TRICARE network providers on the drugs that they should/should not use with soldiers and
to try to develop more efficient means for transmitting prescription information back to the
on-post enterprise.
The FORSCOM/MEDCOM information gap is not the only one existent in the system.
Unit Commanders within FORSCOM state that there is no deliberate means for transmission
of accumulated knowledge regarding soldiers who move from one unit to another on Site C
or to/from another installation. Formerly, leaders generated quarterly counseling
statements for their soldiers that served to help soldiers sustain desirable behaviors and to
improve others. When a soldier moved, all of his counseling documentation would move
with him to inform the next unit's leadership on "who they're getting," and what to expect
from that person. Leaders report that this practice was abandoned for the purpose of giving
each soldier a fresh start at his/her new unit; however, the consequence is that the new
commander may get a soldier prone to destructive behaviors that may be the manifestation
of a Behavioral Health condition and be completely unprepared. Likewise, if the commander
has no documentation of past behaviors that could be evidence that the soldier is unfit for
continued military duty.
The Senior Mission Commander at Site C has decided that in order to avoid moving a
soldier with a challenge to another commander, no one with a pending adverse action or in
Behavioral Health treatment will move from his installation to another. Instead, the soldier
will be remediated or treated at Site C, or he/she will be processed for elimination from the
service. This generates a challenge on Site C because they "accumulate" soldiers with
challenges, and move mission ready soldiers on their normal pace. This behavior, however,
is commendable because Site C does not perpetuate a cycle of negative behavior
manifestation, re-identification of root causes, and restarting a course of treatment to
eliminate those causes.
Misalignment of Incentives
A finding observed at all sites, and is likewise prevalent at Site C, is a misalignment of
incentives with desired behaviors. This is present in several of the enterprise's stakeholders,
but focus should be placed on MEDCOM and FORSCOM. It is evident in the behavior of the
actions of these two organizations that performance measurement drives action. For
MEDCOM, measurement of provider productivity and adherence to access to care standards
drive behavior. For FORSCOM, the driver is mission readiness requirements within the
ARFORGEN cycle. It must be stated up front that individual actors within the stakeholder
organizations are not to blame for actions that do not support strategic objectives, but
instead the measures of success to which they must conform.
MEDCOM receives funding from Congress through the Military Health System (MHS)
relative to the number of Relative Value Units (RVU) generated through individual patient
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encounters. This easily measured performance metric allows the organization to ensure that
the number of providers employed is appropriate for the demand on the system. If providers
do not see enough patients in a month, measured in terms of patient encounters, then the
organizations are considered to be underperforming, and funding is adjusted relative to
demand. This is necessary to ensure that the military is not employing doctors that it does
not need. When queried as to what performance metrics are used to measure the efficacy of
health care, specifically in terms of patient outcomes or contribution to collective readiness,
no respondent has yet (at any site) cited one. The effect, again with the understanding that
performance measurement drives action, is that the medical system incentivizes throughput
over quality. It is important to note that this assertion is not to suggest that providers do not
want to treat patients, but instead to understand the behavior that the incentive structure
promotes.
Second, Military Health Policy dictates adherence to the following access to care
standards:
- One day or less for urgent care
- One week for routine care
- One month for specialty or wellness care
- 30 minutes or less in the provider's waiting room
- 30 minutes or less travel time to the primary care provider's office.
Adherence to these standards precipitates a need for immediate triage at the Triage
and Assessment Clinic (ref: Figure 1), so that urgent care cases, defined for Behavioral
Health as Suicidal/Homicidal/Psychotic may be immediately referred to Inpatient Care.
Since Behavioral Health is considered specialty care, the soldier who is a routine patient
must wait up to one month before seeing a provider at one of the Outpatient Care Clinics.
The providers at the Triage and Assessment Clinic recognize that even those who are not
urgent have symptoms that must be mitigated in the month between initial assessment
and the next appointment. Evidence suggests that the systemic response is to prescribe
psychotropic medications to assuage the patient's symptoms in the interim. The resultant
perception among FORSCOM stakeholders is that the Behavioral Health system is a
"straight to drugs" system, which is again, a response to systemic challenges on the part of
providers who are wearing themselves out to try to provide as much care as they can for
the patient population.
If the on-post Outpatient Care Clinic cannot see the soldier within one month, the
soldier is referred into the TRICARE network for care off post. Next, since there is no
standardization for intakes and assessments, respondents report that each new provider
spends his/her first encounter with the patient executing a new intake and assessment.
An overwhelmed system, as described below, results in Behavioral Health providers both
on and off post having full panels (schedules) for six weeks, which is the limit for provider
scheduling. If we consider all of these factors, it is likely that the first time that a patient
will see a provider for a full therapeutic session will be ten weeks after entry to the system.
The combined result of action driven by performance measurement for the
Behavioral Health system is a course of treatment that frustrates providers because they
cannot see patients frequently enough to provide the continuity of care that they desire,
and a general impression that drugs are becoming a replacement for therapy. For
commanders, the second agency served by the system, there is also frustration due to a
perception of focus on throughput instead of care, and a similar perception that if their
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soldier goes to Behavioral Health, they will just come back to the unit with "a bag full of
pills."
For Commanders in FORSCOM, performance measurement also drives behavior
that is not beneficial to the Behavioral Health Enterprise. Mission Readiness in accordance
with the ARFORGEN cycle forces deploying commanders to establish a 90% unit readiness
rate. This is an understandable and easily measured performance metric, as the
commander must deploy to combat with a force appropriate for executing his mission.
What is not easy to measure is overall force wellness, which is likely a better indicator of
what is needed. The result of performance is the generation of a controlled exchange of
deployable soldiers for non-deployable soldiers between BCTs who are close to
deployment and BCTs who are not. BCT Commanders who need a 90% readiness rate are
able to deploy and perform their mission, but those Commanders who are at home station
are left with a high percentage of non-deployable soldiers within their ranks.
The second orders effect of this controlled exchange of soldiers is a population at
home station that generates a disproportionally large demand for medical care. Add to
this the soldiers in the Rear Detachments who require medical care and those in the WTU,
medical providers must support a unit in which almost everyone has some kind of medical
issue. As with the assessment of the medical system above, this is not meant to be a poor
reflection on commanders who must make these decisions, but instead a description of the
system in which they work that drives this behavior.
Leaders must be aware of the incentive structure in their organizations, and must
assess whether the behavior that they reward is aligned with the enterprise's strategic
objective. Further, senior leaders must evaluate whether the objectives of their
subordinate organizations are aligned with one another. A common management misstep
is to measure what is easy to measure and not what should be measured. (Ackoff, 1996).
Likewise, we should expect organizations to focus on and improve the factors that they
report to their superiors. Only when strategic objectives are aligned with stakeholder
needs and performance metrics, and enterprise processes support improvement of
measured activity should we expect the desired behavior out of stakeholders in the
enterprise.
Vision for Behavioral Health Transformation
As indicated throughout the report, Behavioral Health providers at Site C have
recognized shortcomings in their system, and have developed a vision for the future that will
overcome these challenges. The Director of Behavioral Health Even at Site C stated that even
before the Army funded Embedded Behavioral Health for his installation, he and his staff had
developed a similar concept to allow him to reference his established clinics in accordance
with the Embedded Behavioral Health intent. The Behavioral Health department plans to
transform to dedicated Behavioral Health Clinics that would each service a BCT, and an
additional clinic to provide care for personnel who are not assigned to a BCT. Likewise, the
Behavioral Health department understands that their personnel should be closer to the point
of need. They have a long-term construction plan for clinics within the BDE footprints, and
have suggested that non-permanent structures may be used to move caregivers closer to
their patients.
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The Senior Mission Commander at the site has been briefed on this vision and is
personally invested in ensuring that the Behavioral Health infrastructure on his installation
continues to evolve to meet the needs of the population that is, vice the population that was,
on the post. Additionally, the Commander is working with the MTF Commander and the
installation commander to deliberately develop information and accountability linkages
between all the stakeholders at the site.
Emergent Finding: Soldier Fragility and Junior Leader Skills
At each site that our team has visited, a common theme in the data that we gather is a
reference to an Army-wide change in its junior ranks. Commanders, Behavioral Health
Providers, Chaplains, and Primary Care Physicians all discuss the reduced aggregate quality
of junior enlisted soldiers resulting in a reduction in recruiting standards from 2004-2007.
In this timeframe a great number of junior NCOs left the service, likely due to the
increased OPTEMPO and associated stress on themselves and their families. As a response,
the Army was forced to promote its junior enlisted soldiers to fill the vacancies. These new
NCOs had spent their entire careers in combat, and were excellent in terms of "operations on
the objective." Rapid promotion in combat conditions result in a generation of NCOs who
never learned to lead soldiers in a garrison environment; never learned to do effective
counseling, and do not understand how to lead soldiers andfamilies. This is compounded by
a reduction in scope and/or indefinite deferment of NCOES courses for these junior leaders,
so in addition to the lack of experience, they have not been given the institutional training
that they require for home station operations.
To fill the vacancy of junior enlisted soldiers created by the rapid promotions, the
Army responded by lowering recruiting standards in order to quickly fill the lower ranks.
Stakeholders that we have interviewed that served in Recruiting Command and as Drill
Sergeants in TRADOC in that period have stated that they knew that they were creating long-
term problems for the Army by enlisting and sending those soldiers to units, but the mission
was to grow the Army quickly.
The combined result of these actions is a generation of junior leaders who have never
been given the opportunity to lead soldiers and their families who are forced to lead soldiers
who never should have been allowed in the service. When discussing this topic, a military
provider at another site stated, "the AMEDD is so overwhelmed taking care of people who
can't be helped, who should have never been admitted in the Army, that there's nothing left
to take care of those who can be helped."
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Case Study of the Behavioral Health
Delivery System at Site E
MAJ Shane Scott
Dr. Jayakanth Srinivasan
Purpose:
The Post Traumatic Stress Innovations (PTSI) team from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology's (MIT) Lean Advancement Initiative (LAI) conducted a week-long site visit to
Site E as a part of its data gathering regarding the military's care delivery enterprise for Post
Traumatic Stress and related conditions. The team collected information from stakeholders
from Forces Command (FORSCOM), the US Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), and US
Army Installation Command (IMCOM) at Site E through a series of interviews conducted by
the authors. The interviews focused on how each organization, as a stakeholder in the Site E
Enterprise, participates in the delivery of Behavioral Health services to both service
members and their families during home station operations. This case study presents the
findings regarding the architecture of the enterprise and the processes by which the
enterprise delivers care.
Site Demographics:
Site E is a major FORSCOM installation, with six Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and one
Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), as well as nine Brigade-sized elements for support of the
BCTs. Headquartered at the Site are an Army Corps, a Division HQ, and a Regimental HQ. In
total, over 46,000 military and family members reside at the Site with an additional 73,000
family members living and working in the adjacent communities. The civil infrastructure on
the installation and in the neighboring town is appropriate for this large population, as Site E
has historically been the US Army's largest installation, worldwide. The Site is home to an
Army Community Hospital with 128 operating beds, sixteen of which are dedicated to
inpatient behavioral health care, although the Inpatient Ward is only staffed to operate
twelve beds. The community's civilian hospitals support the installation by providing
additional support for service members and their families as needed.
Deployment History:
The BCTs and the CAB at the installation have been deployed or training for deployment to
Iraq and Afghanistan for the past ten years. At the time of this report, four of the six BCTs
were redeploying from the final rotation of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and in the words of one
of those interviewed, "This is the first time in ten years that soldiers are returning to [Site E]
when they haven't known exactly when they were going to leave again."
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Description of the Site E Behavioral Health Architecture
The architecture of the Behavioral Health system at Site E is characterized by
centralized facilities and services that provide care for the entire military population.
Centralization of services yields a predictable pathway that all soldiers and leaders may
access for Behavioral Health care. The downside of centralization is the susceptibility to
inundation in surge periods during which centralized nodes become pacing items for the
performance of the entire system. The "Gatekeepers" at Site E (ref: Figure 1) function in a
similar fashion to those at previous sites, and will be discussed on a by-exception basis.
Gatekeepers Level 1 Care Level 2 Care Level 3 Care
Army Community
Emergency Room Hospital Inpatient
Ward
*SRP Site -
. Primary Care Triage and Outpatient Soldier Off Post Inpatient
Physician Assessment Clinic Care Clinic Care
Chaplains
Intensive
Outpatient Clinic
MFLC
Off Post
Chain of Outpatient Care
Command
Self Referral
Figure 1. Behavioral Health Architecture at Site E
All soldiers and leaders at Site E report that their point of entry into the Behavioral
Health system is the post's centralized Triage and Assessment Clinic. This clinic serves the
function of determining whether a patient is Suicidal/Homicidal/Psychotic, in which case
they are referred directly to the Army Community Hospital's Inpatient Ward, or if the soldier
should enter the queue for intake at the Outpatient Soldier Care Clinic. The current staff for
this facility is two (of an authorized four) psychologists who may execute triage for the entire
military population of Site E. Wait times for assessment are reported as up to six hours
because of the small staff, and during this time soldiers wait on site, supervised by an NCO
from their unit. Due to the nature of patients' conditions at this clinic an armed guard is also
employed in the waiting room.
If a soldier is assessed as having an urgent need for care, they are referred to the
post's outpatient clinic within seven days for assessment and intake. In routine cases,
soldiers may be seen for their initial appointment at the Outpatient Clinic up to 28 days after
triage and initial assessment. Psychiatrists and Psychologists assigned to the Outpatient
Soldier Care Clinic execute an initial assessment and intake for each patient, and schedule
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appointments for follow-on treatment. For those patients who cannot be seen within 28
days due to lack of capacity in the on-post clinic, they are referred off post into the TRICARE
network for follow-on care.
Soldiers who are assessed as having moderate to severe PTSD may be eligible for the
post's Intensive Outpatient Clinic. This clinic executes a 30 day program to which soldiers
report as their place of duty for eight hours per day. In this program, clinicians administer
multiple and complimentary treatment modalities. At the end of the program, patients may
either Return to Duty (RTD), or if the doctors at the clinic determine that they are not well
enough to RTD, then the soldiers typically begin a Medical Board.
Patients who require extensive inpatient treatment are typically referred to regional
hospitals with the capability to execute that type of care. There is one hospital in the
immediate area that is capable of delivering long-term inpatient care, so the majority of
inpatient care is executed by hospitals outside of a 50-mile radius of the installation. The
Inpatient Ward at the Army Community Hospital is generally utilized for shorter-term
mitigation of critical needs, and currently operates only eight beds.
One BCT at Site E is equipped with an Embedded Behavioral Health element that
changes the architecture and, to a degree the function, of the Behavioral Health architecture
at the Site for that BCT. The Embedded Behavioral Health element is deployed at the BDE
level, and serves as a dedicated Triage/Level 1 Behavioral Health node for 4,000 soldiers.
The TDA for this clinic authorizes one psychiatrist who oversees Psychologists, Licensed
Clinical Social Workers (LCSW) and Behavioral Health Technicians (68X); however, not all of
these authorizations are filled at this time. The MEDCOM providers at this clinic work closely
with the BCT's Behavioral Health Officer, who integrates the clinical Behavioral Health
providers with the BCT's Gatekeepers. The Embedded Behavioral Health Clinic, shown in
Figure 2, only refers soldiers outside the BCT footprint who require more intensive
treatment than can be provided by the single psychiatrist in the facility.
Site E Top Findings
Local Successes:
1. Embedded Behavioral Health
a. The model for Embedded Behavioral Health at Site E, if fully staffed, is a DoD-wide best
practice. Architecturally, this concept pushes providers forward to the point of need and
provides enhanced continuity of care. Primary Care Physicians, Behavioral Health providers,
and soldiers maintain habitual relationships that result in increased communication and
knowledge management for improved patient care and case management. In effect, the
Embedded Behavioral Health model brings what is best about downrange care to home
station: it aligns organizations with the Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness concept, and
it enhances the capability of all actors to optimize outcomes for soldiers and their units. This
concept is consistent with Army doctrine, as well as with the concepts of Army Medicine
Strategy (Army Medicine Strategy Map - March 2011)
Dedicated providers for the BCT's soldiers enhance continuity of care and case
management. In the "centralized" model shown in Figure 1 soldiers see the providers as
dictated by the clinic's schedule, and in practice this results in new providers for each visit,
and a new start to treatment at every appointment. The Embedded Behavioral Health model
enables a patient to see the same clinician throughout his course of treatment. Since the
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soldier is treated by a single provider, the patient and provider can build a relationship, the
provider can understand patient history and progress, and the patient does not have to tell
his story from the beginning with every new doctor. An additional benefit to this model is
that the Primary Care Physician and the Behavioral Health provider can work together to
manage the patient's case cooperatively and in a holistic fashion.
A common theme in the team's research is the importance of relationship building and
cooperation among people and agencies in the military, and in addition to putting providers
forward, the Embedded Behavioral Health model enables the synergy of downrange care at
home station. Medical providers, commanders, and soldiers at Site E (as well as all other
sites) report that downrange medical care is perceived as better than home station care
because all stakeholders are collocated, accessible to one another, and share relationships
that enable information sharing and enhanced knowledge management despite the lack of
sophisticated information systems. Again, all stakeholders at all sites report that person to
person contact is a key enabler for information exchange and team building, and placement
of Behavioral Health providers in the BCT footprint places the final stakeholder in a
comprehensive soldier treatment team with the rest of the stakeholders, and positive
Gatekeepers Level 1 Care Level 2 Care Level 3 Care
Army Community
o Emergency Room * Hospital Inpatient
Ward
aSRP Site
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Figure 2. Architecture for Embedded Behavioral Health at Site E.
emergent system behaviors seen on deployments are likewise observed at home station.
The Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CS F) concept shows that this branch of the
DoD has initiated an effort to approach soldier wellness in a holistic fashion, and the
Embedded Behavioral Health model dovetails with this program. This architecture places
the champions of each CSF pillar at the unit level: Primary Care Providers (Physical),
Behavioral Health Providers (Emotional), Chaplains (Spiritual), FRSAs/FRGs (Family), and
Battle Buddies/Small Unit Leaders (Social). This structure is consistent with the Unity of
Effort principle that is pervasive in military doctrine. The Army's Field Manual 3-24
(Counterinsurgency) states that, "Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a
[counterinsurgency] operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can
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cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities..." Although this publication refers to efforts to
safeguard a system against an armed enemy, the principle remains applicable'. This unified
team is able to cooperatively recognize and care for soldiers who need help, and to prevent
those who do not need help from overwhelming the system.
Commanders in the BCT with Embedded Behavioral Health have a significantly higher
opinion of the Behavioral Health capability at the Site than those in the BCTs without it
because they know the providers by face and name,
and they value the relationships and information
sharing that is provided by proximity. Additionally, "We al/love the embedded
commanders remarked that the focus of the providers [Behavioral Health] capability,
is on providing treatment, instead of generating but we're terrified that
throughput, which is perceived by commanders as the someone is going to take it
medical system's success criteria in the centralized ,
model. Likewise, Behavioral Health providers at the away.
BDE level report that they prefer this architecture for BCT Health Care Providers
the reasons listed. The BCT's assigned behavioral
health provider and the primary care providers from the BCT stated that everyone in the
brigade loves the Embedded Behavioral Health concept, but "we are terrified that someone is
going to take it away."
Of all the Behavioral Health programs and architectures seen across the DoD,
Embedded Behavioral Health at the BCT level is a best practice that must be adopted
across the services.
Further commentary on Site E's Behavioral Health Architecture will ignore Embedded
Behavioral Health, since this model is the exception rather than the rule.
2. The Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP): ASAP at Site E was reported as
excellent by all those interviewed. The Site E ASAP is staffed with 30 counselors, including a
psychiatrist, provided by MEDCOM. The transition from MEDCOM to IMCOM, although
difficult and questioned by providers, has not affected the effectiveness of treatment at the
installation. The primary difference in ASAP at this installation, compared with others that
the team has visited, is the consistent and deliberate integration with the command.
Each Soldier who enters treatment in the program is in-briefed along with his/her
Company Commander and 1SG. In this inbrief, the counselor details expectations, guidelines,
and desired outcomes; defines criteria for successful completion; and integrates the
command team into the treatment plan. At the end of the program the counselor briefs the
soldier and his command team on the outcome, reasons for success/failure, and conducts a
"warm handoff" to the command with a plan for sustainment. All parties reported that this
deliberate, integrated approach was one of two factors in the program's success at the Site.
1 The remainder of the sentence referenced from FM 3-24 is "for insurgents to exploit." One could easily replace
this with "...for service members seeking secondary gain to exploit." Unit Commanders across the Army
recognize that there are many soldiers who truly need Behavioral Health services, and they are encouraged
when those soldiers get the help that they need. However, after interviewing over 150 Company Commanders,
Battalion PAs, BDE Psych providers, and unit medics we have found that the consistent estimate for the
percentage of service-members seeking to "work the system" is between 50%-75%. This is consistent with the
percentage assessment by the psychologist from the triage clinic at Site E.
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The second factor in the program's success is a focus on results. Each soldier enters the
program with a well-defined plan and end state. Likewise, the treatment plan has a timetable
for execution, so there are no indefinite enrollments. This is desirable for commanders
because they have a reasonable schedule at the end of which they can expect the soldier to be
either mission capable or prepared for separation from the service. This is likewise
appealing for the clinicians, because they can see measured progress.
3. Intensive Outpatient Program for Behavioral Health.
Site E operates a thirty-day intensive outpatient Behavioral Health program for soldiers
who are diagnosed with moderate to severe PTSD. For the month that soldiers are enrolled
in the program, their place of duty is the treatment facility in which they engage from 0800-
1600 daily in a variety of treatment modalities. The program treats soldiers in cohorts of
eighteen, so that in addition to individual therapies, group therapies may also be leveraged
and a support network is pre-established for graduates. The downside to the cohort model is
low throughput, but positive results, which are the focus of the program instead of
throughput, demonstrate that the treatment regimen is effective. 50% of the soldiers
admitted into the program are returned to duty successfully, which is remarkable.
The director of the program, a psychiatrist with over 50 years of experience in his field,
stated that the program's ability to take the time to focus on treatment with measurable
patient outcomes is the reason for the program's success. His only concern for the program is
for the soldiers who return to inhospitable units that are focused on his month-long absence
rather than his success in getting the help that he needed. Returning to a toxic environment,
according to the director, can easily reverse the progress made in the program. Site E's
leadership was briefed on the successes of this program and the director's concerns.
4. 68X Training Program
Enlisted Mental Health Technicians at Site E undergo a comprehensive "on the job
(OJT)" training program that is different from any program seen across the military. This
program allows these soldiers to spend time in a variety of garrison environments. Starting
in the Army Community Hospital's Inpatient Ward, the soldier spends around six months
learning the job in a hospital setting. Next, the soldier moves to a Behavioral Health clinic on
Site E to participate in the outpatient clinic environment. While assigned to this clinic the
soldier is able to get out to the combat units to integrate with and educate Commander/1SG
teams on the capabilities of the 68X and to engage service members, in their work areas, to
enhance junior soldier and leader understanding and to conduct counseling as requested.
At the completion of the clinic/unit time, the soldier returns to the Inpatient Behavioral
Health Ward to train new Techs and be available for deployment with BCTs to augment
Combat Stress Teams. The result of the OJT program is a well-rounded Psych Tech who can
relate and succeed in a wide array of possible operating environments. Both 68Xs and
clinical providers see this program as a success, and it should be considered as a possible
best practice.
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Systemic Challenges
1. Architectural Weaknesses. The centralized architecture at Site E is similar in
structure in form and function to other Behavioral Health models observed throughout the
services. Duplication of Effort is widespread due to unintegrated organizations with
overlapping capabilities, poor information sharing/knowledge capture mechanisms, and
unintended consequences of a policy that allows unimpeded access/demand on the system's
pacing items. The outcome of these combined attributes is a system that performs layers of
triage with no continuous Gatekeepers Level 1 Care Level 2 Care Level 3 Care
care, spends time and
resources generating Emergency Room H p npatent
rework, is overwhelmed
at structural chokepoints,
does not deliberately
inform interested soldier P ia Care
stakeholders of necessary Chaplaina
information, or allow MFLC OutpatentClinc
unified effort for
solder/patient case Command
management. Self Referral
The defining Figure 3. Architectural Choke Points - Site E.
features of the current
state architecture is the presence of two structural choke points, highlighted in Figure 3. The
Triage and Assessment Clinic utilizes two psychologists as the entry point into the Behavioral
Health system for the 27,000 military members at the installation. This results in excessive
wait times for soldiers seeking care. Service members report that the average wait time at
the site is two to three hours, but some have reported waiting up to six hours for an initial
assessment/intake. The second choke point is the Outpatient Soldier Care Clinic, which is
staffed with providers who also perform an initial intake and assessment. Because of the
overwhelming demand on this clinic, soldiers must wait up to one month for their intake at
this clinic and generally another month before their first full therapeutic session with a
clinician, seldom the same doctor that they saw for their initial intake at that clinic. Since
there is no common standard for intakes at the clinic, the soldier must start again with each
new provider seen. The Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA)
is meant to be the means of transferring information between the clinicians, but this
information system has a three-page limit on uploads per entry, and the average for intake
forms is around ten pages. This is not meant to be a poor reflection on the providers at this
clinic or their clinical methods, but instead an observation on the architecture of the system
in which they work.
In the case that the wait time for an appointment for therapy exceeds acceptable
standards, the soldier is referred into the TRICARE network in the adjacent town after their
initial intake at the Outpatient Clinic. This yields another re-start for the soldier, because
off-post providers have no means of information exchange with on-post medical providers.
Worse, TRICARE may refer soldiers to a different off-post provider during the course of
treatment, forcing another re-start for the soldier. When we consider all of these re-starts,
coupled with month-long wait times between appointments, we begin to understand how
architecture affects both continuity and quality of care.
January 2012 Page 7 of 13
222
Off-post inpatient care is likewise affected by the absence of an effective information
conduit between on and off-post Behavioral Health providers. When a soldier requiring
long-term inpatient care is sent to a regional civilian provider, that provider has no means of
contacting the soldier's unit for background information or the on-post Primary Care or
Behavioral Health providers for medical or treatment history. On completion of treatment,
the off-post provider has no means of transmitting detailed assessment, clinical notes, or
diagnosis aside from a one-page discharge summary.
Most concerning, regarding off-post medical provision (inpatient or outpatient) is the
absence of an effective mechanism for sharing prescription data with each other or with
military behavioral providers. It is not uncommon for a soldier to be prescribed medication
by an on-post provider, receive referrals to multiple off-post providers as described above,
with each prescribing additional medication in different types and/or doses. A soldier may
unwittingly, or knowingly, take all of these medications, and overdose or be victim of
negative synergistic effects that come from mixing medications. A soldier at Site E recently
died in a similar scenario. Poly-pharmacy is a systemic issue that must be addressed. On-
post medical systems allow pharmacists and physicians to exercise effective med
management, but the addition of off-post providers adds a layer of difficulty in pharmacy that
requires an extensive amount of work to overcome. TRICARE-filled prescription information
is available to on-post pharmacists and clinicians; however, this data must be manually
extracted from one information system and added to AHLTA. Since AHLTA requires 72
hours to update, the very best of scenarios would allow a soldier to go three days with
unknown medications from off post.
2. Information Systems. Ineffective information conduits and an unreliable or absent
feedback structure is the second significant architectural weakness in Site E's Behavioral
Health system. Figure 4 shows information pathways and graphically illustrates the
strengths of those pathways. The first information system, AHLTA (which acts as an overlay
for CHCS), links all on-post outpatient medical providers for clinical assessments, diagnoses,
treatment notes, pharmacy data, etc. The system is shown in amber because it is considered,
Discharge Summary
Discharge Summary
- - - - - - - -- Emergency Room - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Army Community
* AHLTA Hospital Inpatient
Ward
- - - - - - - - - - War
Essentris
AHLTA Triage and AHLTA Outpatient Soldier Off Post Inpatient
Primary Care Assessment Clinic Care Clinic Care
Physician A
I- AHLTA AHLTA
e-Profile A
e-Profile Intensive
Chain of Outpatient Clinic
Command Incident Reporting/ .Off Post
Story Corroboration Outpatient
CHCS Providers
Figure 4. Information Conduits
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system-wide, as difficult to use, unreliable, and inadequate for effectively transmitting
detailed Behavioral Health information. Providers across the Army have stated repeatedly
that they desire a better system because it is a significant source of frustration and an
inhibitor, rather than an enabler, for clinical care.
The second conduit for medical information is Essentris, which is the Army's inpatient
medical record system. In regards to Behavioral Health, Essentris is the information system
that is used in the Inpatient Behavioral Health
Ward at the Army Community Hospital [ACH]. "I know they use Essentris over
This information system is completely federated
from AHLTA, and special training is required for at [the ACH], but I don't know
accessing this system. The training required for anything about it, and I cannot
accessing Essentris requires a half day of training access it anyway."
at the ACH. This system is shown with a dashed Director of an Outpatient Clinic ot
Amber line because it is available, but it is not Site E
utilized outside the hospital's Inpatient Behavioral
Health Ward. As an illustration of this system's
operational isolation, the director of one outpatient clinic at Site E knew that the system
existed, but had no idea that it was accessible outside the ACH.
The third medical information system, eProfile, works well for transmission of Primary
Care-related soldier information to Commanders. It is shown as a solid green line between
Primary Care Providers and Commanders in Figure 4 because it is used for its intended
purpose in this interaction, and weaknesses in electronic communication are strengthened
by personal relationships enabled by collocation of these stakeholders. The same system is
shown as a red solid line between Behavioral Health providers and Commanders because the
system is used, but is inadequate for the transmission of data required to describe
information unprotected by HIPPA, but required at the unit level. Commanders at Site E (and
all other sites) report that Behavioral Health profiles are generally ambiguous/unusable by
command teams or overly restrictive, effectively removing soldiers from the unit's fighting
strength. Often cited example is the "may not work for more than 30 consecutive minutes,
with no weekend duty," or "may not report to work prior to 0900." These types of doctor
recommendations are generated both on and off post.
The final system illustrated in Figure 4 is the
Composite Health Care System, which is the system
underlying the AHLTA Interface, and is the system "n a 20 minute encounter, I
that was described above for extracting TRICARE spend 10 minutes just trying to
pharmacy data. This system is represented by a red make the computer work."
solid line because it is present, but unintegrated, and -Site E Clinical Provider.
requires a deliberate unintuitive, burdensome query
on the part of the provider to determine offline if there is a poly-pharmacy issue. It is worth
noting in this discussion that the Embedded Behavioral Health clinic has a technician who
reconciles this information daily for the purpose of preventing poly-pharmacy. The
Embedded Behavioral Health providers cited this as a best practice within their clinic.
Finally, Figure 4 shows a number of information pathways with gray dashed lines.
These are pathways that should, but do not, exist in the current architecture. Those
associated with off-post providers have been covered above; however, according to those
interviewed, the Emergency Room remains unlinked from the rest of the system. Although
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the Emergency Department is located in the ACH it does not execute inpatient care, so it is
not linked to Essentris. Likewise, stakeholders interviewed at Site C report that the ER does
not reference AHLTA except for the pharmacy data.
The effects of unlinked information systems are not isolated to ineffective feedback
structures and poly-pharmacy. Case management and knowledge capture is made nearly
impossible by unlinked stakeholders in a system that services so many patients. Until
information systems are integrated or unified, these challenges will remain.
3. Unintended Consequences of an Open and Unquestioned Access. An
architecturally-challenged and under-manned system with marginal information systems
and knowledge management mechanisms struggles to provide continuous and effective
Behavioral Health services when operating with a full load of patients. A third challenge, the
system's open, no-questions-asked, access policy has generated a state in which demand for
the system constantly exceeds its capacity for effectiveness. Open access, which is desirable
and necessary for a force as emotionally taxed as combat soldiers, however, is not the root
cause of excessive demand. Instead, the benefits available for soldiers who would selfishly
leverage the system for secondary gain makes self-referral to Behavioral Health too easy for
unscrupulous individuals who may unduly benefit from the system.
In plain terms, soldiers have learned that
Behavioral Health is a "silver bullet" that they may use "There's nothing really wrong
to avoid anything that they want to avoid. .
Commanders report that it has become the default with me. just want to get out
response for soldiers facing administrative or legal of the Army, and this is an easy
action to self refer to the Behavioral Health clinic, way."
where the soldier cannot be touched until his Soldier to a Psychiatrist at the Site E
treatment is complete. Since the system has complete Inpatient Behavioral Health Ward
open access, Behavioral Health providers,
commanders, and soldiers at Site E stated that any
soldier can walk in to the Behavioral Health clinic or the Emergency Room at any time and
report that they are suicidal/homicidal, and they immediately enter inpatient treatment.
Further, a soldier can spend fifteen minutes on the internet2 and learn exactly what to say
and what to do to start the process for a Medical Board and an Honorable Discharge, or to get
out of a deployment or undesirable duty. With this capability so readily available, it is not
surprising that such a high number of soldiers self report to the system.
The effects of malingering on the Behavioral Health system are staggering. Providers
are forced to spend valuable resources unnecessarily, wait times for those who really need
help are excessive to the point of being prohibitive, and stigma associated with Behavioral
Health is increased because good soldiers who need assistance do not want to be thought of
as a malingerer.
2 Example websites found on Google in ten minutes. Using the in formation found on these
two sites, a soldier can be completely prepared to defraud Behavioral Health providers and
get a PTSD diagnosis.
http://www.sovereignwarriors.com/
http://forums.military.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/8280047191001/m/9860093991001
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It is likely that this problem can be fixed by a three-pronged approach. First, a zero-
tolerance policy for Behavioral Health-related malingering should be adopted. In effect, the
policy should state that Chapter Action will be initiated for any soldier found attempting to
defraud the government using the Behavioral Health system as a means. Second, there must
be an effective conduit for Commanders and providers to corroborate soldier claims and/or
provide back-story on soldiers after their initial intake at the Outpatient Behavioral Health
Clinic. Third, adoption of the Embedded Behavioral Health architecture will place providers
closer to their patients, their Primary Care providers, Commanders, and Chaplains, and
providers will have better situational awareness regarding the soldier in their office.
4. Alignment of Incentives for Medical Units
According to the Army Medicine Strategy Map (March 2011) the mission of MEDCOM is
threefold:
- Promote, Sustain and Enhance Soldier Health
- Train, Develop and Equip a Medical Force that Supports Full
Spectrum Operations
- Deliver Leading Edge Health Services to Our Warriors and Military
Family to Optimize Outcomes
Although the MEDCOM mission indicates emphasis on Soldier and Family Health,
Operational Support, and Optimized Outcomes, there are no metrics to measure success
relative to any of these areas at Site E or at any other
site visited thus far. Organizations measure and . .
promote what is important to them, and what is "If our chnc doesn't generate
measured in the Army's Medical Command is the needed number of RVUs for
throughput and provider productivity. Providers at the month, the hospital
Site E, as well as in all other sites, remark that Business Operations Division
generation of Relative Value Units (RVUs), the hammers our boss."performance measurement unit for provider
productivity, is the impetus for most clinical action. -Medical Clinician at Site E
When asked what metrics are used to track patient
progress or outcomes, no provider has yet been able to cite one. Again, this is not a reflection
of poor providers or clinical staffs, but instead an assessment of the system goals and
incentivized behaviors. When we queried clinicians about their ability to track patient
progress, they noted that they do not see patients often enough to be able to provide the care
at the frequency they would like to, and lacked the outcome measures to demonstrate and
discuss progress with their patients.
If a desired behavior of Army Medicine is to Promote, Sustain, and Enhance Soldier
Health, then a large part of the incentive structure for the medical community should be tied
to individual and unit medical readiness metrics. Conversely, if current performance metrics
are sustained, then the emphasis on throughput and provider productivity should likewise
be expected to be sustained.
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5. Rear Detachment Task Organization and Training
Rear Detachment Commanders and 1SGs at Site E, report that a high percentage of soldiers
are in their units because they have medical or legal complications that prevent them from
executing combat deployments. A large part of the Rear Detachment's mission is to work
with these soldiers to solve their issues so that they may join their units downrange or to
process soldiers who have disqualifying medical or legal conditions out of the Army. The
task organization for the rear detachment mission, however, is not consistent with this
mission. A Rear Detachment Commander at another site summed up this problem perfectly
when he said, "They leave me all the medical and legal
problem children, but they take all the medical and 99.9% of my time is spent
legal experts downrange." This sentiment is chasing down the problem
consistent with the attitudes of the Rear-D Staff at Site children, and / don't have any
E, and all interviewed remarked that they needed time to concentrate on getting
dedicated legal and medical assistance for their units soldiers ready to deploy.
and ideally a medical case manager.
Additionally, training for the Rear Detachment is -Rear Detachment Commander, Site E
identical to the Commander/1SG course offered to
MTOE (Modified Table of Organization and Equipment) command teams, and is a brief
overview of the services available on the installation. Rear Detachment staffs interviewed all
agreed that the focus of Rear D training should be on three areas: Medical Boards, Chapter
Actions, and UCMJ, since these are the areas in which the Rear D Commander focuses the
majority of his time.
6. Disconnected Soldier Readiness Processing
The current model for SRP at Site E is a fixed site at which activated Reservists
administer the process as their primary duty. Soldier Readiness Processing at a fixed site
enables predictability and regularity to the SRP process; however, this model presents two
significant challenges. First, information collected/generated by the process has no formal
means for transmission to the unit; and second, the absence of unit providers from the
process reduces the fidelity in the service that units receive. By maintaining the current
cadre, and adding unit providers in both oversight and participatory roles, both of these
challenges could be overcome.
Because of the system for generation of referrals and consults to Site E health care
services/providers, SRP cadre must informally refer soldiers who need off-site care to the
unit providers, so that the unit providers may make the referral. When a referral/consult is
created, the formal feedback mechanism returns information to the originating provider, so
if SRP providers generate the referral, they get the feedback. If unit providers generate the
referral, then the feedback comes back to the unit, which is desirable. Since the SRP cadre do
not provide treatment, there is no reason for the information from the referral to come to
them. By placing unit providers at the SRP site, the providers may eliminate an additional
step for the soldiers in need of care. An alternative solution is to create routing
processes/systems to allow information from SRP-generated referrals to route to unit
providers; however, this is a resource-intensive solution that is likely impractical.
Next, the SRP cadre use data collected through the Down-Range Assessment Tool
(DRAT), the Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA), and the FORSCOM Risk
Assessment Tool to identify soldiers who require behavioral health services. Again, the unit
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providers are not present in the process, and the SRP cadre are left to depend on instruments
that are regarded as extremely poor by all interviewed (at all sites). No SRP cadre-member
understands the soldiers' history or unit's culture, so the ability of the process to identify
soldiers in need of help is reduced. A soldier may hide his condition on redeployment
through lying on the assessments, or he may likewise overstate his condition for the purpose
of seeking secondary gain. When unit providers who understand the soldiers' experiences
and history are not present at the SRP, no one is capable of augmenting the data-collection
instruments with real-world experience. In plain terms, reliance solely on data generated by
flawed instruments significantly reduces the fidelity of the process.
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